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Biomedical subjects

Barbara A Mellers

Publications and source records attributed to Barbara A Mellers.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Emotions and cooperation in economic games.

In this paper, we examine decisions to cooperate in economic games. We investigate which payoffs give players the greatest pleasure and whether the pleasure they feel about payoffs predicts their decisions to cooperate. To do this, we modify the ultimatum and dictator games by asking players to consider a fixed set of offers and report their preferences over all offers. Players also report the pleasure they imagine feeling from each possible payoff. Results show that players differ in the extent to which they derive pleasure from fairness or greediness. They also differ in the extent to which their choices depend on what we call "strategic" and "non-strategic" pleasure. Strategic pleasure is the expected pleasure of offers, whereas non-strategic pleasure is the pleasure of accepted payoffs. Players whose pleasure primarily depends on larger payoffs tend to make fair offers in the ultimatum game and selfish offers in the dictator game. They maximize strategic pleasure in the ultimatum game and non-strategic pleasure in the dictator game. Players who derive greater pleasure from fairness tend to act fairly in both games. These players maximize non-strategic pleasure. Brain imaging studies should address the question of whether the observed differences in pleasure and preference are systematically linked to differences in neurological activation.

Adult↗

The agony of victory and thrill of defeat: Mixed emotional reactions to disappointing wins and relieving losses.

Because of counterfactual comparisons, good outcomes that could have been better (i.e., disappointing wins) and bad outcomes that could have been worse (i.e., relieving losses) elicit relatively middling ratings on bipolar emotion scales. We conducted two experiments with gambles to examine whether such outcomes elicit neutral emotions, sequentially mixed emotions of positive and negative affect, or simultaneously mixed emotions. In Experiment 1, static unipolar measures of positive and negative affect revealed that disappointing wins and relieving losses elicit mixed emotions, rather than relatively neutral emotions. In Experiment 2, participants provided continuous unipolar measures of positive and negative affect by pressing one button whenever they felt good and another button whenever they felt bad. Results revealed that disappointing wins and relieving losses elicit positive and negative affect simultaneously, rather than in alternation.

Affect↗

Do juries meet our expectations?

Surveys of public opinion indicate that people have high expectations for juries. When it comes to serious crimes, most people want errors of convicting the innocent (false positives) or acquitting the guilty (false negatives) to fall well below 10%. Using expected utility theory, Bayes' Theorem, signal detection theory, and empirical evidence from detection studies of medical decision making, eyewitness testimony, and weather forecasting, we argue that the frequency of mistakes probably far exceeds these "tolerable" levels. We are not arguing against the use of juries. Rather, we point out that a closer look at jury decisions reveals a serious gap between what we expect from juries and what probably occurs. When deciding issues of guilt and/or punishing convicted criminals, we as a society should recognize and acknowledge the abundance of error.

Bayes Theorem↗