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Biomedical subjects

Geoffrey R Loftus

Publications and source records attributed to Geoffrey R Loftus.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Object identification in preschool children and adults.

We introduce computer-based methodologies for investigating object identification in 3- to 5-year-old children. In two experiments, preschool children and adults indicated when they could identify degraded pictures of common objects as those pictures either gradually improved or degraded in clarity. Clarity transformations were implemented in four ways: blurring, decreasing the picture's physical size, decreasing the pixel signal-to-noise ratio, and cropping. In Experiment 1, all age groups correctly identified objects at a more degraded state when those objects began moderately, as opposed to very, degraded and then clarified. This finding supports the notion that previous perceptual hypotheses interfere with object identification (i.e. the perceptual interference effect). In Experiment 2, children, but not adults, overestimated their ability to recognize objects in a degraded state when the object's identity was given to them beforehand. This suggests that for young children knowledge of the object's true identity cannot be ignored when evaluating their current perceptions. This is the first demonstration of the perceptual interference effect in children. We discuss both methodological and theoretical implications of the findings for research on object perception and theory of mind.

Adult↗

Why is it easier to identify someone close than far away?

It is a matter of common sense that a person is easier to recognize when close than when far away. A possible explanation for why this happens begins with two observations. First, the human visual system, like many image-processing devices, can be viewed as a spatial filter that passes higher spatial frequencies, expressed in terms of cycles/degree, progressively more poorly. Second, as a face is moved farther from the observer, the face's image spatial frequency spectrum, expressed in terms of cycles/face, scales downward in a manner inversely proportional to distance. An implication of these two observations is that as a face moves away, progressively lower spatial frequencies, expressed in cycles/face--and therefore, progressively coarser facial details--are lost to the observer at a rate that is likewise inversely proportional to distance. We propose what we call the distance-as-filtering hypothesis, which is that these two observations are sufficient to explain the effect of distance on face processing. If the distance-as-filtering hypothesis is correct, one should be able to simulate the effect of seeing a face at some distance, D, by filtering the face so as to mimic its spatial frequency composition, expressed in terms of cycles/face, at that distance. In four experiments, we measured face perception at varying distances that were simulated either by filtering the face as just described or by shrinking the face so that it subtended the visual angle corresponding to the desired distance. The distance-as-filtering hypothesis was confirmed perfectly in two face perception tasks: assessing the informational content of the face and identifying celebrities. Data from the two tasks could be accounted for by assuming that they were mediated by different low-pass spatial filters within the human visual system that have the same general mathematical description but that differ in scale by a factor of approximately 0.75. We discuss our results in terms of (1) how they can be used to explain the effect of distance on visual processing, (2) what they tell us about face processing, (3) how they are related to "flexible spatial scale usage," as discussed by Schyns and colleagues, and (4) how they may be used in practical (e.g., legal) settings to demonstrate the loss of face information that occurs when a person is seen at a particular distance.

Discrimination Learning↗

Linear theory, dimensional theory, and the face-inversion effect.

We contrast 2 theories within whose context problems are conceptualized and data interpreted. By traditional linear theory, a dependent variable is the sum of main-effect and interaction terms. By dimensional theory, independent variables yield values on internal dimensions that in turn determine performance. We frame our arguments within an investigation of the face-inversion effect--the greater processing disadvantage of inverting faces compared with non-faces. We report data from 3 simulations and 3 experiments wherein faces or non-faces are studied upright or inverted in a recognition procedure. The simulations demonstrate that (a) critical conclusions depend on which theory is used to interpret data and (b) dimensional theory is the more flexible and consistent in identifying underlying psychological structures, because dimensional theory subsumes linear theory as a special case. The experiments demonstrate that by dimensional theory, there is no face-inversion effect for unfamiliar faces but a clear face-inversion effect for celebrity faces.

Computer Simulation↗

How different spatial-frequency components contribute to visual information acquisition.

We test 3 theories of global and local scene information acquisition, defining global and local in terms of spatial frequencies. By independence theories, high- and low-spatial-frequency information are acquired over the same time course and combine additively. By global-precedence theories, global information acquisition precedes local information acquisition, but they combine additively. By interactive theories, global information also affects local-information acquisition rate. We report 2 digit-recall experiments. In the 1st, we confirmed independence theories. In the 2nd, we disconfirmed both independence theories and interactive theories, leaving global-precedence theories as the remaining alternative. We show that a specific global-precedence theory quantitatively accounted for Experiments 1-2 data as well as for past data. We discuss how their spatial-frequency definition of spatial scale comports with definitions used by others, and we consider the suggestion by P. G. Schyns and colleagues (e.g., D. J. Morrison & Schyns, 2001) that the visual system may act flexibly rather than rigidly in its use of spatial scales.

Humans↗

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias.

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.

Culture↗

We saw it all along: visual hindsight bias in children and adults.

We traced the developmental origins and trajectory of the hindsight bias. Three-, 4-, and 5-year-old children and adults identified gradually clarifying images of degraded common objects on a computer. Half the time, observers did not know in advance what the object would become. The rest of the time, observers knew the object's identity in advance and estimated when a naive same-age peer would identify the clarifying object. In two experiments, children and adults demonstrated hindsight bias by using advance knowledge to overestimate their same-age peers' ability to identify the objects. The magnitude of this bias declined across age in one experiment, but remained relatively stable over age in the other experiment. These findings link developmental psychology and adult cognitive science.

Adult↗

Why is it difficult to see in the fog? How stimulus contrast affects visual perception and visual memory.

Processing visually degraded stimuli is a common experience. We struggle to find house keys on dim front porches, to decipher slides projected in overly bright seminar rooms, and to read 10th-generation photocopies. In this research, we focus specifically on stimuli that are degraded via reduction of stimulus contrast and address two questions. First, why is it difficult to process low-contrast, as compared with high-contrast, stimuli? Second, is the effect of contrast fundamental in that its effect is independent of the stimulus being processed and the reason for processing the stimulus? We formally address and answer these questions within the context of a series of nested theories, each providing a successively stronger definition of what it means for contrast to affect perception and memory. To evaluate the theories, we carried out six experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 involved simple stimuli (randomly generated forms and digit strings), whereas Experiments 3-6 involved naturalistic pictures (faces, houses, and cityscapes). The stimuli were presented at two contrast levels and at varying exposure durations. The data from all the experiments allow the conclusion that some function of stimulus contrast combines multiplicatively with stimulus duration at a stage prior to that at which the nature of the stimulus and the reason for processing it are determined, and it is the result of this multiplicative combination that determines eventual memory performance. We describe a stronger version of this theory--the sensory response, information acquisition theory--which has at its core, the strong Bloch's-law-like assumption of a fundamental visual system response that is proportional to the product of stimulus contrast and stimulus duration. This theory was, as it has been in the past, highly successful in accounting for memory for simple stimuli shown at short (i.e., shorter than an eye fixation) durations. However, it was less successful in accounting for data from short-duration naturalistic pictures and was entirely unsuccessful in accounting for data from naturalistic pictures shown at longer durations. We discuss (1) processing differences between short- and long-duration stimuli, (2) processing differences between simple stimuli, such as digits, and complex stimuli, such as pictures, (3) processing differences between biluminant stimuli (such as line drawings with only two luminance levels) and multiluminant stimuli (such as grayscale pictures with multiple luminance levels), and (4) Bloch's law and a proposed generalization of the concept of metamers.

Fixation, Ocular↗