Biomedical subjects

David L Swerdlow

Publications and source records attributed to David L Swerdlow.

29 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

PubMed2004

Chicken consumption is a newly identified risk factor for sporadic Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis infections in the United States: a case-control study in FoodNet sites.

The sources of sporadic Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis (SE) infections in the United States are unclear. To determine risk factors for sporadic SE infection, we conducted a population-based case-control study in 5 Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance Network surveillance areas. During the 12-month study, 396 cases of SE infection were ascertained. Among the 182 case patients and 345 controls, SE infection was univariately associated with international travel (matched odds ratio [MOR], 61; 95% confidence interval [CI], 8-447), eating undercooked eggs (MOR, 2.2; 95%CI, 1-5), and eating chicken prepared outside of the home (MOR, 2.2; 95% CI, 1.3-3.4). Multivariate analysis revealed that eating chicken outside of the home remained the only significant risk factor for illness (MOR, 2.0; 95% CI, 1.1-3.6). Chicken consumption has not previously been identified in the United States as a risk factor for SE infection. Measures to prevent SE infections include educating consumers and food handlers about food safety and interventions to decrease contamination of eggs and poultry.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Salmonella enteritidis infections, United States, 1985-1999.

Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis emerged as an important illness during the 1980s. Investigations showed that consumption of undercooked eggs was the major risk factor for disease, and a variety of prevention and control efforts were initiated during the 1990s. We describe sporadic infections and outbreaks of S. Enteritidis in the United States from 1985 through 1999 and discuss prevention and control efforts. After reaching a high of 3.9 per 100,000 population in 1995, S. Enteritidis infections declined to 1.98 per 100,000 in 1999. While the total number of outbreaks decreased by half, those in the western states tripled. Outbreaks of S. Enteritidis phage type 4 infections accounted for 49% of outbreaks in 1999. Outbreak-associated deaths in health facilities decreased from 14 in 1987 to 0 in 1999. Overall, rates of sporadic S. Enteritidis infection, outbreaks, and deaths have declined dramatically. For further reductions, control measures should continue to be applied along the entire farm-to-table continuum.

Cooking↗

PubMed2003

Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax in an elderly woman, Connecticut, 2001.

On November 20, 2001, inhalational anthrax was confirmed in an elderly woman from rural Connecticut. To determine her exposure source, we conducted an extensive epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investigation. Molecular subtyping showed that her isolate was indistinguishable from isolates associated with intentionally contaminated letters. No samples from her home or community yielded Bacillus anthracis, and she received no first-class letters from facilities known to have processed intentionally contaminated letters. Environmental sampling in the regional Connecticut postal facility yielded B. anthracis spores from 4 (31%) of 13 sorting machines. One extensively contaminated machine primarily processes bulk mail. A second machine that does final sorting of bulk mail for her zip code yielded B. anthracis on the column of bins for her carrier route. The evidence suggests she was exposed through a cross-contaminated bulk mail letter. Such cross-contamination of letters and postal facilities has implications for managing the response to future B. anthracis-contaminated mailings.

Aged↗

PubMed2002

Threat of a biological terrorist attack on the US food supply: the CDC perspective.

Deliberate contamination of food with biological agents has already been perpetrated in the USA. The US food supply is increasingly characterised by centralised production and wide distribution of products. Deliberate contamination of a commercial food product could cause an outbreak of disease, with many illnesses dispersed over wide geographical areas. Dependent on the biological agent and contaminated food, such an outbreak could either present as a slow, diffuse, and initially unremarkable increase in sporadic cases, or as an explosive epidemic suddenly producing many illnesses. Preparedness for a bioterrorist event affecting the food supply, therefore, entails augmentation of the traditional public-health infrastructure to enhance disease surveillance, accelerate capacity of laboratory detection, rapidly investigate and control outbreaks, and develop capacity for response to mass-casualty disasters.

Bioterrorism↗

PubMed2002

Fatal inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman.

We describe the 11th case of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax reported in the United States. The presenting clinical features of this 94-year-old woman were subtle and nondistinctive. The diagnosis was recognized because blood cultures were obtained prior to administration of antibiotics, emphasizing the importance of this diagnostic test in evaluating ill patients who have been exposed to Bacillus anthracis. The patient's clinical course was characterized by progression of respiratory insufficiency, pleural effusions and pulmonary edema, and, ultimately, death. Although her B anthracis bacteremia was rapidly sterilized after initiation of antibiotic therapy, viable B anthracis was present in postmortem mediastinal lymph node specimens. The source of exposure to B anthracis in this patient is not known. Exposure to mail that was cross-contaminated as it passed through postal facilities contaminated with B anthracis spores is one hypothesis under investigation.

Aged↗

PubMed2002

Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli in children with diarrhea: a prospective point-of-care study.

OBJECTIVE: To conduct a prospective cohort study to determine the frequency and characteristics of Shiga toxin (Stx)-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) infections in children with diarrhea attending an emergency department and a private clinic in Seattle, Washington. METHODS: Between November 1998 and October 2001, 1851 stools were processed for STEC by sorbitol-MacConkey (SMAC) agar screening and a commercial Stx enzyme immunoassay (EIA). RESULTS: STEC belonging to serotypes O157:H7 (n = 28), O103:H2 (n = 4), O118:H16 (n = 2), O26:H11, O111:nonmotile, O111:H8, O121:H19, and O rough:H11 (n = 1 each) were recovered from 39 (2.1%) stools. EIA and SMAC agar detected 89% and 100% of the patients with E coli O157:H7, respectively. E coli O157:H7-infected patients had significantly higher frequencies of bloody stools, fecal leukocytes, and abdominal tenderness and shorter symptom duration. Hemolytic uremic syndrome developed in 5 (18%) and none of the children infected with E coli O157:H7 and non-O157:H7 STEC, respectively (P =.30). CONCLUSIONS: E coli O157:H7 is the predominant STEC in this population. Children infected with E coli O157:H7 have clinical presentations different from those whose stools contain non-O157:H7 STEC. Culture and Stx detection are needed to optimally detect STEC of all serotypes in stools. SMAC agar screening should not be replaced by EIA.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Anthrax postexposure prophylaxis in postal workers, Connecticut, 2001.

After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient's area. Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers within 20 days of initial prophylaxis. Ninety-four workers obtained antibiotics, 68 of whom started postexposure prophylaxis, and of these, 21 discontinued. Postal workers who never started or stopped taking prophylaxis cited as reasons disbelief regarding anthrax exposure, problems with adverse events, and initial reports of negative cultures. Postal workers with adverse events reported predominant symptoms of gastrointestinal distress and headache. The influence of these concerns on adherence suggests that communication about risks of acquiring anthrax, education about adverse events, and careful management of adverse events are essential elements in increasing adherence.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001: epidemiologic findings.

In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facilities, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty (91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law enforcement communities.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

Environmental sampling for spores of Bacillus anthracis.

On November 11, 2001, following the bioterrorism-related anthrax attacks, the U.S. Postal Service collected samples at the Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center; all samples were negative for Bacillus anthracis. After a patient in Connecticut died from inhalational anthrax on November 19, the center was sampled again on November 21 and 25 by using dry and wet swabs. All samples were again negative for B. anthracis. On November 28, guided by information from epidemiologic investigation, we sampled the site extensively with wet wipes and surface vacuum sock samples (using HEPA vacuum). Of 212 samples, 6 (3%) were positive, including one from a highly contaminated sorter. Subsequently B. anthracis was also detected in mail-sorting bins used for the patient's carrier route. These results suggest cross-contaminated mail as a possible source of anthrax for the inhalational anthrax patient in Connecticut. In future such investigations, extensive sampling guided by epidemiologic data is imperative.

Anthrax↗

PubMed2002

Bioterrorism-related anthrax surveillance, Connecticut, September-December, 2001.

On November 19, 2001, a case of inhalational anthrax was identified in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman, who later died. We conducted intensive surveillance for additional anthrax cases, which included collecting data from hospitals, emergency departments, private practitioners, death certificates, postal facilities, veterinarians, and the state medical examiner. No additional cases of anthrax were identified. The absence of additional anthrax cases argued against an intentional environmental release of Bacillus anthracis in Connecticut and suggested that, if the source of anthrax had been cross-contaminated mail, the risk for anthrax in this setting was very low. This surveillance system provides a model that can be adapted for use in similar emergency settings.

Absenteeism↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Investigation of multistate foodborne disease outbreaks.

The U.S. food supply is characterized increasingly by centralized production and wide distribution of products, and more foodborne disease outbreaks are dispersed over broad geographic areas. Such outbreaks may present as a gradual, diffuse, and initially unapparent increase in sporadic cases. Recognition and reporting by clinicians and local public health officials and the ordering of laboratory tests by clinicians continue to be cornerstones of detecting all outbreaks. New methods--such as active laboratory-based surveillance, automated algorithms for detecting increases in infection rates, and molecular subtyping--facilitate detection of diffuse outbreaks. Routines have evolved for the investigation of multistate outbreaks; they are characterized by rapid communication between local, state, and federal public health officials; timely review of epidemiologic data by expert panels; collaboration on tracebacks with food safety regulatory agencies; and communication with the public and media. Rapid, efficient investigation of multistate outbreaks may result in control of acute public health emergencies, identification and correction of hazardous food production and processing practices, and consequent improvement in food safety.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.↗