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Biomedical subjects

F Happé

Publications and source records attributed to F Happé.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Inferring thought and action in motor neurone disease.

The traditional assumption that classical motor neurone disease (MND) invariably spares cognitive function is now recognised to be incorrect. Deficits have most commonly been demonstrated on executive tasks suggesting impaired function of frontal systems. Yet, crucial aspects of frontal lobe function have not hitherto been explored. The study used tests of theory of mind (ToM) (interpretation of cartoons and stories) to examine the ability of 16 patients with MND to interpret social situations and ascribe mental states to others. Only minor differences were elicited in the MND group as a whole compared to controls, and performance was not differentially affected for cartoons and stories requiring inference of another's mental state (mental) compared to control (physical) cartoons and stories. However, abnormalities were elicited on both mental and physical tasks in a subgroup of patients with bulbar signs. Moreover, examination of individual patient scores revealed a spectrum of performance ranging from normal to severely impaired. Errors were qualitatively similar to those seen in frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Performance on the ToM tasks was significantly correlated with conventional, untimed measures of executive function, suggesting that ToM deficits in MND are likely to be linked to a more general executive failure. The findings contribute to the understanding of ToM performance in neurodegenerative disease and provide further evidence of the association between MND and FTD.

Aged↗

Social cognition in frontotemporal dementia and Huntington's disease.

Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) and Huntington's disease (HD) are degenerative disorders, with predominant involvement, respectively of frontal neocortex and striatum. Both conditions give rise to altered social conduct and breakdown in interpersonal relationships, although the factors underlying these changes remain poorly defined. The study used tests of theory of mind (interpretation of cartoons and stories and judgement of preference based on eye gaze) to explore the ability of patients with FTD and HD to interpret social situations and ascribe mental states to others. Performance in the FTD group was severely impaired on all tasks, regardless of whether the test condition required attribution of a mental state. The HD group showed a milder impairment in cartoon and story interpretation, and normal preference judgements. Qualitative differences in performance were demonstrated between groups. FTD patients made more concrete, literal interpretations, whereas HD patients were more likely to misconstrue situations. The findings are interpreted as demonstrating impaired theory of mind in FTD, as one component of widespread executive deficits. In HD the evidence does not suggest a fundamental loss of theory of mind, but rather a tendency to draw faulty inferences from social situations. It is concluded that social breakdown in FTD and HD may have a different underlying basis and that the frontal neocortex and striatum have distinct contributions to social behaviour.

Cognition↗

Mind reading: neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective.

Human self-consciousness as the metarepresentation of ones own mental states and the so-called theory of mind (TOM) capacity, which requires the ability to model the mental states of others, are closely related higher cognitive functions. We address here the issue of whether taking the self-perspective (SELF) or modeling the mind of someone else (TOM) employ the same or differential neural mechanisms. A TOM paradigm was used and extended to include stimulus material that involved TOM and SELF capacities in a two-way factorial design. A behavioral study in 42 healthy volunteers showed that TOM and SELF induced differential states of mind: subjects assigned correctly first or third person pronouns when providing responses to the stimuli. Following the behavioral study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in eight healthy, right-handed males to study the common and differential neural mechanisms underlying TOM and SELF. The main factor TOM led to increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex. The main factor SELF led to increased neural activity in the right temporoparietal junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex. A significant interaction of both factors TOM and SELF was observed in the right prefrontal cortex. These divergent neural activations in response to TOM and SELF suggest that these important differential mental capacities of human self-consciousness are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions. Press

Adult↗

Acquired mind-blindness following frontal lobe surgery? A single case study of impaired 'theory of mind' in a patient treated with stereotactic anterior capsulotomy.

Social insight, specifically the ability to represent thoughts and feelings ('theory of mind'), may have a circumscribed and dedicated neurological substrate. Evidence of deficits in 'theory of mind' following acquired lesions would support this idea. Previous studies of lesions resulting from stroke or head injury have been hampered by lack of detailed lesion information and pre-lesion documentation. We report the case of a 76-year-old man who, following a standard surgical procedure to treat bipolar affective disorder, showed evidence of impaired 'theory of mind'. This case, which is the first of its type, may contribute to the search for the brain basis of social insight.

Aged↗

Exploring the cognitive phenotype of autism: weak "central coherence" in parents and siblings of children with autism: I. Experimental tests.

Previous twin and family studies have indicated that there are strong genetic influences in the etiology of autism, and provide support for the notion of a broader phenotype in first-degree relatives. The present study explored this phenotype in terms of one current cognitive theory of autism. Parents and brothers of boys with autism, boys with dyslexia, and normal boys were given tests of "central coherence", on which children with autism perform unusually well due to an information-processing bias favouring part/detail processing over processing of wholes/meaning. Results indicated that fathers of boys with autism, as a group, showed piecemeal processing across four tests of central coherence. This was not true for any other group. These findings raise the possibility that the broader autism phenotype may include a "cognitive style" (weak central coherence) that can confer information-processing advantages.

Adolescent↗

Exploring the cognitive phenotype of autism: weak "central coherence" in parents and siblings of children with autism: II. Real-life skills and preferences.

Information on everyday life activities and preferences in both social and nonsocial domains was obtained from parents and children who had taken part in an experimental study of central coherence. Comparisons were made between parents who had a son with autism, parents with a dyslexic son, and families without a history of developmental disorder, as well as the male siblings in these families. Data on everyday preferences and abilities were elicited by means of an experimental questionnaire. Significant group differences in social and nonsocial preferences were found, suggesting that some parents showed similarities with their son with autism, in preference for nonsocial activities and ability in detail-focused processing. A similar experimental questionnaire, completed by parents on behalf of their sons, discriminated between autism group probands and controls, but did not differentiate sibling groups. The relevance of the nonsocial items to central coherence is discussed in the light of the findings in Part I: autism parents who reported more autism-related nonsocial (but not social) preferences, tended to show a piecemeal processing style on the experimental tasks.

Adolescent↗

Movement and mind: a functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of complex intentional movement patterns.

We report a functional neuroimaging study with positron emission tomography (PET) in which six healthy adult volunteers were scanned while watching silent computer-presented animations. The characters in the animations were simple geometrical shapes whose movement patterns selectively evoked mental state attribution or simple action description. Results showed increased activation in association with mental state attribution in four main regions: medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (superior temporal sulcus), basal temporal regions (fusiform gyrus and temporal poles adjacent to the amygdala), and extrastriate cortex (occipital gyrus). Previous imaging studies have implicated these regions in self-monitoring, in the perception of biological motion, and in the attribution of mental states using verbal stimuli or visual depictions of the human form. We suggest that these regions form a network for processing information about intentions, and speculate that the ability to make inferences about other people's mental states evolved from the ability to make inferences about other creatures' actions.

Adult↗

Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an fMRI study of 'theory of mind' in verbal and nonverbal tasks.

Previous functional imaging studies have explored the brain regions activated by tasks requiring 'theory of mind'--the attribution of mental states. Tasks used have been primarily verbal, and it has been unclear to what extent different results have reflected different tasks, scanning techniques, or genuinely distinct regions of activation. Here we report results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI) involving two rather different tasks both designed to tap theory of mind. Brain activation during the theory of mind condition of a story task and a cartoon task showed considerable overlap, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (paracingulate cortex). These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning our everyday ability to 'mind-read'.

Adult↗

High "intelligence," low "IQ"? Speed of processing and measured IQ in children with autism.

The uneven profile of performance on standard assessments of intelligence and the high incidence of savant skills have prompted interest in the nature of intelligence in autism. The present paper reports the first group study of speed of processing in children with autism (IQ 1 SD below average) using an inspection time task. The children with autism showed inspection times as fast as an age-matched group of young normally developing children (IQ 1 SD above average). They were also significantly faster than mentally handicapped children without autism of the same age, even when these groups were pairwise matched on Wechsler IQ. To the extent that IT tasks tap individual differences in basic processing efficiency, children with autism in this study appear to have preserved information processing capacity despite poor measured IQ. These findings have implications for the role of general and specific cognitive systems in knowledge and skill acquisition: far from showing that children with autism are unimpaired, we suggest that our data may demonstrate the vital role of social insight in the development of manifest "intelligence."

Adolescent↗

Good test--retest reliability for standard and advanced false-belief tasks across a wide range of abilities.

Although tests of young children's understanding of mind have had a remarkable impact upon developmental and clinical psychological research over the past 20 years, very little is known about their reliability. Indeed, the only existing study of test-retest reliability suggests unacceptably poor results for first-order false-belief tasks (Mayes, Klin, Tercyak, Cicchetti, & Cohen, 1996), although this may in part reflect the nonstandard (video-based) procedures adopted by these authors. The present study had four major aims. The first was to re-examine the reliability of false-belief tasks, using more standard (puppet and storybook) procedures. The second was to assess whether the test-retest reliability of false-belief task performance is equivalent for children of contrasting ability levels. The third aim was to explore whether adopting an aggregate approach improves the reliability with which children's early mental-state awareness can be measured. The fourth aim was to examine for the first time the test-retest reliability of children's performances on more advanced theory-of-mind tasks. Our results suggest that most standard and advanced false-belief tasks do in fact show good test-retest reliability and internal consistency, with very strong test-retest correlations between aggregate scores for children of all levels of ability.

Aptitude↗

The neuroanatomy of autism: a voxel-based whole brain analysis of structural scans.

Autism is a biological disorder which affects social cognition, and understanding brain abnormalities of the former will elucidate the brain basis of the latter. We report structural MRI data on 15 high-functioning individuals with autistic disorder. A voxel-based whole brain analysis identified grey matter differences in an amygdala centered system relative to 15 age- and IQ-matched controls. Decreases of grey matter were found in anterior parts of this system (right paracingulate sulcus, left inferior frontal gyrus). Increases were found in posterior parts (amygdala/peri-amygdaloid cortex, middle temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus), and in regions of the cerebellum. These structures are implicated in social cognition by animal, imaging and histopathological studies. This study therefore provides converging evidence of the physiological basis of social cognition.

Adult↗

Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following stroke.

The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others ('theory of mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired theory of mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired theory of mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined theory of mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental state tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for theory of mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states.

Aged↗

Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style?

Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by impaired social and communicative development, and restricted interests and activities. This article will argue that we can discover more about developmental disorders such as autism through demonstrations of task success than through examples of task failure. Even in exploring and explaining what people with autism find difficult, such as social interaction, demonstration of competence on contrasting tasks has been crucial to defining the nature of the specific deficit. Deficit accounts of autism cannot explain, however, the assets seen in this disorder; for example, savant skills in maths, music and drawing, and islets of ability in visuospatial tests and rote memory. An alternative account, reviewed here, suggests that autism is characterized by a cognitive style biased towards local rather than global information processing - termed 'weak central coherence'. Evidence that weak coherence might also characterize the relatives of people with autism, and form part of the extended phenotype of this largely genetic disorder, is discussed. This review concludes by considering some outstanding questions concerning the specific cognitive mechanism for coherence and the neural basis of individual differences in this aspect of information processing.

Journal Article↗

Distinguishing lies from jokes: theory of mind deficits and discourse interpretation in right hemisphere brain-damaged patients.

Right-hemisphere brain damaged (RHD) patients and a normal control group were tested for their ability to infer first- and second-order mental states and to understand the communicative intentions underlying ironic jokes and lies. Subjects listened to stories involving a character who had either a true or a false belief about another character's knowledge. Stories ended either with an ironic joke or a lie by this character. In the joke stories, the speaker knew that the listener knew the truth (a true second-order belief) and did not expect the listener to believe what was said; in the lie stories, the speaker did not know that the listener actually knew the truth (a false second-order belief) and thus did expect the listener to believe what was said. RHD patients performed significantly worse than control subjects on one of two measures of second-order belief, which suggests that the ability to make second-order mental state attributions is fragile and unreliable following right-hemisphere damage. RHD patients in addition performed worse than controls when asked to distinguish lies from jokes, confirming their known difficulties with discourse interpretation. For both groups, the ability to distinguish lies from jokes was strongly correlated with two measures of the ability to attribute correctly second-order beliefs. These results suggest that the fragility of RHD patients' understanding of second-order mental states underlies a portion of their difficulties in discourse comprehension, but that the underlying impairment is not restricted to right hemisphere dysfunction.

Aged↗

'Theory of mind' in the brain. Evidence from a PET scan study of Asperger syndrome.

The ability to attribute mental states to others ('theory of mind') pervades normal social interaction and is impaired in autistic individuals. In a previous positron emission tomography scan study of normal volunteers, performing a 'theory of mind' task was associated with activity in left medial prefrontal cortex. We used the same paradigm in five patients with Asperger syndrome, a mild variant of autism with normal intellectual functioning. No task-related activity was found in this region, but normal activity was observed in immediately adjacent areas. This result suggests that a highly circumscribed region of left medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial component of the brain system that underlies the normal understanding of other minds.

Adult↗

The neuropsychology of autism.

In this review, we aim to bring together major trends in autism research at three levels: biology, behaviour and cognition. We propose that cognitive theories are vital in neuropsychology, which seeks to make connections between brain abnormality and behavioural symptoms. Research at each of the three levels is incomplete, but important advances have been made. At the biological level, there is strong evidence for genetic factors, although the mechanism is, as yet, unknown. At the behavioural level, diagnosis and education are becoming more coherent and less controversial, although the possibility of autism subtypes has provoked new debate. At the cognitive level, three major theories are proving fruitful (mentalizing impairment, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), although the relation and overlap between these is uncertain. Rapidly advancing technology and methodology (e.g. brain imaging, gene mapping), as tools of cognitive theory, may help to make autism one of the first developmental disorders to be understood at the neuropsychological level.

Autistic Disorder↗

Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of "theory of mind" in story comprehension.

The ability of normal children and adults to attribute independent mental states to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviour ("theory of mind") has been a focus of much recent research. Autism is a biologically based disorder which appears to be characterised by a specific impairment in this "mentalising" process. The present paper reports a functional neuroimaging study with positron emission tomography in which we studied brain activity in normal volunteers while they performed story comprehension tasks necessitating the attribution of mental states. The resultant brain activity was compared with that measured in two control tasks: "physical" stories which did not require this mental attribution, and passages of unlinked sentences. Both story conditions, when compared to the unlinked sentences, showed significantly increased regional cerebral blood flow in the following regions: the temporal poles bilaterally, the left superior temporal gyrus and the posterior cingulate cortex. Comparison of the "theory of mind" stories with "physical" stores revealed a specific pattern of activation associated with mental state attribution: it was only this task which produced activation in the medial frontal gyrus on the left (Brodmann's area 8). This comparison also showed significant activation in the posterior cingulate cortex. These surprisingly clear-cut findings are discussed in relation to previous studies of brain activation during story comprehension. The localisation of brain regions involved in normal attribution of mental states and contextual problem solving is feasible and may have implication for the neural basis of autism.

Adolescent↗

Language and communication in autistic disorders.

Communication problems form one of the key diagnostic criteria for autism, but there is a wide variety of manifestations. The theory that autistic individuals are unable to represent mental states can shed light on both the nature and range of communication impairments. This theory predicts that the specific communication deficit lies in the use of language to affect other minds. Language is not special in this respect, and is important only in so far as it may be used to give evidence of a speaker's thoughts and intentions. Thus, in autism, language level would be expected to relate strongly to performance on standard tests of theory of mind. Normal language acquisition appears to build upon the ability to recognize and orient towards ostensive behaviour. For this reason, it may not be necessary to postulate additional language impairments in order to explain the almost universal prevalence of language delay in children with autism. Autism, then, provides a model for studying the important distinction between language and communication, and demonstrates the vital part which mind-reading plays in normal human verbal and non-verbal interaction.

Autistic Disorder↗