Biomedical subjects

Daniel Freeman

Publications and source records attributed to Daniel Freeman.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

PubMed2005

Psychological investigation of the structure of paranoia in a non-clinical population.

BACKGROUND: Previous studies of paranoia have assessed only limited numbers of paranoid thoughts, and have not considered the experience from a multidimensional perspective or examined the relationship between different suspicious thoughts. AIMS: To assess a wide range of paranoid thoughts multidimensionally and examine their distribution, to identify the associated coping strategies and to examine social-cognitive processes and paranoia. METHOD: Six questionnaire assessments were completed by 1202 individuals using the internet. RESULTS: Paranoid thoughts occurred regularly in approximately a third of the group. Increasing endorsement of paranoid thoughts was characterised by the recruitment of rarer and odder ideas. Higher levels of paranoia were associated with emotional and avoidant coping, less use of rational and detached coping, negative attitudes to emotional expression, submissive behaviours and lower social rank. CONCLUSIONS: Suspiciousness is common and there may be a hierarchical arrangement of such thoughts that builds on common emotional concerns.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed2005

The prediction of hallucinatory predisposition in non-clinical individuals: examining the contribution of emotion and reasoning.

BACKGROUND: Emotion, especially anxiety, has been implicated in triggering hallucinations. Reasoning processes are also likely to influence the judgments that lead to hallucinatory experiences. We report an investigation of the prediction of hallucinatory predisposition by emotion and associated processes (anxiety, depression, stress, self-focused attention) and reasoning (need for closure, extreme responding). METHOD: Data were analysed from a questionnaire survey in a student population (N = 327). RESULTS: Higher levels of anxiety, self-focus, and extreme responding were associated with hallucinatory predisposition. Interactions between these three variables did not strengthen the predictive effect of each. Depression, stress, and need for closure were not found to be predictors of hallucinatory experience in the regression analysis. CONCLUSION: Emotional and reasoning processes may both need to be considered in the understanding of hallucinatory experience.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Developing a theoretical understanding of therapy techniques: an illustrative analogue study.

OBJECTIVES: In psychological interventions, clients are often asked to review unhelpful beliefs. Surprisingly, there is no theoretical understanding of how beliefs are reviewed in therapy. Moreover, by understanding a therapeutic technique, potential interactions with symptom processes can be considered. An analogue study assessing the feasibility of researching therapy techniques is described, in which links between symptoms, reasoning style, and an experimental version of the cognitive therapy technique of belief evaluation are examined. DESIGN: Individuals without psychiatric illness (N = 30) completed (i) dimensional measures of depression, anxiety, and delusions, (ii) a measure of confirmatory reasoning (Wason's 2-4-6 task) both before and after instruction in disconfirmatory reasoning, and (iii) a belief evaluation task. RESULTS: Compared with individuals with a confirmatory reasoning style, individuals with a disconfirmatory reasoning style in Wason's task were less hasty in their data gathering, considered a greater number of hypotheses during the task, had higher intellectual functioning, and had lower levels of depressive symptoms. Conversely, the individuals with the strongest confirmatory reasoning had higher levels of depression and preoccupation with delusional ideation. Successful adoption of disconfirmatory reasoning was associated with less hasty decision-making and lower levels of preoccupation and distress by delusional ideation. Individuals with a disconfirmatory reasoning style reported more evidence both for and against their beliefs in the belief evaluation task. CONCLUSION: The preliminary evidence, from this small non-clinical group, indicates that evaluating beliefs may partially involve the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory reasoning processes. Disconfirmatory reasoning, associated with less hasty data gathering and consideration of alternatives, may lead to better belief evaluation. In the context of clinical research indicating that individuals with delusions are hasty in their data gathering and have difficulty considering alternatives, a potential implication of the findings is that individuals with delusions may find belief evaluation in therapy.

Adult↗

PubMed2004

Why do people with delusions fail to choose more realistic explanations for their experiences? An empirical investigation.

Delusions can be viewed as explanations of experiences,. By definition, the experiences are insufficient to merit the delusional explanations. So why have delusions been accepted rather than more realistic explanations? The authors report a study of alternative explanations in 100 individuals with delusions. Patients were assessed on the following criteria: symptom measures, the evidence for the delusions, the availability of alternative explanations, reasoning, and self-esteem. Three quarters of the patients did not report any alternative explanation for the experiences on which the delusions were based. These patients reported significantly more internal anomalous experiences and had a more hasty reasoning style than patients who did have alternative explanations available. Having doubt in a delusion, without an alternative explanation, was associated with lower self-esteem. Clinicians will need to develop plausible and compelling alternative accounts of experience in interventions rather than merely challenge patients' delusional beliefs.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Connecting neurosis and psychosis: the direct influence of emotion on delusions and hallucinations.

Diagnostic classification systems contain a core divide between neurosis and psychosis, leading to their separate study and treatment. The basis for the separation of the disorders is outlined and reassessed. It is argued that the empirical evidence does not support such a sharp distinction between neurosis and psychosis. The frequent occurrence of emotional disorder prior to and accompanying psychosis indicates that neurosis contributes to the development of the positive symptoms of psychosis. Psychological theories and experimental evidence concerning the influence of emotion on the content and form of delusions and hallucinations are therefore reviewed. It is argued that in many cases delusions are a direct representation of emotional concerns, and that emotion contributes to delusion formation and maintenance. The content of hallucinations less often directly expresses the emotional concerns of the individual, but emotion can trigger and contribute to the maintenance of hallucinatory phenomena, although how this occurs is not well understood. It is concluded that study needs to be made of the interaction between psychotic and neurotic processes in the development of delusions and hallucinations, and that neurotic and psychotic disorders may have common maintenance processes.

Delusions↗

PubMed2003

Can virtual reality be used to investigate persecutory ideation?

The use of virtual reality permits individuals' reactions to standard controlled environments to be studied. It may therefore provide a means for understanding the interpretations of experience relevant to clinical disorders. The use of this technology for understanding persecutory ideation has not been investigated. A pilot study was undertaken to examine whether individuals have persecutory thoughts about virtual reality characters under controlled conditions and if there are factors that predict the occurrence of such thoughts.Twenty-four nonclinical participants entered a neutral virtual environment that contained computer-generated people. The participants completed dimensional assessments of items related to psychiatric symptoms and their thoughts about the virtual characters. Positive views about the virtual characters were common. However, a number of participants had ideas of reference and ideas of persecution about the virtual characters. Individuals who had persecutory thoughts about the virtual characters had significantly higher levels of interpersonal sensitivity and anxiety. The study provides direct evidence that individuals attribute mental states to virtual reality characters. Important for the study of clinical phenomena, some individuals have thoughts of a persecutory nature about virtual characters. Additionally, the findings indicate that feelings of interpersonal vulnerability and anxiety may directly contribute to the development of persecutory ideation in response to essentially neutral contexts. Virtual reality may prove to be a valuable methodology for developing an understanding of persecutory ideation.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

A cognitive model of persecutory delusions.

A multifactorial model of the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions is presented. Persecutory delusions are conceptualized as threat beliefs. The beliefs are hypothesized to arise from a search for meaning for internal or external experiences that are unusual, anomalous, or emotionally significant for the individual. The persecutory explanations formed reflect an interaction between psychotic processes, pre-existing beliefs and personality (particularly emotion), and the environment. It is proposed that the delusions are maintained by processes that lead to the receipt of confirmatory evidence and processes that prevent the processing of disconfirmatory evidence. Novel features of the model include the (non-defended) direct roles given to emotion in delusion formation, the detailed consideration of both the content and form of delusions, and the hypotheses concerning the associated emotional distress. The clinical and research implications of the model are outlined.

Cognition Disorders↗