PET images of blood flow changes during anxiety: correction.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to A K MacLeod.
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This experiment examines one component of worry, elevated subjective probabilities of negative events, and attempts to elucidate the cognitive processes on which this is based. The results suggest that the pessimistic subjective probabilities shown by chronic worriers can be understood using general theories of judgment, specifically, by the use of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). However, it is the availability of a particular pattern of cognitions--an increased accessibility of explanations for why a negative event would occur, combined with a reduced accessibility of explanations for why it would not--that is important. The results are integrated within a description of the worry process, and possible clinical applications through the use of reason-generation techniques are discussed.
Despite its status as a general assumption, the idea that mood disturbance is associated with reduced complexity of cognitive representations has received little in the way of empirical support. It is suggested that this may arise because of a failure to make distinctions concerning the severity and type of mood disturbance, as well as not being specific about what the representations actually refer to. Using repertory grid methodology (Bieri et al., 1966) with a group of moderately mood-disturbed 'worriers', results showed that this group are significantly more complex than matched controls, but only for representations concerned with themselves. Moreover, this was related to chronic rather than current mood disturbance. The results are interpreted as indicating that cognitive complexity may follow an inverted-U pattern, where the self-representations of severely mood-disturbed and control subjects, although differing in valence, are similar in their lack of complexity. On the other hand, those who are chronically but moderately disturbed are, as a result of their ongoing tendency towards introspection, more complex in their self-representations. Possible implications for vulnerability to emotional disorder are discussed.
Two self-report scales--the Cognitions Questionnaire (Fennell & Campbell, 1984) and the Attitudes to Self Scale (Carver & Ganellen, 1983)--which attempt to measure overgeneralization in depression are described. In line with previous research, both measures correlated with levels of depression, but the lack of a direct relationship between them implies that the construct of overgeneralization may not be a homogeneous one. Suggestions are made for future research which include elaboration of the construct and the development of new methods for measuring it.
The paper explores a distinction between different kinds of lapse of concentration in depressed patients. The strategy is to begin with the phenomenological distinction between the mind (a) 'wandering' on to something else or (b) going 'blank'. Blanking, but not mind-wandering, is associated with longer planning times on the 'Tower of London' task. In contrast, mind-wandering but not blanking, is associated with poor memory for prose, at least under ordinary processing conditions. Different phenomenal forms of concentration problem thus have different task performance correlates. A tentative formulation is offered in terms of Shallice's model of the regulation of attention. Mind-wandering is seen as a problem of 'contention scheduling', and blanking as the result of generalized inhibition by the Supervisory Attentional System. It is evident that not all performance deficits in depression can be attributed to the cognitive capacity taken up by competing thoughts.
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