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Biomedical subjects

E R Flavell

Publications and source records attributed to E R Flavell.

10 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1997

The development of children's knowledge about inner speech.

Two studies demonstrated that preschool children have little knowledge and awareness of inner speech. Study 1 showed that, in contrast to 6- to 7-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds usually did not infer that a person silently engaged in such intrinsically verbal mental activities as reading, counting, or recalling items from a shopping list was saying things to herself. They also tended to deny that covert speech is a possible human activity. Study 2 demonstrated that 4- and 5-year-olds are much poorer than adults at detecting their own inner speech. Children seem to acquire this sort of knowledge and awareness during the early school years, perhaps through experiencing their own inner speech while reading, writing, adding, and subtracting.

Adult↗
PubMed1993

Children's understanding of the stream of consciousness.

Children and adults were tested for their understanding that there is a virtually continuous flow of mental content in a waking person, a "stream of consciousness" that continues to run even when the person is not examining stimuli perceptually or trying to solve a problem. There was a marked increase with age from preschool to adulthood in subjects' tendency to say that a person who was just waiting quietly was having "some thoughts and ideas" rather than "a mind empty of thoughts and ideas." 4-year-olds also tended to say that the mind of a waiting person was "not doing anything," whether that person was another individual or themselves, and that a person who wanted to could keep his or her "mind completely empty of all thoughts and ideas" for 3 min. These results suggest that preschoolers' conceptions of people's mental lives may be quite different from those of older children and adults.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

Young children's understanding of different types of beliefs.

The purpose of this investigation was to see whether children's understandings of different types of beliefs develop concurrently. Children of 3, 4, and 5 years of age were told or shown that child story characters held beliefs different from their own or from one another, not only concerning matters of physical fact ("false beliefs"), but also concerning morality, social convention, value, and ownership of property. In contrast to the older subjects, most 3-year-olds had difficulty in attributing to others deviant beliefs of all types, except perhaps ownership, sometimes even after having been told repeatedly what the other child believed. In addition, intercorrelations among different belief tasks were positive and substantial. It was suggested that an emerging representational conception of the mind is what enables older preschoolers to understand the possibility of belief differences of all these types.

Aggression↗
PubMed1990

Young children's understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs.

Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.

Attention↗
PubMed1989

Young children's ability to differentiate appearance-reality and level 2 perspectives in the tactile modality.

A key acquisition in the child's developing knowledge of the mind is the subjective-objective distinction, which includes a clear understanding that things may appear to be other than the way they really are (appearance-reality distinction) and may present different appearances to self and others (Level 2 perspective-taking). Previous studies using tasks involving visual appearances have found that most children do not show such understanding until 4 or 5 years of age. However, a conceptual analysis of tactile as compared to visual and other perceptual experiences suggested the hypothesis that this understanding might appear earlier if the appearances the child must identify are tactile rather than visual. This hypothesis was supported by the results of 3 studies. In Studies 1 and 2, 3-year-old subjects could correctly indicate, for example, that an ice cube they were feeling with a heavily gloved finger did not feel cold to that finger (tactile appearance for the self), did feel cold to the experimenter's ungloved or thinly gloved finger (tactile appearance for another person), and was a cold ice cube, really and truly (reality). In contrast, and consistent with previous research findings, they were much poorer at distinguishing between real and visually apparent object identity, number, and color. Similarly, in Study 3 they tended to perform better on tactile appearance-reality tasks involving the properties of number, wetness, and intactness than on visual appearance-reality tasks that involved these same properties.

Attention↗
PubMed1986

Development of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction.

7 studies of the acquisition of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction suggest the following course of development. Many 3-year-olds seem to possess little or no understanding of the distinction. They fail the simplest Appearance-Reality (AR) tasks and are unresponsive to efforts to teach them the distinction. Skill in solving simple AR tasks is highly correlated with skill in solving simple perceptual Perspective-taking (PT) tasks; this suggests the hypothesis that the ability to represent the selfsame stimulus in two different, seemingly incompatible ways may underlie both skills. Children of 6-7 years have acquired both skills but nevertheless find it very difficult to reflect on and talk about such appearance-reality concepts as "looks like," "really and truly," and "looks different from the way it really and truly is." In contrast, children of 11-12 years, and to an even greater degree college students, possess a substantial body of rich, readily accessible, and explicit knowledge in this area.

Auditory Perception↗
PubMed1977

The development in very young children of tacit knowledge concerning visual perception.

The purpose of this study of early social-cognitive development was to assess the very young child's behaviorally expressed knowledge of people's visual-attentional acts and abilities. Boys and girls (N = 60) 1, 1 1/2, 2, 2 1/2, and 3 years of age were tested in their homes with their mother's help. Three sorts of tasks were used: 1. Percept production. The child's task was to produce a visual percept in the other. Examples include pointing to objects ("productive pointing") and a wide variety of object-showing problems. 2. Percept deprivation. The opposite, exemplified by a variety of object-hiding problems. 3. Percept diagnosis. The child's task was to determine what the other was already visually attending to, either by looking where his or her finger was pointed ("receptive pointing") or where his eyes were directed. It was found that the majority of 1-year-olds produced and comprehended pointing, and would sometimes hold out a toy to show it, but did little else. The 3-year-olds were at ceiling on virtually all tasks. At 1 1/2 years, children usually showed a picture by holding it flat so that both they and the other could see it. Jrom 2 on, they usually turned it toward the other in the adult fashion. Very few children of any age showed egocentrically--i.e., orienting the picture so only they could see it. By age 2, the children solved what were presumably novel showing problems for them: e.g., successfully showing to another a picture pasted on the inside bottom of a hollow cube. Hiding ability emerged later than showing ability but seemed well established by age 3. The role of the other's eyes in seeing appeared to be quite well understood at least by age 2-2 1/2. As examples, children of this age took the other's hands away from her or his eyes before trying to show her something, and could usually tell where she was looking from her eye orientation alone. These age trends presumably reflect important developments in the area of social interaction and communication, as well as with respect to cognition about percepts.

Age Factors↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Development of children's knowledge about unconsciousness.

Children of ages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 years, and adults were asked whether people who are sound asleep and not dreaming could or would: (1) see, hear, listen, notice, think, wish, pretend, and feel things (primary-consciousness activities), (2), know that they are asleep, and know whether they are or are not engaged in primary-consciousness activities such as perceiving and thinking (reflective-consciousness activities), (3) deliberately decide to or try to perform mental or physical actions (control activities). Results indicated that the recognition that people do not engage in conscious mental activities when unconscious is still developing during the late middle-childhood years. We speculate that a developing understanding of consciousness may assist the development of an understanding of unconsciousness and vice versa, and that sensitivity to the phenomenology as contrasted with the content of mental states may be a late acquisition in the theory-of-mind area.

Adult↗