Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Frédéric Grosshans.
We analyze the asymptotic security of the family of Gaussian modulated quantum key distribution protocols for continuous-variables systems. We prove that the Gaussian unitary attack is optimal for all the considered bounds on the key rate when the first and second momenta of the canonical variables involved are known by the honest parties.
We present here an information theoretic study of Gaussian collective attacks on the continuous variable key distribution protocols based on Gaussian modulation of coherent states. These attacks, overlooked in previous security studies, give a finite advantage to the eavesdropper in the experimentally relevant lossy channel, but are not powerful enough to reduce the range of the reverse reconciliation protocols. Secret key rates are given for the ideal case where Bob performs optimal collective measurements, as well as for the realistic cases where he performs homodyne or heterodyne measurements. We also apply the generic security proof of Christiandl et al. to obtain unconditionally secure rates for these protocols.
A general study of arbitrary finite-size coherent attacks against continuous-variable quantum cryptographic schemes is presented. It is shown that, if the size of the blocks that can be coherently attacked by an eavesdropper is fixed and much smaller than the key size, then the optimal attack for a given signal-to-noise ratio in the transmission line is an individual Gaussian attack. Consequently, non-Gaussian coherent attacks do not need to be considered in the security analysis of such quantum cryptosystems.
Quantum continuous variables are being explored as an alternative means to implement quantum key distribution, which is usually based on single photon counting. The former approach is potentially advantageous because it should enable higher key distribution rates. Here we propose and experimentally demonstrate a quantum key distribution protocol based on the transmission of gaussian-modulated coherent states (consisting of laser pulses containing a few hundred photons) and shot-noise-limited homodyne detection; squeezed or entangled beams are not required. Complete secret key extraction is achieved using a reverse reconciliation technique followed by privacy amplification. The reverse reconciliation technique is in principle secure for any value of the line transmission, against gaussian individual attacks based on entanglement and quantum memories. Our table-top experiment yields a net key transmission rate of about 1.7 megabits per second for a loss-free line, and 75 kilobits per second for a line with losses of 3.1 dB. We anticipate that the scheme should remain effective for lines with higher losses, particularly because the present limitations are essentially technical, so that significant margin for improvement is available on both the hardware and software.
We propose several methods for quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the generation and transmission of random distributions of coherent or squeezed states, and we show that they are secure against individual eavesdropping attacks. These protocols require that the transmission of the optical line between Alice and Bob is larger than 50%, but they do not rely on "sub-shot-noise" features such as squeezing. Their security is a direct consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which limits the signal-to-noise ratio of possible quantum measurements on the transmission line. Our approach can also be used for evaluating various QKD protocols using light with Gaussian statistics.