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Gedeon O Deák

Publications and source records attributed to Gedeon O Deák.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Do children really confuse appearance and reality?

Our understanding of many mental, social and physical phenomena hinges on a general understanding that appearances can differ from reality. Yet young children sometimes seem unable to understand appearance-reality dissociations. In a standard test, children are shown a deceptive object and asked what it really is and what it looks like. Many preschool children give the same answer to both questions. This error has been attributed to children's inflexible conceptual representations or inflexibility in representing their own changing beliefs. However, evidence fails to support either hypothesis: new tests show that young children generally understand appearance-reality discrepancies as well as fantasy-reality distinctions. These tests instead implicate children's failure to understand the unfamiliar discourse format of the standard test. This misunderstanding might reveal a subtler difficulty in making logical inferences about questions.

Child↗

Gaze following: why (not) learn it?

We propose a computational model of the emergence of gaze following skills in infant-caregiver interactions. The model is based on the idea that infants learn that monitoring their caregiver's direction of gaze allows them to predict the locations of interesting objects or events in their environment (Moore & Corkum, 1994). Elaborating on this theory, we demonstrate that a specific Basic Set of structures and mechanisms is sufficient for gaze following to emerge. This Basic Set includes the infant's perceptual skills and preferences, habituation and reward-driven learning, and a structured social environment featuring a caregiver who tends to look at things the infant will find interesting. We review evidence that all elements of the Basic Set are established well before the relevant gaze following skills emerge. We evaluate the model in a series of simulations and show that it can account for typical development. We also demonstrate that plausible alterations of model parameters, motivated by findings on two different developmental disorders - autism and Williams syndrome - produce delays or deficits in the emergence of gaze following. The model makes a number of testable predictions. In addition, it opens a new perspective for theorizing about cross-species differences in gaze following.

Animals↗

Choose and choose again: appearance-reality errors, pragmatics and logical ability.

In the Appearance/Reality (AR) task some 3- and 4-year-old children make perseverative errors: they choose the same word for the appearance and the function of a deceptive object. Are these errors specific to the AR task, or signs of a general question-answering problem? Preschoolers completed five tasks: AR; simple successive forced-choice question pairs (QP); flexible naming of objects (FN); working memory (WM) span; and indeterminacy detection (ID). AR errors correlated with QP errors. Insensitivity to indeterminacy predicted perseveration in both tasks. Neither WM span nor flexible naming predicted other measures. Age predicted sensitivity to indeterminacy. These findings suggest that AR tests measure a pragmatic understanding; specifically, different questions about a topic usually call for different answers. This understanding is related to the ability to detect indeterminacy of each question in a series. AR errors are unrelated to the ability to represent an object as belonging to multiple categories, to working memory span, or to inhibiting previously activated words.

Auditory Perception↗

Is perseveration caused by inhibition failure? Evidence from preschool children's inferences about word meanings.

Four studies examined the relation between children's cognitive inhibition and flexibility in a lexical inference task. Children's linguistic flexibility was assessed by the Flexible Induction of Meaning (FIM) test (Deák, 2000a), which requires that children shift inferences about the meanings of several words for novel objects. In Study 1, 54 3-year-olds either were trained between blocks of problems, for a delay of 3 min, or received no training or delay. Training delays did not influence perseveration. In Study 2 (N=72 3- and 4-year-olds') novel word problems were grouped either to increase the frequency of cue switches (i.e., reduce response "set") or minimize the interval between problems about the same objects. Again, no effect was found. In Study 3, 48 3- and 4-year-olds completed 6 preliminary trials; in a high interference group these trials generated a response set to be inhibited upon the first switch to a new cue context. This group did not perseverate more than a control group. There was no association between FIM perseveration and a Stroop-like test of verbal inhibition though both were marginally related to receptive vocabulary. In study 4 (48 3- and 4-year-olds), FIM was again unrelated to Stroop performance, but was related to the ability to tell whether a situation or problem is indeterminate. Thus, flexibility across semantic inferences is not influenced by timing, order, and number of pre-switch problems and is not predicted by individual differences in a test of verbal inhibition. However previously reported age and individual differences in flexible induction of word meanings are robust and related to vocabulary and logical ability.

Child, Preschool↗

Matching and naming objects by shape or function: age and context effects in preschool children.

Three experiments tested preschoolers' use of abstract principles to classify and label objects by shape or function. Three- and 4-year-olds were instructed to match objects by shape or function. Four-year-olds readily adopted either rule, but 3-year-olds followed only the shape rule. Without a rule, 4-year-olds tended to match by shape unless object function was shown during matching (Experiment 2). Three-year-olds' ability to use a function rule was tested in several conditions (re-presenting functions; reminders to "use the rule"; repeating rule on every trial). None induced consistent function matching (Experiment 3). Supplemental memory and verbal tasks showed that 3-year-olds have trouble using function as an abstract basis of comparison. Naming data, however, show that preschoolers are learning that object labels are based on function. The results show preschoolers' growing flexibility in adopting abstract generalization rules and growing knowledge of conventions for extending words.

Age Factors↗

Children's perseverative appearance-reality errors are related to emerging language skills.

Two experiments explored the communicative bases of preschoolers' object appearance-reality (AR) errors. In Experiment 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 36) completed the AR test (with high- and low-deceptive objects), a control test with the same discourse structure but nondeceptive stimuli, and stimulus naming and memory tests. AR performance correlated positively with control (discourse) and naming test performance. Object deceptiveness had little effect. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 64) completed AR tests that experimentally varied question phrasing and use of exemplar objects. Children also completed memory, vocabulary, and control tests (of verbal perseveration). AR performance variance was predicted by a composite perseveration score from three non-AR tasks, vocabulary, and exemplars. The results indicate that the discourse structure of the AR test elicits a perseverative tendency that is mediated by children's verbal knowledge.

Child↗