Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Antonio Acín.
We analyze the asymptotic security of the family of Gaussian modulated quantum key distribution protocols for continuous-variables systems. We prove that the Gaussian unitary attack is optimal for all the considered bounds on the key rate when the first and second momenta of the canonical variables involved are known by the honest parties.
The first step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol consists of sequences of measurements that produce correlated classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition.
The impossibility of perfect cloning and state estimation are two fundamental results in quantum mechanics. It has been conjectured that quantum cloning becomes equivalent to state estimation in the asymptotic regime where the number of clones tends to infinity. We prove this conjecture using two known results of quantum information theory: the monogamy of quantum correlations and the properties of entanglement breaking channels.
Any Bell test consists of a sequence of measurements on a quantum state in spacelike separated regions. Thus, a state is better than others for a Bell test when, for the optimal measurements and the same number of trials, the probability of existence of a local model for the observed outcomes is smaller. The maximization over states and measurements defines the optimal nonlocality proof. Numerical results show that the required optimal state does not have to be maximally entangled.
Security bounds for key distribution protocols using coherent and squeezed states and homodyne measurements are presented. These bounds refer to (i) general attacks and (ii) collective attacks where Eve applies the optimal individual interaction to the sent states, but delays her measurement until the end of the reconciliation process. For the case of a lossy line and coherent states, it is first proven that a secure key distribution is possible up to 1.9 dB of losses. For the second scenario, the security bounds are the same as for the completely incoherent attack.
It is shown that (i) all entangled states can be mapped by single-copy measurements into probability distributions containing secret correlations, and (ii) if a probability distribution obtained from a quantum state contains secret correlations, then this state has to be entangled. These results prove the existence of a two-way connection between secret and quantum correlations in the process of preparation. They also imply that either it is possible to map any bound entangled state into a distillable probability distribution or bipartite bound information exists.
We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.
We show that weak measurements with postselection, proposed in the context of the quantum theory of measurement, naturally appear in the everyday physics of fiber optics telecom networks through polarization-mode dispersion (PMD) and polarization-dependent losses (PDL). Specifically, the PMD leads to a time-resolved discrimination of polarization; the postselection is done in the most natural way: one postselects those photons that have not been lost because of the PDL. The quantum formalism is shown to simplify the calculation of optical networks in the telecom limit of weak PMD.
We study the problem of secret key distillation from bipartite states in the scenario where Alice and Bob can perform measurements only at the single-copy level and classically process the obtained outcomes. Even with these limitations, secret bits can be asymptotically distilled by the honest parties from any two-qubit entangled state, under any individual attack. Our results point out a complete equivalence between two-qubit entanglement and secure key distribution: a key can be established through a one-qubit channel if and only if it allows one to distribute entanglement. These results can be generalized to a higher dimension for all those states that are one-copy distillable.