Biomedical subjects

Andreas Wohlschläger

Publications and source records attributed to Andreas Wohlschläger.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

Intentions and expectations in temporal binding.

Recently, it has been shown that the perceived times of voluntary movements and their effects are perceived as shifted towards each other. This temporal binding phenomenon was explained by an integrated representation of movement and effect, facilitating operant learning and the experience of intentionality. Here, we investigated whether temporal binding depends on explicit intentional attributions. In Experiment 1, participants intended to either produce or avoid producing an effect (a tone) by the timing of their movements, with the ratio of success being fixed at 2:1. In Experiments 2 and 3, the influence of the action-effect contingency ratio on temporal binding was controlled for by removing the intentional attribution of the effect. The results indicate that temporal binding is a general associative mechanism that facilitates the learning of movement-effect contingencies. Beyond that, temporal binding is sensitive to explicit intentional attributions, which selectively enhance the link between an intentional movement and the effect a moving agent intends to produce.

Analysis of Variance↗

PubMed2003

Action generation and action perception in imitation: an instance of the ideomotor principle.

We review a series of behavioural experiments on imitation in children and adults that test the predictions of a new theory of imitation. Most of the recent theories of imitation assume a direct visual-to-motor mapping between perceived and imitated movements. Based on our findings of systematic errors in imitation, the new theory of goal-directed imitation (GOADI) instead assumes that imitation is guided by cognitively specified goals. According to GOADI, the imitator does not imitate the observed movement as a whole, but rather decomposes it into its separate aspects. These aspects are hierarchically ordered, and the highest aspect becomes the imitator's main goal. Other aspects become sub-goals. In accordance with the ideomotor principle, the main goal activates the motor programme that is most strongly associated with the achievement of that goal. When executed, this motor programme sometimes matches, and sometimes does not, the model's movement. However, the main goal extracted from the model movement is almost always imitated correctly.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Impaired mirror-image imitation in Asperger and high-functioning autistic subjects.

Imitation is crucial for proper development of social and communicative skills. Here, we argue that, based on an error analysis of a behavioral imitation task, adult Asperger and high-functioning autistic subjects suffer from an intriguing deficit of imitation: they lack the natural preference for imitation in a mirror-image fashion. The imitation task consisted of a simple movement sequence of putting a pen with the left or right hand into a green or a blue cup using one of two possible grips. The subjects were asked to imitate the experimenter's hand movements either using the crossed hand (e.g., the subject's right hand corresponding to the experimenter's right hand) for imitation or to imitate as if looking in a mirror (e.g., the subject's left hand corresponding to the experimenter's right hand). When people normally view other persons face-to-face, they prefer to imitate as in a mirror, and observation of mirror-image-like movements speeds up performance in nonimitative tasks. However, our autistic subjects, defective in social cognition, did not profit from mirror-image movements of others. These results provide a new insight into the difficulties that autistic subjects face in viewing and understanding actions of others.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self--and other selves.

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

The perceived onset time of self- and other-generated actions.

Awareness of actions is partly based on the intentions accompanying them. Thus, the awareness of self- and other-generated actions should differ to the extent that access to own and other's intentions differs. Recent studies have found a brain circuit (the mirror-neuron system) that represents self- and other-generated actions in an integrated fashion. This system does not respond to actions made by nonagents, such as machines. We measured the estimated onset time of actions that subjects either executed themselves or observed being executed by someone else or by a machine. In three experiments, the estimates of the machine actions always differed from those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were indistinguishable. Our results are consistent with the view that intentions are attributed to others but not to machines. They also raise the interesting possibility that people attribute intentions to themselves in the same way as they do to others.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

Unihemispheric memory in pigeons-knowledge, the left hemisphere is reluctant to share.

In the present study, pigeons were trained under binocular conditions in a conditional visual discrimination in which they were faced with two identical patterns arranged one above the other. In half of these stimulus pairs the animals had to peck the upper pattern, in the other half the lower one. Although only six pairs of stimuli were used, only four out of eight birds reached learning criterion. These animals needed up to 6 months of training with 3050 to 6650 trails. Then, the experiment proceeded under identical conditions using eye caps restricting vision alternatively to the left or the right eye. These monocular tests revealed that three out of four birds virtually had no knowledge of the task contingencies using their left eye (right hemisphere). Again, several thousand trials were needed to train the birds to criterion with their left eye, while they were simultaneously discriminating at a very high level with their right. These results show that memories on task contingencies are stored unihemispherically in the visually dominant left side despite extensive training with both eyes open. Additionally, it can be concluded that the subsequent read-out by the 'naive' hemisphere can be largely restricted, resulting in a 'natural split-brain' like situation in birds. It is speculated that the absence of a corpus callosum in birds restricts interhemispheric transfer of information.

Animals↗

PubMed2002

Is human imitation based on a mirror-neurone system? Some behavioural evidence.

Recently, a population of neurones was discovered in the monkey's ( Macaca nemestrina) ventrolateral part of the pre-motor cortex (area F5). It is specialised for recognising object-oriented actions, regardless of whether these actions are performed or observed by the monkey. The latter observation led to the term mirror-neurones, and because these cells respond to both observed and executed actions, it seems likely that neurones of that type became co-opted during hominid evolution to serve the imitative behaviours that are so prevalent in our species. There is recent physiological evidence that Broca's area, the human ( Homo sapiens) homologue of monkey's area F5, is involved in the imitation of finger movements. However, concluding that human imitation is based on a mirror-neurone system is premature, because: (1) imitation in monkeys does not reach the same level as in humans or apes and (2) monkeys' mirror-neurones are specialised for object-oriented actions. This specialisation has not yet been demonstrated in adult humans. We investigated the role of objects in human imitation behaviour in a response time experiment. Subjects had to imitate downward movements of an index finger. In one condition, the observed finger touched one of two dots either ipsi- or contralaterally. In the other condition, the very same movements had to be imitated. However, there were no dots on the table. The presence of dots had a decisive influence on error patterns and on response times, but did not influence the movement proper. Dots specifically reduced the onset latency of ipsilateral finger movements and they specifically increased the use of the wrong finger, when contralateral movements were required. In general, results showed that objects also drive human imitation behaviour. Hence, it is very likely that imitation emerged from the mirror-neurone system of the common ancestor of monkeys and humans.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

Modulation of motor and premotor activity during imitation of target-directed actions.

Behavioral studies reveal that imitation performance and the motor system are strongly influenced by the goal of the action to be performed. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess the effect of explicit action goals on neural activity during imitation. Subjects imitated index finger movements in the absence and presence of visible goals (red dots that were reached for by the finger movement). Finger movements were either ipsilateral or contralateral. The pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus showed increased blood oxygen level-dependent fMRI signal bilaterally for imitation of goal-oriented actions, compared with imitation of actions with no explicit goal. In addition, bilateral dorsal premotor areas demonstrated greater activity for goal-oriented actions, for contralateral movements and an interaction effect such that goal-oriented contralateral movements yielded the greatest activity. These results support the hypothesis that areas relevant to motor preparation and motor execution are tuned to coding goal-oriented actions and are in keeping with single-cell recordings revealing that neurons in area F5 of the monkey brain represent goal-directed aspects of actions.

Adult↗