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Biomedical subjects

E F Loftus

Publications and source records attributed to E F Loftus.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Misinformation revisited: new evidence on the suggestibility of memory.

In three experiments involving a total of 623 subjects, a series of slides was shown depicting a student in a college bookstore stealing a variety of items. Next, subjects read a narrative describing the event that contained some misinformation and some neutral information about several critical details. Finally, subjects took a memory test. On this test, subjects were asked to list exemplars of 20 specified categories but were instructed not to list any items that they saw in the slide sequence. Analogous to Lindsay's (1990) adaptation of Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley's (1989) "logic-of-opposition" paradigm, the tendency to report suggested details was thus set in opposition to the ability to remember the source of those details. Therefore, we interpreted failure to include suggested details as exemplars as evidence that subjects believed those details had been present in the event. Analysis of subjects' responses under opposition instructions suggests that some misled subjects come to genuinely believe that they saw items that, in reality, were only suggested to them.

Adult

Forgetting sexual trauma: what does it mean when 38% forget?

L. M. Williams (1994) has shown that many women who were sexually abused as children do not report the abuse when questioned 2 decades later. These findings do not support certain freely made claims about memory, but they do support other claims. The findings do not provide cogent support for the claim that a long stream of childhood sexual traumas is routinely banished from conscious awareness and then can be reliably recovered later. The findings do support the claim that many children can forget about a sexually abusive experience from their past. Extreme claims such as "if you were raped, you'd remember" are disproven by these findings.

Adolescent

The possible role of source misattributions in the creation of false beliefs among preschoolers.

In this article the authors examine one possible factor in the creation of false beliefs among preschool-aged children, namely, source misattributions. The authors present the results from an ongoing program of research which suggest that source misattributions could be a mechanism underlying children's false beliefs about having experienced fictitious events. Findings from this program of research indicate that, although all children are susceptible to making source misattributions, very young children may be disproportionately vulnerable to these kinds of errors. This vulnerability leads younger preschoolers, on occasion, to claim that they remember actually experiencing events that they only thought about or were suggested by others. These results are discussed in the context of the ongoing debate over the veracity and durability of delayed reports of early memories, repressed memories, dissociative states, and the validity risks posed by therapeutic techniques that entail repeated visually guided imagery inductions.

Child, Preschool

Pseudomemories without hypnosis.

Hypnosis is often colloquially associated with "the power of suggestion"; however, some cognitive memory researchers believe that suggestions have power even without hypnosis. A well-known phenomenon in cognitive psychology is the "misinformation effect," in which subjects who are misled about previously witnessed events often integrate that inaccurate postevent information into their accounts of the event. In the present article, we review the misinformation literature in four major rounds according to the nature of the memory distortion. The first three rounds are studies of memory suggestibility for observed events; by contrast, the fourth (and newest) one deals with personal or autobiographical memory. Considered collectively, these four rounds of research provide compelling evidence that it is not hard at all to make people truly believe they have seen or experienced something they have not-without any hypnosis at all. Finally, we discuss the tragic implications for the unquestioned acceptance of all recovered memories.

Adolescent

Is the unconscious smart or dumb?

How sophisticated is unconscious cognition? This is one of the most fundamental questions about the unconscious that has been posed by research psychologists over the past century. Anthony Greenwald takes a contemporary look at this classical problem and concludes that unconscious cognition is severely limited in its analytic capability. In response, other leading scholars agree that the reality of unconscious processes is no longer questionable. Although there is some disagreement about just how sophisticated these processes are, the consensus is that exciting times are ahead for both research and theory concerning the mental processes involved in unconscious cognition.

Freudian Theory

Resolving legal questions with psychological data.

Psychologists are ever finding new legal arenas for their psychological data and concepts. Findings about the character and operation of stereotyping have been introduced in sex discrimination litigation in the United States. Findings about conformity, obedience to authority, and bystander apathy have been introduced into death penalty cases in South Africa. These concrete and detailed applications of psychological science demonstrate the expanding role that psychology is playing in the legal world.

Expert Testimony

Eye fixations and memory for emotional events.

Subjects watched either an emotional, neutral, or unusual sequence of slides containing 1 critical slide in the middle. Experiments 1 and 2 allowed only a single eye fixation on the critical slide by presenting it for 180 ms (Experiment 1) or 150 ms (Experiment 2). Despite this constraint, memory for a central detail was better for the emotional condition. In Experiment 3, subjects were allowed 2.70 s to view the critical slide while their eye movements were monitored. When subjects who had devoted the same number of fixations were compared, memory for the central detail of the emotional slide was again better. The results suggest that enhanced memory for detail information of an emotional event does not occur solely because more attention is devoted to the emotional information.

Adult

Recall strategies and memory for health-care visits.

Complex questions in health surveys place heavy cognitive demands on respondents, prompting researchers to appraise how specific cognitive interventions may improve the accuracy of people's answers. Investigators in one experiment asked participants to recall visits to medical providers in forward, backward, or no particular order, and matched results with providers' records. "Free" recall proved marginally superior to forward or backward ordering, although overall respondents underreported the number of visits by 20 percent; participants' gender and self-reported health status, among other factors, also affected quality of recall. The experiment lends support to contentions that the methods of cognitive science applied to survey research better the accuracy of population survey data.

Cognition

Trivial persuasion in the courtroom: the power of (a few) minor details.

Investigated the influence of trivial testimonial detail on judgments of 424 undergraduates who served as mock jurors. Ss read a summary of a court case involving robbery and murder. In Experiment 1, detailed testimony influenced judgments of guilt, even when the detail was unrelated to the culprit. In Experiment 2, detailed testimony was especially powerful when an opposing witness testified that she could not remember the trivial details. Subsequent analyses suggest that the impact of detailed testimony on guilt judgments is mediated by inferences about the eyewitnesses. When eyewitnesses provided more detail, they were generally judged to be more credible, to have a better memory for the culprit's face and for details, and to have paid more attention to the culprit.

Attention

Misinformation and memory: the creation of new memories.

Misleading information presented after an event can lead people to erroneous reports of that misinformation. Different process histories can be responsible for the same erroneous report in different people. We argue that the relative proportion of times that the different process histories are responsible for erroneous reporting will depend on the conditions of acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information. Given the conditions typical of most misinformation experiments, it appears that misinformation acceptance plays a major role, memory impairment plays some role, and pure guessing plays little or no role. Moreover, we argue that misinformation acceptance has not received the appreciation that it deserves as a phenomenon worthy of our sustained investigation. It may not tell us anything about impairment of memories, but it does tell us something about the creation of new memories.

Attention

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held.

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.

Adult

Qualities of the unreal.

Witnesses to complex events often recall nonexistent objects after being exposed to misleading postevent information. The present series of experiments investigated whether descriptions of these "unreal" memories differ from those of memories based on perception. In Experiment 1 subjects viewed a slide sequence depicting a traffic accident. In one condition, the sequence included a slide involving a yield sign. In a second condition, subjects did not see the sign but merely had its existence suggested. Many subjects in both groups later reported seeing the sign, and these subjects provided verbal descriptions. Descriptions that resulted from suggestion were longer and contained more hedges, more reference to cognitive operations, and fewer sensory details. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with a different object. Experiment 3 investigated judges' ability to discriminate the source of the descriptions based on perception and suggestion. Although judges often employed the appropriate criteria, their performance was only slightly above chance. Experiments 4 and 5 revealed that providing judges with clues regarding differences between perceived and suggested memories facilitated discrimination. The results of these experiments indicate that subtle differences exist between perceived and suggested memories, that people have a minimal ability to detect these differences, and that instructions can improve that ability.

Adolescent