Biomedical subjects

Dennis J Alexander

Publications and source records attributed to Dennis J Alexander.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

An overview of the epidemiology of avian influenza.

Only viruses of the Influenzavirus A genus have been isolated from birds and termed avian influenza [AI] viruses, but viruses with all 16 haemagglutinin [H1-H16] and all 9 neuraminidase [N1-N9] influenza A subtypes in the majority of possible combinations have been isolated from avian species. Influenza A viruses infecting poultry can be divided into two groups. The very virulent viruses causing highly pathogenic avian influenza [HPAI], with flock mortality as high as 100%. These viruses have been restricted to subtypes H5 and H7, although not all H5 and H7 viruses cause HPAI. All other viruses cause a milder, primarily respiratory, disease [LPAI], unless exacerbated. Until recently HPAI viruses were rarely isolated from wild birds, but for LPAI viruses extremely high isolation rates have been recorded in surveillance studies, with overall figures of about 11% for ducks and geese and around 2% for all other species. Influenza viruses may infect all types of domestic or captive birds in all areas of the world, the frequency with which primary infections occur in any type of bird usually depending on the degree of contact there is with feral birds. Secondary spread is usually associated with human involvement, either by bird or bird product movement or by transferring infective faeces from infected to susceptible birds, but potentially wild birds could be involved. In recent years there have been costly outbreaks of HPAI in poultry in Italy, The Netherlands and Canada and in each millions of birds were slaughtered to bring the outbreaks under control. Since the 1990s AI infections due to two subtypes have been widespread in poultry across a large area of the World. LPAI H9N2 appears to have spread across the whole of Asia in that time and has become endemic in poultry in many of the affected countries. However, these outbreaks have tended to have been overshadowed by the H5N1 HPAI virus, initially isolated in China, that has now spread in poultry and/or wild birds throughout Asia and into Europe and Africa, resulting in the death or culling of hundreds of millions of poultry and posing a significant zoonosis threat.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Newcastle disease virus (strain Herts 33/56) in tissues and organs of chickens infected experimentally.

Six-week-old susceptible specific pathogen free chickens were infected intranasally with the virulent Newcastle disease virus strain Herts 33/56 and the levels of virus present in blood, faeces, breast muscle, leg muscle and a pool of heart/kidney/spleen were estimated in birds killed humanely at each day post inoculation. Highest titres were recorded at day 4 post inoculation when titres of virus were 10(6) median egg infectious doses (EID50)/g in the heart/kidney/spleen pool, 10(4.2) EID50/g in the leg muscle and 10(4) EID50/g in the breast muscle and faeces. A median oral infectious dose of Newcastle disease virus strain Herts 33/56 for 3-week-old chickens was estimated to be equivalent to 10(4) EID50.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

The challenge of avian influenza to the veterinary community.

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. The increased relevance of AI in the fields of animal and human health has highlighted the lack of scientific information on several aspects of the disease, which has hampered the adequate management of some of the recent crises. Millions of animals have died, and there is growing concern over the loss of human lives and over the management of the pandemic potential. The present paper aims to identify areas of knowledge of veterinary competence that need to be improved in order to generate information to support the global AI crisis, and highlights the major changes in AI legislation, including regulations related to trade. It also reviews the human health implications of AI, including the mechanisms by which a human pandemic virus may be generated, and the food safety issues related to this infection. The application of control policies, ranging from stamping out to emergency and prophylactic vaccination, are discussed on the basis of data generated in recent outbreaks, and in the light of new regulations, also in view of the maintenance of good animal welfare. Poultry veterinarians working for the industry or for the public sector represent the first line of defence against the pandemic threat and for the prevention and control of this infection in poultry and in wild birds. However, given the current situation, it is imperative that close collaboration is sought and achieved by health officials involved in the veterinary, agricultural and medical aspects of the disease. Only through the exchange of data, experiences, views and information will it be possible to combat this zoonosis, which represents a major threat to public health and animal well-being.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Antigenic and genotypical characterization of Newcastle disease viruses isolated in Taiwan between 1969 and 1996.

Three major epidemics of Newcastle disease (ND) occurred in Taiwan over the past three decades (in 1969, 1984, and 1995). In order to gain a better understanding of the relationships between past ND epizootics in Taiwan, 36 ND viruses (NDVs) isolated between 1969 and 1996 were characterized antigenically and genotypically. The antigenicity of these viruses was analysed by their ability to cause binding of mouse monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) to cell cultures infected with the isolate. Using a panel of 22 mAbs to divide NDVs into subgroups, a total of 18 binding patterns were revealed. The sequences covering the cleavage site of the fusion protein gene of these isolates were also determined. The results of the phylogenetic analysis placed 36 NDVs into I, II, VIb, VIIa, VIII and two novel genotypes (provisionally termed X and VIh). The 1969 velogenic isolates were of genotypes X and VIh; the 1984-1985 velogenic isolates were genotyped VIb, VIh, VIIa, and X; while the 1995-1996 velogenic isolates were genotyped VIIa or VIII. Some 1969 and 1984 velogenic isolates were of the same mAbs binding pattern and genotype, and the mAbs binding patterns of the 1995-1996 isolates have not been seen before. It is concluded that velogenic NDVs of different genotype and antigenic type have co-circulated in Taiwan at least since 1969. Also there were epizootiological links between strains isolated in 1969 and 1984, whereas the 1995-1996 epidemic was caused by new antigenic variants.

Amino Acid Sequence↗

PubMed2004

Avian influenza: recent developments.

This paper reviews the worldwide situation regarding avian influenza infections in poultry from 1997 to March 2004. The increase in the number of primary introductions and the scientific data available on the molecular basis of pathogenicity have generated concerns particularly for legislative purposes and for international trade. This has led to a new proposed definition of 'avian influenza' to extend all infections caused by H5 and H7 viruses regardless of their virulence as notifiable diseases, although this has encountered some difficulties in being approved. The paper also reviews the major outbreaks caused by viruses of the H5 or H7 subtype and the control measures applied. The zoonotic aspects of avian influenza, which until 1997 were considered to be of limited relevance in human medicine, are also discussed. The human health implications have now gained importance, both for illness and fatalities that have occurred following natural infection with avian viruses, and for the potential of generating a reassortant virus that could give rise to the next human influenza pandemic.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Heat inactivation of Newcastle disease virus (strain Herts 33/56) in artificially infected chicken meat homogenate.

Heat inactivation curves were constructed for Newcastle disease virus strain Herts 33/56 in artificially infected meat homogenate at 60 degrees C, 65 degrees C, 70 degrees C, 74 degrees C and 80 degrees C. For the four higher temperatures the time taken to reduce the infectivity by 90% (1 log10) at the specified temperature (Dt) were estimated as: D65=120 sec, D70=82 sec, D74=40 sec and D80 29=sec.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Recombination resulting in virulence shift in avian influenza outbreak, Chile.

Influenza A viruses occur worldwide in wild birds and are occasionally associated with outbreaks in commercial chickens and turkeys. However, avian influenza viruses have not been isolated from wild birds or poultry in South America. A recent outbreak in chickens of H7N3 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) occurred in Chile. One month later, after a sudden increase in deaths, H7N3 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus was isolated. Sequence analysis of all eight genes of the LPAI virus and the HPAI viruses showed minor differences between the viruses except at the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site. The LPAI virus had a cleavage site similar to other low pathogenic H7 viruses, but the HPAI isolates had a 30-nucleotide insert. The insertion likely occurred by recombination between the HA and nucleoprotein genes of the LPAI virus, resulting in a virulence shift. Sequence comparison of all eight gene segments showed the Chilean viruses were also distinct from all other avian influenza viruses and represent a distinct South American clade.

Amino Acid Sequence↗

PubMed2002

Avian influenza and human health.

Natural infections with influenza A viruses have been reported in a variety of animal species including humans, pigs, horses, sea mammals, mustelids and birds. Occasionally devastating pandemics occur in humans. Although viruses of relatively few HA and NA subtype combinations have been isolated from mammalian species, all 15 HA subtypes and all 9 NA subtypes, in most combinations, have been isolated from birds. In the 20th century the sudden emergence of antigenically different strains transmissible in humans, termed antigenic shift, has occurred on four occasions, 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), 1968 (H3N2) and 1977 (H1N1), each time resulting in a pandemic. Genetic analysis of the isolates demonstrated that 'new' strains most certainly emerged after reassortment of genes of viruses of avian and human origin in a permissive host. The leading theory is that the pig represents the 'mixing vessel' where this genetic reassortment may occur. In 1996, an H7N7 influenza virus of avian origin was isolated from a woman with a self-limiting conjunctivitis. During 1997 in Hong Kong, an H5N1 avian influenza virus was recognised as the cause of death of 6 of 18 infected patients. Genetic analysis revealed these human isolates of H5N1 subtype to be indistinguishable from a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that was endemic in the local poultry population. More recently, in March 1999, two independent isolations of influenza virus subtype H9N2 were made from girls aged one to four who recovered from flu-like illnesses in Hong Kong. Subsequently, five isolations of H9N2 virus from humans on mainland China in August 1998 were reported. H9N2 viruses were known to be widespread in poultry in China and other Asian countries. In all these cases there was no evidence of human to human spread except with the H5N1 infections where there was evidence of very limited spread. This is in keeping with the finding that all these viruses possessed all eight genes of avian origin. It may well be that infection of humans with avian influenza viruses occurs much more frequently than originally assumed, but due to their limited effect go unrecognised. For the human population as a whole the main danger of direct infection with avian influenza viruses appears to be if people infected with an 'avian' virus are infected simultaneously with a 'human' influenza virus. In such circumstances reassortment could occur with the potential emergence of a virus fully capable of spread in the human population, but with antigenic characteristics for which the human population was immunologically naive. Presumably this represents a very rare coincidence, but one which could result in a true influenza pandemic.

Animals↗

PubMed2001

Characterization of H5N2 influenza viruses from Italian poultry.

From October 1997 to January 1998, highly pathogenic H5N2 avian influenza viruses caused eight outbreaks of avian influenza in northern Italy. A nonpathogenic H5N9 influenza virus was also isolated during the outbreaks as a result of virological and epidemiological surveillance to control the spread of avian influenza to neighbouring regions. Antigenic analysis showed that the Italian H5N2 isolates were antigenically similar to, although distinguishable from, A/HK/156/97, a human influenza H5N1 virus isolated in Hong Kong in 1997. Phylogenetic analysis of the haemagglutinin (HA) genes showed that the highly pathogenic Italian viruses clustered with the Hong Kong strains, whereas the nonpathogenic H5N9 virus, despite its epidemiological association with the highly pathogenic Italian isolates, was most closely related to the highly pathogenic A/Turkey/England/91 (H5N1) strain. Like the HA phylogenetic tree, the nonstructural (NS) phylogenetic tree showed that the H5N2 Italian virus genes are clearly separate from those of the H5N9 strain. In contrast, results of the phylogenetic analysis of nucleoprotein (NP) genes indicated a closer genetic relationship between the two Italian virus groups, a finding suggesting a common progenitor. Comparison of the HA, NS and NP genes of the Italian H5 strains with those of the H5N1 viruses simultaneously circulating in Hong Kong revealed that the two groups of viruses do not share a recent common ancestor. No virological and serological evidence of bird-to-human transmission of the Italian H5N2 influenza viruses was found.

Animals↗