PubMed Health⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

D Reisberg

Publications and source records attributed to D Reisberg.

15 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1995

The role of subvocalization in auditory imagery.

Five experiments explored the utility of subvocal rehearsal, and of an inner-ear/inner-voice partnership, in tasks of auditory imagery. In three tasks (reinterpreting ambiguous auditory images, parsing meaningful letter strings, scanning familiar melodies) subjects relied on a partnership between the inner ear and inner voice, one similar to the phonological loop system described in the short-term memory literature. Apparently subjects subvocally rehearsed the imagery material, which placed the material in a phonological store that allowed the imagery judgement. In a fourth task (distinguishing voiced and unvoiced consonants in imagery), subjects still subvocally rehearsed, but seemed to need no additional phonological store to respond correctly. In this case they may have consulted articulatory or kinesthetic cues instead. In a fifth experiment (making homophone judgements), subjects hardly even needed to subvocally rehearse, a result suggesting that homophone judgements rely on some direct route from print to phonology. We consider the breadth of the partnership between the inner ear and inner voice, the level that subvocal rehearsal occupies in the cognitive system, and the functional neuroanatomy of the phonological loop system.

Acoustic Stimulation↗
PubMed1995

Monobloc craniomaxillofacial distraction osteogenesis in a newborn with severe craniofacial synostosis: a preliminary report.

Severe craniofacial synostosis can be a devastating problem for a newborn infant. Reasons for early surgical intervention include cranial stenosis, hydrocephalus, inadequate globe and corneal protection, compromised airway patency, and feeding problems. In this preliminary report, we describe the management of severe craniofacial synostosis in a newborn infant by means of cranial and midfacial distraction osteogenesis.

Acrocephalosyndactylia↗
PubMed1992

What an image depicts depends on what an image means.

Previous research has shown that subjects visually imaging the classical ambiguous figures have great difficulty in reconstruing these images. To explain this finding, we propose that subjects' construal of their image strongly influences what is depicted in the image, leading to the inclusion of some aspects of an imaged figure and the exclusion of others. Thus, images of (supposedly) ambiguous figures may literally omit information necessary for the reconstrual. To test this claim, we asked subjects to form an image of the duck/rabbit figure, and then to compare their image to drawings that departed slightly from the original figure. We hypothesized that subjects would have a clear image of the side of the figure they understood as the "face" (the left side if the image is understood as a duck, the right side for the rabbit). Conversely, subjects would have only a vague image of the "back" of the head. Consequently, in comparing their image to test stimuli, subjects should be able to detect variations in the contour of the "face," but not in the contour of the "back" of the animal's head. These predictions were confirmed, strongly suggesting that the construal of an image does dictate what is depicted within the image.

Attention↗
PubMed1992

Remembering emotional events.

Recent experiments have implied that emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention and, therefore, impoverished memory encoding. In contrast, other studies have found that emotional arousal enhances memory for all aspects of an event. We report two experiments investigating whether these differing results are due to the different retention intervals employed in past studies or to their different categorization schemes for the to-be-remembered material. Our results indicate a small role for retention interval in moderating emotion's effects on memory. However, emotion had markedly different impacts on different types of material: Emotion improved memory for gist and basic-level visual information and for plot-irrelevant details associated, both temporally and spatially, with the event's center. In contrast, emotion undermined memory for details not associated with the event's center. The mechanisms for emotion's effects are discussed.

Adult↗
PubMed1991

Neither pictures nor propositions: what can we learn from a mental image?

In an earlier paper, we reported that subjects have great difficulty in finding alternative construals of their own mental images. In the present paper, we examine how subjects can nonetheless learn from their mental images. We argue that mental images, like percepts, are meaningful depictions. As such, mental images do depict appearance but are also inherently understood in a certain way, and this understanding influences the phenomenal appearance of the represented form. This, in turn, governs what the form will be seen to resemble and what the form is likely to call from memory. We report four experiments in support of this view. In each experiment, subjects are briefly shown outline shapes and asked to form a mental image of each shape. Subjects are then asked what familiar form the imaged shape resembles. Subjects routinely find target shapes in their images when the target is compatible both with the imaged geometry and with how that geometry is organized and understood. When the sought-for target is compatible with image geometry but not with how the image is understood, subjects reliably fail to find the target shape in their images.

Adult↗
PubMed1990

Vivid memories of emotional events: the accuracy of remembered minutiae.

It has been claimed that emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention, and, therefore, impoverished memory encoding. On this view, if details of an emotional event are reported subsequently, these details must be after-the-fact reconstructions that are open to error. Our study challenges these claims. Using a long-term (2-week), incidental learning procedure, we found that emotion promotes memory both for information central to an event and for peripheral detail. This contrasts with the results of explicit instructions to remember or to attend closely to the event, both of which seem to promote memory for the event's gist at the expense of detail. The likely mechanisms underlying these effects are discussed.

Adult↗
PubMed1989

"Enacted" auditory images are ambiguous; "pure" auditory images are not.

Previous research indicates that visual images are inherently unambiguous. The present study extends this argument to auditory imagery. In Experiment 1, subjects were able to reinterpret an imaged ambiguous auditory figure, but covert subvocalization apparently aided this reinterpretation. When subvocalization was blocked, reinterpretations were eliminated. Experiments 2 and 3 generalize this finding to different procedures and stimuli. Experiment 4 explores further the role of subvocalization, by showing that the likelihood of reinterpreting an imaged stimulus is directly proportional to the degree of enactment allowed. We argue that subvocalization or enactment provides an internal stimulus that is subject to reinterpretation. Without enactment, the "pure" auditory image is as unambiguous as a visual image. Thus, in both visual and auditory modalities, images come into being as representations and so are inherently meaningful.

Adult↗
PubMed1984

Diverting subjects' concentration slows figural reversals.

Earlier research has shown that subjects are slower to discover the alternative construal of ambiguous geometric figures if they are simultaneously engaged in distractor tasks. Results are reported which show that this effect slows reversals subsequent to the first reversal, and is therefore not merely slowing the discovery of the alternative construal. In addition, the magnitude of the distraction effect seems unchanged through the successive reversals. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for figural reversal and of their implications for the role of mental resources in perceiving.

Attention↗
PubMed1983

General mental resources and perceptual judgments.

We argue that the requirement of task-general mental resources marks more "cognitive" kinds of perception. In Experiment 1, subjects are slower to discover the alternative organization of ambiguous stimuli if they are simultaneously doing mental arithmetic; in Experiment 2, latency to first reversal is increased by a concurrent memory load of seven digits. In Experiment 3, counting tasks also slow subjects solving the Street figures and judging whether drawings depict possible three-dimensional objects. There is no effect of distractor tasks on the perception of random-dot stereograms. Further, the data argue that the pattern of disruption cannot be attributed either to the unfamiliarity of the judgments or to their latency. We suggest that the distractor tasks are competing with the perceptual judgments for working memory and that perceptual judgments demand memory whenever a perceptual "solution" cannot be locally confirmed.

Attention↗
PubMed1981

Eye position and the control of auditory attention.

In a binaural selective-listening task, subjects' performance was strongly influenced by the position of their eyes, Subjects remembered fewest words from the relevant message and made the most intrusion errors when looking in the direction of the irrelevant input. Looking away from the relevant message but in a direction from which no auditory input originated was not significantly different from looking toward the relevant input. As the speakers were arrayed along a vertical line, the results cannot be interpreted as reflecting activation of the cerebral hemispheres (unlike earlier related work). The results are discussed in terms of the control of auditory attention.

Attention↗
PubMed1980

Overcoming Stroop interference: the effects of practice on distractor potency.

With practice, do distracting stimuli lose their ability to distract? In a series of experiments, subjects practiced counting digits, a task subject to Stroop-type interference, and then were tested in a variety of transfer conditions. The results indicate that digits do lose their ability to distract as a result of practice but that this loss is highly specific; practice in ignoring one pair of distractors (2 and 4) does not improve later performance when ignoring a different pair (1 and 3). However, this practice effect does transfer to distractor stimuli having the same meaning as the stimuli ignored in practice (TWO and FOUR, but not TO and FOR). The results can be explained either in terms of active learning to suppress distraction or in terms of habituation of competing responses.

Attention↗