Hospital preparedness for pandemic influenza.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to D A Henderson.
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The prospect of biological attacks is a growing strategic threat. Covert aerosol attacks inside a building are of particular concern. In the summer of 2005, the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center convened a Working Group to determine what steps could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure of building occupants after an aerosol release of a biological weapon. The Working Group was composed of subject matter experts in air filtration, building ventilation and pressurization, air conditioning and air distribution, biosecurity, building design and operation, building decontamination and restoration, economics, medicine, public health, and public policy. The group focused on functions of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in commercial or public buildings that could reduce the risk of exposure to deleterious aerosols following biological attacks. The Working Group's recommendations for building owners are based on the use of currently available, off-the-shelf technologies. These recommendations are modest in expense and could be implemented immediately. It is also the Working Group's judgment that the commitment and stewardship of a lead government agency is essential to secure the necessary financial and human resources and to plan and build a comprehensive, effective program to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings.
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Because smallpox could be a factor in bioterrorism, the United States has provided guidelines for smallpox vaccination of certain members of the population, including health care workers and first responders, as well as military personnel. A plan for more extensive vaccination, if it is needed in the event of a bioterrorist attack, is being developed under the aegis of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The characteristics of smallpox vaccine, the technique of administration, and the expected reactions to primary vaccination and revaccination are outlined in this article.
Smallpox vaccination of health care workers, military personnel, and some first responders has begun in the United States in 2002-2003 as one aspect of biopreparedness. Full understanding of the spectrum of adverse events and of their cause, frequency, identification, prevention, and treatment is imperative. This article describes known and suspected adverse events occurring after smallpox vaccination.
They had said that it couldn't be done-the worldwide eradication of smallpox. To hear D.A. Henderson tell it, the job of leading the World Health Organization's initiative to conquer the disease in the 1960s and 1970s rather fell into his lap. In fact, he describes each of the posts that he has held with great modesty, beginning with his military service at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention all the way through his assignments as Dean of Public Health at Johns Hopkins, Associate Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President, and more recently as Director of the Office of Public Health Preparedness under Secretary Thompson at the Department of Health and Human Services. Confronted with enormous challenges in terms of public health initiatives, Henderson describes each assignment as a matter of communicating with the people he works with and the people that he serves, and drawing on their insights to devise strategies for accomplishing the task at hand. With bioterrorism posing one of the major public health concerns to face the United States and the world, it's gratifying to know that someone with Henderson's track record and wide-ranging expertise is paying attention and making sure that medical and government officials are preparing to respond to the threat. Again and again, Henderson appears to have the knack for showing up in the right place at the right time with just the right idea.
OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are used as biological weapons against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense included 26 representatives from academic medical centers, public health, military services, governmental agencies, and other emergency management institutions. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE was searched from January 1966 to January 2002. Retrieved references, relevant material published prior to 1966, and additional sources identified by participants were reviewed. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the evidence-gathering process were reviewed by the working group. Each draft incorporated comments and judgments of the members. All members approved the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: Weapons disseminating a number of HFVs could cause an outbreak of an undifferentiated febrile illness 2 to 21 days later, associated with clinical manifestations that could include rash, hemorrhagic diathesis, and shock. The mode of transmission and clinical course would vary depending on the specific pathogen. Diagnosis may be delayed given clinicians' unfamiliarity with these diseases, heterogeneous clinical presentation within an infected cohort, and lack of widely available diagnostic tests. Initiation of ribavirin therapy in the early phases of illness may be useful in treatment of some of these viruses, although extensive experience is lacking. There are no licensed vaccines to treat the diseases caused by HFVs.
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After eradication, there is a small but finite risk that smallpox and/or poliomyelitis viruses could accidentally escape from a laboratory or be released intentionally. The reintroduction of either virus into a highly susceptible population could develop into a serious catastrophe. To counter such an occurrence will require the use of vaccine, perhaps in substantial quantities. In the United States, new stocks of smallpox vaccine are being procured and arrangements are being made for a standby production facility. Similar provisions need to be considered for polio. To counter an epidemic of polio will require the use of the oral vaccine, which is presently the World Health Organization-recommended vaccine of choice for countries throughout the developing world. In these countries, its continued use is advised because of its ability to induce intestinal immunity, its ability to spread to other susceptible household members and to protect them, its ease of administration, and its low cost.
To destroy all remaining stocks of variola virus on or before 31 December 2002 seems an even more compelling goal today than it did in 1999, when the 52d World Health Assembly authorized temporary retention of remaining stocks to facilitate the possible development of (1) a more attenuated, less reactogenic smallpox vaccine and (2) an antiviral drug that could be used in treatment of patients with smallpox. We believe the deadline established in 1999 should be adhered to, given the potential outcomes of present research. Although verification that every country will have destroyed its stock of virus is impossible, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of a smallpox virus release would be diminished were the World Health Assembly to call on each country to destroy its stocks of smallpox virus and to state that any person, laboratory, or country found to have virus after date x would be guilty of a crime against humanity.
OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period.
OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine. EVIDENCE: The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing.
An outbreak of anthrax occurred in the city of Sverdlovsk in Russia in the spring of 1979. The outbreak was due to the inhalation of spores that were accidentally released from a military microbiology facility. In response to the outbreak a public health intervention was mounted that included distribution of antibiotics and vaccine. The objective of this paper is to develop and apply statistical methodology to analyse the Sverdlovsk outbreak, and in particular to estimate the incubation period of inhalational anthrax and the number of deaths that may have been prevented by the public health intervention. The data available for analysis from this common source epidemic are the incubation periods of reported deaths. The statistical problem is that incubation periods are truncated because some individuals may have had their deaths prevented by the public health interventions and thus are not included in the data. However, it is not known how many persons received the intervention or how efficacious was the intervention. A likelihood function is formulated that accounts for the effects of truncation. The likelihood is decomposed into a binomial likelihood with unknown sample size and a conditional likelihood for the incubation periods. The methods are extended to allow for a phase-in of the intervention over time. Assuming a lognormal model for the incubation period distribution, the median and mean incubation periods were estimated to be 11.0 and 14.2 days respectively. These estimates are longer than have been previously reported in the literature. The death toll from the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak could have been about 14% larger had there not been a public health intervention; however, the confidence intervals are wide (95% CI 0-61%). The sensitivity of the results to model assumptions and the parametric model for the incubation period distribution are investigated. The results are useful for determining how long antibiotic therapy should be continued in suspected anthrax cases and also for estimating the ultimate number of deaths in a new outbreak in the absence of any public health interventions.
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