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D Beyleveld

Publications and source records attributed to D Beyleveld.

7 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2000

Is embryo research and preimplantation genetic diagnosis ethical?

The legal position in the UK on embryo research and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is outlined and contrasted with the position in other EU countries. The "gradualist" position of the UK on the moral status of the embryo is defended on the basis of an argument that precaution must be applied in proportion to the degree to which the embryo has developed to display components of agency, on the assumption that mortality is categorically binding and requires agents to be granted rights and that it cannot be known with certainty that the embryo is not an agent. The extent to which this argument, when combined with vicarious protections that the embryo should receive in order to protect the rights of other agents, limits embryo research and PGD, is discussed. It is concluded that the complexities that attend deliberation about the moral problems attending embryo research and PGD are such that the proper response to these problems is via the procedures of political democracy to achieve accountable answers rather than "correct" answers. This allows for a variety of judgements.

Attitude to Health↗
PubMed2000

My body, my body parts, my property?

This paper challenges the view, commonly held in biolaw and bioethics, that there can be no proprietary rights in our own bodies or body parts. Whether the starting point is the post-intervention informed consent regime of Article 22 of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine or the traditional (exclusionary) understanding of private property it is argued that property in our own bodies or body parts is presupposed. Although these arguments do not demonstrate that there is property of this kind (for that, a full-scale justification of the institution of private property would be required), they suggest nevertheless that the commonly held view has an immanent property logic that has not yet been drawn out or appreciated.

Bioethics↗
PubMed2000

Betrayal of confidence in the Court of Appeal.

In overturning Latham J's judgment in R v Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd. that anonymisation does not obviate breaching a personal confidence, the Court of Appeal holds that where the duty of confidence arises in equity it does not prohibit the confidant using the confided information without the consent of the confider if this does not treat the confider unfairly (relative to the Court's view of the confider's legitimate interests). We argue that this principle--by bringing fairness to bear on the scope of the duty of confidence rather than on whether a breach of it may be lawful--has no authority in usable precedents; that the Court's interpretation of fairness in applying this principle is, in any event, incompatible with the Data Protection Act 1998 (in part because the Court has too narrow a conception of privacy); that the Court errs in holding that neither anonymisation of personal data nor use of anonymous data falls under the Data Protection Act; and that the Court's insensitivity to the vulnerability that leads patients to disclose information about themselves to health professionals for their treatment, leads it to misidentify the basis of the duty of confidence in such disclosures. The Court of Appeal's reasoning does not clarify the duty of confidence, but virtually abolishes it in the face of competing commercial and research interests.

Confidentiality↗
PubMed1999

Case commentary: anonymisation is not exoneration.

This case commentary analyses a ruling that any use of information given in confidence for unconsented purposes is a breach of confidence capable of supporting a legal action (even if the information has previously been anonymised and aggregated). The ruling is being appealed. It is argued that, while it is reasonable to delineate a narrower duty of confidentiality (not to disclose personal information, against breach of which anonymisation protects), this must be within a broad duty of confidence (not to use private information, which using anonymous information can still breach). Thus, the ruling is fundamentally correct in holding that anonymisation does not permit information obtained in confidence to be used for unconsented purposes. This, however, implies that information obtained for a patient's treatment may not be used lawfully for medical research or NHS management purposes without consent, even if it is anonymised. Such a consequence is unacceptable as a matter of public policy. However, it is equally unacceptable to seek an exemption through the idea that patients give "implied consent" for medical research and NHS management purposes. It is also unacceptable to maintain that the public interest in medical research (regardless of its aims) justifies unconsented use of information obtained in confidence, even if the information is anonymised. The way in which Section 33 of the Data Protection Act 1998 creates an exemption to its Second Data Protection Principle provides a ready-made model for a public interest based exemption for medical research and statistical NHS purposes.

Biomedical Research↗
PubMed1995

Heart valve ownership: legal, ethical and policy issues.

It is in the interest of parties to be able to test a defective explanted heart valve. This article identifies some of the relevant interests of patients (or their relatives), the manufacturers and society at large, and considers some of the legal issues involved in determining the ownership of valves in English law that arise from the varying nature of heart valves and the setting in which they are purchased and delivered. Ownership of explanted valves may vary according to whether the patient obtains the valve by private purchase, through the National Health Service, or through private health care insurance. It seems that, in the most common scenario (delivery via the National Health Service), the patient owns the valve (once implanted) by way of a gift, but that ownership revests to the health authority once the valve is explanted. The determination of ownership is, however, very complex. It is argued, however, that ownership does not automatically entail the right to test. So, even if it were determined that the patient (or the patient's estate) owned the valve, it would not follow that the patient had the right to control the testing of the valve or otherwise dispose of it. Close attention to the network of interests (both moral and socio-economic) in having explanted valves tested competently, suggests that it should be public policy to place custody of explanted valves (for the purposes of having them tested) in the hands of the Medical Devices Agency. This authority should be incorporated into regulation applying the European Community Medical Devices Directive.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Autopsy↗