Biomedical subjects

B W Pelham

Publications and source records attributed to B W Pelham.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed1993

The idiographic nature of human personality: examples of the idiographic self-concept.

Arguments are made for the practical and theoretical merits of idiographic approaches to personality. In addition, it is argued that idiographic approaches to personality afford levels of prediction that cannot be provided by nomothetic analyses, and 2 studies of the role of self-investment in interpersonal perception are presented in support of this position. Finally, in contrast to previous arguments for idiographic approaches, it is suggested that idiographic approaches to personality can provide special insight into universal patterns of human personality.

Adult↗

PubMed1992

Allure of negative feedback: self-verification strivings among depressed persons.

We propose that people with negative self-views are rejected because they gravitate to partners who view them unfavorably. In relation to nondepressed college students (n = 28), depressives (n = 13) preferred interaction partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 1). Similarly, in relation to nondepressives (n = 106), depressives (n = 10) preferred friends or dating partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 2). Dysphorics (n = 6) were more inclined to seek unfavorable feedback from their roommates than were nondepressives (n = 16); feedback-seeking activities of dysphorics were also associated with later rejection (Study 3). Finally, people with negative self-views (n = 37) preferentially solicited unfavorable feedback, although receiving such feedback made them unhappy, in comparison with people with positive self-views (n = 42; Study 4). It seems a desire for self-verification compels people with negative self-views to seek unfavorable appraisals.

Adult↗

PubMed1991

On confidence and consequence: the certainty and importance of self-knowledge.

Belief certainty and belief importance represent 2 relatively independent forms of investment in the self-concept. Three studies suggested that whereas certainty is associated with epistemic (i.e., rational or informational) factors, importance is more closely associated with emotive (i.e., emotional and motivational) factors. A 4th study explored the implications of certainty and importance for the temporal stability of people's self-views and revealed that whereas belief certainty was associated with the stability of both positive and negative beliefs, belief importance was associated with the stability of positive beliefs only. The implications of belief investment for the verification-enhancement debate and for the structure and measurement of the self-concept are discussed.

Emotions↗

PubMed1991

On the benefits of misery: self-serving biases in the depressive self-concept.

Two survey studies suggested that depressed people react to their acute distress by engaging in self-serving biases and striving to develop positive self-views. Study 1 revealed that whereas most of the specific self-views of depressed persons were relatively negative, their best (most favorable) self-views were just as favorable as the best self-views of nondepressed persons. Moreover, depressed participants reported that they were highly confident of their best self-views and considered these beliefs extremely important. Analyses equating depressed and nondepressed persons for global self-esteem provided even stronger evidence of self-serving biases among the depressed. Specifically, such analyses revealed that depressed persons' best self-views were even more positive than the best self-views of the nondepressed. A 2nd study replicated these effects and provided tentative evidence that downward comparison processes play a role in the development of depressed persons' positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed1989

From self-conceptions to self-worth: on the sources and structure of global self-esteem.

Three factors were identified that uniquely contribute to people's global self-esteem: (a) people's tendencies to experience positive and negative affective states, (b) people's specific self-views (i.e., their conceptions of their strengths and weaknesses), and (c) the way people frame their self-views. Framing factors included the relative certainty and importance of people's positive versus negative self-views and the discrepancy between people's actual and ideal self-views. The contribution of importance to people's self-esteem, however, was qualified in 2 ways. First, importance contributed only to the self-esteem of those who perceived that they had relatively few talents. Second, individuals who saw their positive self-views as important were especially likely to be high in self-esteem when they were also highly certain of these positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.

Affect↗

PubMed1989

Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? Reconciling self-enhancement and self-verification.

Three studies asked why people sometimes seek positive feedback (self-enhance) and sometimes seek subjectively accurate feedback (self-verify). Consistent with self-enhancement theory, people with low self-esteem as well as those with high self-esteem indicated that they preferred feedback pertaining to their positive rather than negative self-views. Consistent with self-verification theory, the very people who sought favorable feedback pertaining to their positive self-conceptions sought unfavorable feedback pertaining to their negative self-views, regardless of their level of global self-esteem. Apparently, although all people prefer to seek feedback regarding their positive self-views, when they seek feedback regarding their negative self-views, they seek unfavorable feedback. Whether people self-enhance or self-verify thus seems to be determined by the positivity of the relevant self-conceptions rather than their level of self-esteem or the type of person they are.

Feedback↗

PubMed1988

Change through paradox: using self-verification to alter beliefs.

Past research has shown that conventional strategies of persuasion tend to be ineffective against people who are highly certain of their beliefs. To change the beliefs of such individuals, we devised a paradoxical strategy that consisted of posing superattitudinal leading questions (questions that encouraged respondents to make statements that were consistent with, but more extreme than, their own viewpoints). We expected that individuals who were high in belief certainty would resist such questions and, therefore, change their beliefs in the opposite direction. To test this reasoning, we used either a conventional or a paradoxical strategy to change people's beliefs about women's roles. As suggested by earlier research, the conventional strategy was effective in changing the beliefs of targets who were low in belief certainty only. In contrast, the paradoxical strategy was effective in changing the beliefs of targets who were high in belief certainty only. A follow-up investigation replicated this effect and indicated that paradoxical injunctions change people's positions on belief dimensions rather than their perception of the dimension itself. The implications of these findings for an understanding of the interpersonal mechanisms that generate stability and change in people's beliefs are discussed.

Adult↗

PubMed1987

Causal chunking: memory and inference in ongoing interaction.

We propose that people simplify their perceptions of their interactions by organizing them into discrete casual chunks. Once formed, these chunks presumably influence the extent to which people are aware of their influence on others, as well as their impressions of others. We anticipated that people would form self-causal chunks (e.g., my action causes my partner's action) when they possessed an offensive set and other-causal chunks when they possessed a defensive set. We also expected that a self-causal chunking strategy would make salient people's influence on their partners and thereby discourage them from concluding that their partner's behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. In contrast, we anticipated that an other-causal chunking strategy would obscure people's influence on their partners, thereby encouraging them to infer that their partners' behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. We tested these hypotheses by inducing participants to develop either a defensive or an offensive set prior to interacting with another person in a simulated arms race. After the interactions, we assessed the manner in which participants chunked their interactions, as well as their impressions of partners. The results supported our predictions. The implications of these findings for understanding conflict and misunderstanding in interpersonal relations are discussed.

Adult↗