PubMed Health⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

Angela Bate

Publications and source records attributed to Angela Bate.

6 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

Preferences for access to the GP: a discrete choice experiment.

BACKGROUND: Access to primary care services is one of the key components of the NHS Plan which states that patients should be able to see a health professional within 24 hours and a GP within 48 hours. However, it is not clear how patients value speed of access in comparison with other aspects of primary care. AIM: To investigate patient preferences when making an routine appointment for a GP, and to describe the trade-offs and relationships between speed of access, choice of time and choice of doctor in different patient groups. DESIGN OF STUDY: Discrete choice experiment. SETTING: Adults consulting a GP in six general practices in Sunderland. METHOD: Choice sets based on three attributes (time to appointment, choice of time, choice of doctor) were presented in a self-completion questionnaire. RESULTS: We obtained 6985 observations from 1153 patients. We found that the waiting time to make an appointment was only important if the appointment is for a child or when attending for a new health problem. Other responders would trade-off a shorter waiting time and be willing to wait in order to either see their own choice of doctor or attend an appointment at their own choice of time. For responders who work, choice of time is six times more important than a shorter waiting time and they are willing to wait up to 1 day extra for this. Those with a long-standing illness value seeing their own GP more than seven times as much as having a shorter waiting time for an appointment and will wait an extra 1 day for an appointment with the GP of their choice, women will wait an extra 2 days, and older patients an extra 2.5 days. CONCLUSION: Speed of access is of limited importance to patients accessing their GP, and for many is outweighed by choice of GP or convenience of appointment.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2005

Decentralization strategies and provider incentives in healthcare: evidence from the english national health service.

INTRODUCTION: This article examines the incentive effects of delegating operational and financial decision making from central government to local healthcare providers. It addresses the economic consequences of a contemporary policy initiative in the English National Health Service (NHS)-earned autonomy. This policy entails awarding operational autonomy to 'front-line' organisations that are assessed to be meeting national performance targets. In doing so, it introduces new types of incentives into the healthcare system, changes the nature of established agency relationships and represents a novel approach to performance management. METHODS: Theoretical elements of a principal-agent model are used to examine the impact of decentralization in the context of the results of an empirical study that elicited the perceptions of senior hospital managers regarding the incentive effects of earned autonomy. A multi-method approach was adopted. In order to capture the breadth of policy impact, we conducted a national postal questionnaire survey of all Chief Executives in acute-care hospital Trusts in England (n = 173). To provide added depth and richness to our understanding of the impact and incentive effects of earned autonomy at an organisational level, we interviewed senior managers in a purposeful sample of eight acute-care hospital Trusts. RESULTS: This theoretical framework and our empirical work suggest that some aspects of the earned autonomy as currently implemented in the NHS serve to weaken the potential incentive effect of decentralization. In particular, the nature of the freedoms is such that many senior managers do not view autonomy as a particularly valuable prize. This suggests that incentives associated with the policy will be insufficiently powerful to motivate providers to deliver better performance. We also found that principal commitment may be a problem in the NHS. Some hospital managers reported that they already enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, regardless of their current performance ratings. We also found evidence that the objectives of providers may differ from those of both the central government and local purchasers. There is, therefore, a risk that granting greater autonomy will allow providers to pursue their own objectives which, whilst not self-serving, may still jeopardize the achievement of strategic goals. CONCLUSION: It is apparent that the design and implementation features of decentralizing policies such as earned autonomy require careful attention if an optimal balance is to be struck between central oversight and local autonomy in the delivery of healthcare.

Hospitals, Public↗