The group-size effect in non-feeding animals.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Gilbert Roberts.
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Reciprocity, whether direct or indirect, is thought to be the key to establishing cooperation among non-relatives. But Riolo et al. have presented a model in which cooperation is instead based on similarity: agents donate only when their partner's 'tag' lies within a 'tolerance' range around their own. Here we point out that their model requires individuals with identical tags to cooperate with each other, and show that cooperation tends to collapse when individuals bearing identical tags are given the option of not donating. We therefore question their mechanism for maintaining cooperation without reciprocity.
In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the results of several studies which have investigated the evolution of cooperation between non-relatives in systems where investment in partners can vary. In contrast to previous proposals, we show for the first time that variable-investment cooperation can be readily maintained in inter-species mutualistic relationships even in the absence of spatial structure, but that the stability of this interaction is dependent on the particular investment-response rule that is employed. By allowing the evolution of investment-response parameters in both inter- and intra-specific versions of the continuous variable-investment Prisoners' Dilemma we show that, in the absence of further factors, the raise-the stakes (RTS) strategy is likely to evolve into a simpler, variable investment form of Give-as-Good-as-you-Get that initially offers a high fixed amount and subsequently matches its partner's investment. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that genuine RTS-like strategies will still be selected if two intuitively reasonable conditions hold: if individuals are limited in terms of the total they can invest in cooperative actions over their lifetimes, and if there are always some individuals in a population that cannot cooperate.