An outsider's view of the NHS reforms.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to A Maynard.
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The purpose of the present NHS reforms is to introduce a managed market; developing some of the incentives for greater efficiency that are often found in markets while still being able to regulate proceedings to prevent market failures. If government intervenes too much there will be no incentive to improve efficiency and streamline operations: too little intervention may result in some areas having inadequate health service cover or monopoly powers abusing their position. Effective management of the NHS market requires eight core elements: openness of information, control of labour and capital markets, regulation of mergers and takeovers, arbitrating in disputes, protection of unprofitable functions such as research and development, overseeing national provision of health services, protection of basic principles of the NHS, and handling of closures and redundancy. Management of the market would best be performed by the NHS management executive and health authority purchasers acting within a framework set by politicians.
Everywhere there is a recognition that the delivery of health care is ineffective and inefficient and that these unpleasant outcomes are a product of the perverse incentives inherent in all health care systems. In New Zealand the Government documented the defects of the health care system and has introduced radical competitive market reforms, with a purchaser-provider split, in the belief that these will improve the system's performance. The nature of these reforms, centred on the purchaser-provider divide, is similar to changes introduced in the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Israel and Russia. The reforms which have been introduced in New Zealand are evaluated in terms of the eight major problems its Government sought to eradicate. It is shown that instead of mitigating these problems the reforms may worsen them, with the system becoming fragmented and less equitable. The move away from a single (tax) source of funds (i.e. the single pipe) may make cost control more difficult. The Government is seeking to address the issue of information generation to facilitate market trading but it is not clear how effectiveness and efficiency data will be produced in adequate volume and quality, let alone how it will be used to change producers behaviour. Many of the problems identified by the New Zealand Government are significant and in need of resolution. However whilst the political imperative may require immediate action, the economic case for these reforms is quite poor. Incremental change, with careful evaluation, would 'inform' policy change with knowledge of the attributes of competing management mechanisms and reward systems. Instead there is the too familiar combination of political assertions and an unwillingness to measure the impact of change, behaviours which may create the causes for the advocacy of the next 'redisorganisation' of the health care system.
Since 1991 the reform of the U.K.-NHS has been introduced cumulatively. Public funding of health care has been retained and the goal of the reformers is to improve the efficiency of resource allocation by creating competition on the supply side of the market. The introduction of more autonomous Trust hospitals, general practice fund holders (GPFH) and the purchase-provider divide is described. The policy contradictions in the implementation of the reforms are analysed: the incomplete utilization of population weighted funding, the absence of a strategy in the development of GPFHs which are at once the mavericks and the catalysts of change in the new structures, the poor articulation of pricing and contracting rules, the maintenance of planned labour and capital markets which facilitate cost control but frustrate resource reallocation, and the incomplete articulation of many market rules (e.g. about merger and exit). It seems that the rhetoric of the market has been submerged in legislation and managerial rules which increase the power of central government rather than delegating control to local providers and purchasers. The lessons of the U.K. reforms for future innovators in the design of health care systems are numerous. Would a new Hippocratic Oath requiring the delivery by professionals of knowledge based medicine be as efficient but have lower transactions costs than the creation of an internal market? Who should regulate the health care market and how? How can reform best be sequenced? Is reform of funding (competing purchasers) an essential ingredient in the reform process or will supply side reform alone be adequate?(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
The economic evaluation of any new or existing therapy should include a comprehensive appraisal of costs. When evaluating pharmaceutical interventions, it is inappropriate to identify the purchase price alone. Other relevant costs include the costs of time of doctors, nurses and other personnel in administering and monitoring the effects of the therapy, and the costs of treating any side-effects. This study estimates direct National Health Service (NHS) costs in the U.K. of current medical practice in managing severe cancer pain, using a review of the published literature and constructing a cost analysis for four 'typical' patients. Costs are estimated for patients with severe cancer pain in a hospital and an ambulatory setting, with oral and subcutaneous routes of drug administration. The study includes costs of drugs, supplies, equipment and personnel time. The results demonstrate the importance of personnel time costs, and potential cost savings which could result from the use of transdermally administered opioid analgesics.
To assess the effect of fetal exposure to cocaine on neonatal serum bilirubin values, we compared 17 infants whose cocaine exposure was confirmed by urine toxicology studies, with no evidence of other drug exposure by history or urinalysis, with 31 sequentially born healthy term infants without evidence of maternal drug use. The mean (+/- SD) bilirubin concentration in control infants was 110 +/- 32 mumol/L (6.5 +/- 1.9 mg/dl) at 30.5 +/- 5.4 hours of age, compared with 55 +/- 26 mumol/L (3.2 +/- 1.5 mg/dl) at 30.8 +/- 5.3 hours in cocaine-exposed infants (p < 0.001). We also compared the abilities of cocaine and clofibrate, a known inducer of bilirubin uridine diphosphate-glucuronosyl transferase (BGT), to induce drug and bilirubin metabolizing pathways in young male Sprague-Dawley rats. Animals received drugs or saline solution for 7 days, and livers were assayed for cytochrome P-450, peroxisomal beta-oxidase, delta 5-3-ketosteroid isomerase (KSI), glutathione-S-transferase (GST), and BGT. Cocaine was a weak inducer of GST but a strong inducer of KSI, a member of the GST family of enzymes that is closely associated with bilirubin transport (ligandin) in liver, and a moderately strong inducer of BGT. Neither drug increased cytochrome P-450 levels, and only clofibrate induced peroxisomal beta-oxidase. We conclude that cocaine appears to induce bilirubin metabolizing pathways, resulting in a lower risk of neonatal hyperbilirubinemia.
All policy interventions have costs and benefits and the 'harm' created by the use of alcohol can only be mitigated at a cost. The purpose of economic analysis is to measure these costs and benefits in an explicit way and to use these results to inform policy. Policy makers like to use estimates of the social costs of alcohol use but such data are of little use in identifying which interventions reduce harm at least cost: knowing alcohol use costs in local currencies $6 million in Australia, $5.8 billion in the USA, $5.7 billion in Canada and $2 billion in the UK may fuel political debate but does not identify the intervention where investment produces the greatest increase in benefit at least cost. Integrated policies to raise taxes in relation to price and income changes have significant impacts on alcohol consumption and, if complemented with advertising controls and limits on availability have even larger effects. The quantity and quality of economic evaluations of health care interventions is inadequate. What little evaluation that has been undertaken indicates that low cost minimal interventions may be cost effective for the wider population of problem drinkers. Other more intensive interventions are likely to be cost effective only if well targeted on appropriate client groups. There are many effective ways of reducing alcohol consumption. The industry will lose and oppose change but improvements in health and other aspects of life (eg civil order) will be significant.
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Despite the dominant ideology of the 1980s being libertarian, pragmatism triumphed and, despite several attempts to privatise the UK National Health Service, the Thatcherite reforms maintained public finance and sought to create competition in the supply of health care. Even this partial reform was radical and has led to major changes in structure and process. However, the Government has refused to evaluate both the cost and the outcome of the reforms. Furthermore, with minimal definition of how the 'internal market' was to work, the Government has regulated the competitive processes in an ad hoc manner, often responding to obvious but unforeseen problems (e.g. local monopoly power). Competition is costly to create, requiring large investments in managerial personnel and information technology, and difficult to sustain because of the propensity of capitalists, through self interest, to destroy capitalism. Problems such as quality, equity and the closure of excess capacity were well defined prior to the NHS reforms and have not yet been resolved following the reforms. Whether adversarial rather than collaborative relationships are more efficient in the health care sector is unknown. Indeed there remains little evidence to sustain the claims of political rhetoric that competition 'works' i.e. increases efficiency, enhances equity and contains costs. Despite this reformers seek to create competition and complete mission impossible.
The use of techniques of economic analysis in improving the efficiency of cancer services is both complex and poorly understood. Like many other areas of health care, there are large variations in treatment patterns, a reluctance to invest in prevention, inadequate data about effectiveness, and a reluctance to invest in cost-effectiveness analysis to inform purchasers' choices. Without the deployment of such techniques and the basing of treatment choices on a balancing of costs and effects, resources will continue to be used inefficiently and to the detriment of patients' welfare.
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Research into health and social services in Britain is largely funded by the Department of Health. Regional NHS research and development has recently been reformed and a new report now proposes replacement of the 13 research units funded by the department with three or four large multidisciplinary centres. Evidence to support such a step is lacking, and many criticisms of the existing units arise from poor departmental planning rather than deficiencies of the units themselves. Large units may make research less responsive to the department's needs, and it is essential that the proposed new structure is thoroughly evaluated before it is introduced.
The markets for drugs such as cocaine are characterized by much ignorance about the nature of trading relationships, in particular the volumes and prices exhibited by overlapping national and international networks of buyers and sellers (i.e. markets), and by severe regulation by the State. The regulation of illegal markets is expensive; for example, in 1988 in the UK, over 5000 Customs officers and 1800 CID and uniformed policemen were involved in enforcing the law at a cost of about 140 million pounds. The size of the markets can be only 'guesstimated': in 1989 just over 520 kg of cocaine was seized. If this is assumed to be 10% of the market, the total size of the cocaine market was somewhere in excess of 5000 kg. The 'cost-effectiveness' of both Customs and the police in enforcing the law may have declined in the late 1980s. What economic arguments are there for sustaining illegality and an expensive enforcement effort? Some arguments for State regulation are explored; for example, the drug user harms 'innocent' third parties, the drug user is less productive and reduces national income, the drug user will impose costs on the National Health Service, the drug user's behaviour is offensive, and the drug user should be protected from his own stupidity. Where do these arguments leave the case for maintaining public policy towards illicit drugs? Would it be cost effective to move towards the liberalization of these markets?
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