Biomedical subjects

Adam S Goodie

Publications and source records attributed to Adam S Goodie.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2007

A cognitive neuroscience approach to studying the role of overconfidence in problem gambling.

Research on the neural correlates of decision making in gambling tasks may be informative for understanding problem gambling. The present study explored confidence and overconfidence using magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure brain activity during a judgment task. Nineteen undergraduates who self-identified as frequent gamblers (average age 19.7 years; 5 females, 14 males) participated in this study. Participants first completed the DIGS (Winters, Specker & Stinchfield, 2002), a measure of gambling pathology. They then engaged in a behavioral task of confidence assessment, wherein they answered two-alternative trivia questions and estimated the probability that each answer was correct. In a subsequent MEG task, they viewed the questions and a target answer, and indicated with a button press whether the target matched the correct answer. Confidence was directly related to activity in the right prefrontal cortex. Matching and mismatching targets were associated with activity in the medial occipital cortex and left supramarginal gyrus, respectively. An interaction of pathology and match/mismatch was observed in the right inferior occipital-temporal junction region, showing more activity following a mismatch in non-problem gamblers, but not in problem gamblers. Implications of the results for understanding of top-down modulation and attentional systems are discussed in relation to gambling behavior.

Adult↗

PubMed2007

Frequent card playing and pathological gambling: the utility of the Georgia Gambling Task and Iowa Gambling Task for predicting pathology.

The current investigation examined performance on two laboratory-based gambling tasks, the Georgia Gambling Task (GGT; Goodie, 2003. The effects of control on betting: Paradoxical betting on items of high confidence with low value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 598-610) and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994. Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50, 7-15), as well as self-reported markers of gambling pathology using the Diagnostic Interview for Gambling Severity (DIGS; Winters, Specker, & Stinchfield, 2002. The downside: Problem and pathological gambling (pp. 143-148). Reno, NV: University of Nevada, Reno) among a sample of undergraduate students who are frequent card players. Two hundred twenty-one participants (55 female and 166 male; mean age 19.21 years) who self-classified as playing cards at least once per month completed these measures. Performance on GGT and IGT systematically related to gambling-related pathology in several ways. Overconfidence and bet acceptance on the GGT, and myopic focus on reward on the IGT, predicted gambling related pathology. GGT and IGT performance correlated with each other, but both contributed independently to predicting gambling pathology. Card playing frequency predicted gambling pathology but not GGT or IGT performance. Discussion focuses on the role of biases of judgment and risky decision making in pathological gambling.

Behavior, Addictive↗

PubMed2005

The role of perceived control and overconfidence in pathological gambling.

Two studies sought to determine whether perceived control has different effects on confidence assessment and betting decisions among pathological and problem gamblers than among non-problem gamblers. In Study 1, 200 college students who were frequent gamblers (80 female and 120 male, median age 20) completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and then engaged in a task in which they answered questions, assessed confidence in each answer, and considered bets on their answers that were fair if they were well-calibrated, but unfavorable if they were overconfident. Probable pathological and problem gamblers earned significantly fewer points than non-problem gamblers. This was due to greater overconfidence among pathological and problem gamblers, which led to systematically less favorable bets. In Study 2, using 384 participants (105 female and 279 male, median age 20), control was independently manipulated and bets were constructed to make point value independent of overconfidence. Problem and pathological gamblers showed both greater overconfidence and greater bet acceptance. They were less affected by control in their betting decisions than non-problem gamblers, but more affected in the slope of their betting function. It is concluded that pathological and problem gamblers process information about confidence and control differently from non-problem gamblers.

Adult↗

PubMed2004

Time-pressure effects on performance in a base-rate task.

Researchers assume that time pressure impairs performance in decision tasks by invoking heuristic processes. In the present study, the authors inquired (a) whether it was possible in some cases for time pressure to improve performance or to alter it without impairing it, and (b) whether the heuristic invoked by base-rate neglect under direct experience can be identified. They used a probability-learning design in 2 experiments, and they measured the choice proportions after each of 2 possible cues in each experiment. In 1 comparison, time pressure increased predictions of the more likely outcome, which improved performance. In 2 comparisons, time pressure changed the choice proportions without affecting performance. In a 4th comparison, time pressure hindered performance. The choice proportions were consistent with heuristic processing that is based on cue matching rather than on cue accuracy, base rates, or posterior probabilities.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed2003

The effects of control on betting: paradoxical betting on items of high confidence with low value.

Traditional decision theories emphasize the probabilities and values of possible outcomes, but decisions may also be influenced by perceived control, with control defined as probability alterability. In 3 experiments, participants were offered bets on their own answers to general knowledge questions, bets that are characterized by control. The bets were fair if participants' reported confidence was well calibrated, positively valued if participants were underconfident, but unfavorable when participants were overconfident. Bet acceptance was a steep, linear, increasing function of confidence that is termed paradoxical betting. This pattern was generally contrary to the value of bets (considered either as average outcome or as subjective utility) and was steeper in slope than matched bets on apparently random events in Experiment 3. The author argues that control is a fundamental determinant of decision making that is readily incorporated in some existing models of decision weighting.

Confidence Intervals↗

PubMed2003

Controlling for causally relevant third variables.

In 3 experiments, the authors tested the conditions under which 3rd variables are controlled for in making causal judgments. The authors hypothesized that 3rd variables are controlled for when the 3rd variables are themselves perceived as causal. In Experiment 1, the participants predicted test performance after seeing information about wearing a lucky garment, taking a test-preparation course, and staying up late. The course (perceived as more causally relevant) was controlled for more than was the garment (perceived as less causally relevant) in assessing the effectiveness of staying up late. In Experiments 2 and 3, to obviate the many alternative accounts that arise from the realistic cover story of Experiment 1, participants predicted flowers' blooming after the presentation or nonpresentation of liquids. When one liquid was trained as causal, it was controlled for more in judging another liquid than when it was trained as neutral. Overall, stimuli perceived as causal were controlled for more when judging other stimuli. The authors concluded that the effect of perceived causal relevance on causal conditionalizing is real and normatively reasonable.

Adolescent↗