On hypothesis and evidence.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to E A Schwaber.
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Questioning whether or not we have entered a new "two-person" paradigm, the author shares a traumatic personal experience, considers its impact on her work with a patient, and discusses some clinical and epistemological dilemmas in self-disclosure.
The author focuses on state, a particular and continuing dimension of non-verbal expression which, though generally seen, heard or felt, often remains implicit. Basic, primal, reflecting psyche and soma woven together, state lies in a direct link with our earliest beginnings. Conveying one's affect, the sense of one's body--of one's self--in relationship to oneself and to the outer world, it influences and is influenced by the presence of the other. Thus, a change in state may be an early cue of the experiential effect of a perception, reflecting the impact of another's felt participation--including that other's state--the place from which we may truly find ourselves as participant-observers. State illuminates our unceasing subjectivity. In its subtle manifestation, it offers an added 'royal road' to what is yet unconscious, opening vital pathways of psychic experience that might otherwise have remained unnoted. Brought to collaborative and explicit focus, state can be mutually observed, and enquiry as to its meaning undertaken. It can be verbalised, and it can be analysed. Further, in sharpening our observance of nuances of data, attention to state will deepen consideration of the nature of our analytic evidence. Clinical examples are offered in elaboration of these ideas.
The central question which I hope to address is: how do we discover, in our clinical work, what we had not before even considered, another way of thinking about a matter? Drawing upon clinical examples, including a critique of my material, I shall illustrate a mode of listening which attempts to keep clear the delineation of whose point of view one is referring to--patient's or analyst's. In so doing, I shall consider some conceptual, methodological, and epistemological ramifications of this effort in an attempt to demonstrate the potential for deepened illumination of nuances of the patient's experience--and of our own--which may otherwise go unnoted.
The concept the "patient's psychic reality" describes a fundamental epistemological and clinical position regarding the notion of reality. Two distinctions are implied: the patient's psychic reality as opposed to another's (e.g., the analyst's), and psychic as contrasted with objective reality. It is my contention, illustrated in some detail, that these distinctions are frequently clouded in our clinical propositions, and our methodology. We tend to speak as though the analyst's view--even about his or her own subjectivity--is the "truer" reality, and the patient's view however defensively or non-verbally communicated is more distorted, "transference-based," or, it is simply presumed. By thus blurring the boundaries between the patient's and the analyst's vantage point, we fail to distinguish between hypothesis and evidence, bypassing nuances of clinical data that do not fit the path on which we seem to be. Reflecting more rigorously on the question of how we arrive at what we believe we know may help us find our way far less inferentially onto pathways heretofore unconscious, deepening our recognition of multiple levels of the patient's psychic reality.
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The author states that the 75th Anniversary Edition of the IJPA (December, 1994) offers a superb collection of diverse views on the daunting question of the ways in which we conceptualise and communicate psychoanalytic clinical facts. The focus of this discussion is certain methodological and epistemological concerns deriving from some of the ideas and clinical examples presented in these writings. It is noted that while our central task is to uncover and recover what had been outside awareness, the concept of 'The Unconscious' has inclined us towards inferring knowledge about another as though it were fact. There is a tendency, descriptively and clinically, to view the analyst as potentially capable, however he or she may arrive at this, of apprehending meaning that is yet unconscious to the patient. Turns of language take place that impute unconscious intentionality to the patient (e.g. 'the patient is unconsciously attacking the analyst') while relieving the analyst of responsibility in the evocation of the patient's perception (e.g. 'the analyst is unconsciously forced to play a role'). Thus, unexamined assumptions are introduced, while perception itself is relegated to a secondary, rather than primary experiential phenomenon, nuances of which remain outside analytic enquiry. As verbal and non-verbal data are often omitted from active exploration, the power of intellectual persuasion risks overtaking the requisite demand for evidence. Clinical examples drawn from each of the three geographical regions are reviewed in detail in order to explicate these conceptual dilemmas.
Although often used descriptively, the concept 'interaction' has not been an inherently psychoanalytic term. It suggests an external or social purview, rather than an intrapsychic one. If, however, the term were qualified to convey 'experienced' interaction and a clear delineation were maintained between the point-of-view of the patient and that of the analyst or other outside observer, 'interaction' might then be credibly employed within the psychoanalytic lexicon. For in this way the investigative terrain remains the patient's psychical reality--with its conscious and unconscious, conflictual, defensive and imaginative expressions still our fundamental purview. Clinical examples are offered to illustrate a sharpened focus on interaction as seen from the patient's point-of-view to highlight the implications of this position in furthering our psychoanalytic inquiry.
Freud's delineation of 'psychical reality' as our investigative domain poses compelling epistemological and clinical challenges, which must profoundly affect our understanding of what is meant by what is real. Exploring the patient's inner reality as our central database, we are given a remarkable, but elusive opportunity for discovery and recognition, holding a pervading mutative power. It is elusive, for, despite our intentions otherwise, there is a continuing pull towards a belief in the greater 'wisdom' of our own assumptions and predilections, a blurring of the boundaries between our and our patient's vantage points, leading us away from essential, if subtler dimensions of the patient's experience. Utilising a clinical example, the author tries to illustrate some of her efforts to listen to her patient, and the difficulty she encountered. Her struggle was one which, she believes, has more far-ranging, even ubiquitous ramifications. Further consideration is given to some of the theoretical underpinnings in this mode of analytic listening.
We tend to think of impasses as manifest, if often puzzling events, but they may also occur quietly, disguised. The analytic process may seem to be moving on course--yet, on further glance, there can be subtle evidence that some impasse, at times just emerging, may be, perhaps collusively, evaded. Often outside the patient's awareness, cues to its occurrence may be expressed in the vicissitudes of affect or state or shift in content. When such phenomena go unnoted as vital communications, ultimately, a more dramatic eruption may take place; or, perhaps more insidiously, some central conflictual feature of the patient's character continues unexamined, unabated. The author suggests an alteration in how we think about impasses--how pervasive they may be, even as we may believe we are seeing the ordinary ebbs and flows of resistances and defensive processes. Drawing upon four clinical examples, the effort is made to elucidate the link between our understanding and recognition of the presence of an impasse and our mode of analytic listening.
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Freud's shift to the fantasy theory of neurosogenesis defined the investigation of intrapsychic life as our fundamental theoretical purview. In assigning to inner experience a data base for scientific exploration, there is reflected a central epistemological innovation which must profoundly alter the way we view what is real. This paper considers some of the continuing clinical challenges and far-reaching implications posed by this shift to "psychic reality" as our core psychoanalytic theory.
As analysts, we may agree with certain basic tenets: we should not impose our truths, whether or not theory-laden; we should maintain the focus on the patient's inner reality, not on how he or she lives in the world--out there; we should be prepared to be surprised, to learn something that hadn't occurred to us; we should look for multiple cues in the clinical data, pay attention to affect and state as may be expressed within the moment, and listen for subtleties that may convey something about how we are being experienced in the transference. But again and again, we fail to adhere to these precepts. Despite our best intentions, we seem to have a fundamental disinclination to maintaining these positions. I have tried to consider some reasons for this difficulty and its relation to the countertransference. Drawing upon several clinical examples, I have attempted to examine ways of enhancing our attunement to verbal and non-verbal cues from the patient which may direct us, sooner, to dimensions of our counter-transference responses otherwise overlooked.
Our theories are to derive from empirical clinical findings. Their task is to order the data and broaden our perceptual scope. But often and unwittingly, we draw upon them to make leaps of inference about unconscious meaning, and bypass untold directions for which the model may not fit. Despite the fact that such super-imposition is generally decried, we are each of us vulnerable to using theory--experience-near or distant--to rationalize hidden assumptions and agendas, to lead our patients to 'truths' we presume we already 'know' to be present. The effort of this discussion has been to highlight this ubiquitous risk and to consider its implications for our psychoanalytic listening and concomitant methodology.
There is a fundamental difference in outlook between an interpretive effort that attempts to help the patient arrive at a truth, the existence of which the analyst has implicitly pre-existing knowledge, and an interpretation that inherently derives from a question to which the analyst does not yet have an answer. Drawing upon a number of clinical examples, I have tried to illustrate this distinction, arguing that the latter outlook, though difficult to sustain, will lead to a methodology which more rigorously focuses on the patient's psychic reality as our sole preview. New vistas of human experience may then be opened to us that may not otherwise have been contemplated.
Freud's monumental shift to the fantasy theory heralded the view that "it is psychical and not material reality" which is our sole domain of inquiry. Yet despite theoretical agreement and cogent technical admonitions against concerning ourselves with absolute or "external" truths, psychoanalytic listening betrays a stance in which the analyst attunes to a reality other than that of the patient's inner world, assuming the position of arbiter--even if a silent one--of what is or is not "distorted" in the patient's perceptual experience. The central impact of perception as a significant component of the patient's inner experience--past and present--goes unattended. Clinical examples from differing theoretical persuasions are reviewed to demonstrate this occurrence. An alternative mode of listening is considered which assumes an underlying shift in outlook, suspending any notion that we can "know" what is "correct" in the patient's perception, while sharpening attunement to its clinical impact--as may be evidenced by a shift in affect or state, a turn of phrase, or the transient appearance of a symptom or old behavior. It is argued that such a stance will lead to a more singular focus on the patient's psychic reality, permitting the emergence of a deepening realm of psychic phenomena, enhancing the capacity of self-observation, and richly facilitating the reconstructive process.