Biomedical subjects

György Gergely

Publications and source records attributed to György Gergely.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2007

On pedagogy.

Humans are adapted to spontaneously transfer relevant cultural knowledge to conspecifics and to fast-learn the contents of such teaching through a human-specific social learning system called 'pedagogy' (Csibra & Gergely, 2006). Pedagogical knowledge transfer is triggered by specific communicative cues (such as eye-contact, contingent reactivity, the prosodic pattern of 'motherese', and being addressed by one's own name). Infants show special sensitivity to such 'ostensive' cues that signal the teacher's communicative intention to manifest new and relevant knowledge about a referent object. Pedagogy offers a novel functional perspective to interpret a variety of early emerging triadic communicative interactions between adults and infants about novel objects they are jointly attending to. The currently dominant interpretation of such triadic communications (mindreading) holds that infants interpret others' object-directed manifestations in terms of subjective mental states (such as emotions, dispositions, or intentions) that they attribute to the other person's mind. We contrast the pedagogical versus the mindreading account in a new study testing 14-month-olds' interpretation of others' object-directed emotion expressions observed in a communicative cueing context. We end by discussing the far-reaching implications of the pedagogical perspective for a wide range of early social-cognitive competences, and for providing new directions for future research on child development.

Analysis of Variance↗

PubMed2006

'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans.

Humans show a strong and early inclination to interpret observed behaviours of others as goal-directed actions. We identify two main epistemic functions that this 'teleological obsession' serves: on-line prediction and social learning. We show how teleological action interpretations can serve these functions by drawing on two kinds of inference ('action-to-goal' or 'goal-to-action'), and argue that both types of teleological inference constitute inverse problems that can only be solved by further assumptions. We pinpoint the assumptions that the three currently proposed mechanisms of goal attribution (action-effect associations, simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning) imply, and contrast them with the functions they are supposed to fulfil. We argue that while action-effect associations and simulation procedures are generally well suited to serve on-line action monitoring and prediction, social learning of new means actions and artefact functions requires the inferential productivity of teleological reasoning.

Cognition↗

PubMed2003

The early origins of goal attribution in infancy.

We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance', however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of Woodward (1999) showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions.

Awareness↗

PubMed2003

Teleological reasoning in infancy: the nai;ve theory of rational action.

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2003

Calculation of the surface excitation parameter for Si and Ge from measured electron backscattered spectra by means of a Monte-Carlo simulation.

A new Monte Carlo method has been developed for simulating backscattered electron spectra, and this was applied for determining the surface excitation parameter (SEP). The simulation is based on direct tracking of electron trajectories in the solid, taking into account elastic and inelastic events. The elastic scattering cross sections are taken from literature, while inelastic cross section data are obtained by a fitting procedure. After some iterations, the program produces electron spectra fitting well to the experimental ones. Si and Ge electron spectra were simulated and SEP values were calculated. The SEP values are compared to other ones from literature.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2003

The development of teleological versus mentalizing observational learning strategies in infancy.

The author introduces the concept of mentalization as a central interpretative mechanism of social reality testing. It is argued that developmentally the emergence of this mentalizing capacity to interpret other people's actions in terms of their causal intentional mind states (such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions) is preceded by an earlier, nonmentalistic, teleological action interpretational system that represents others' actions in terms of their concrete and visible outcomes. Then the early psychosocial determinants of the developmental unfolding of our mentalizing capacity are considered from the points of view of attachment theory and developmental psychopathology. It is argued that, in severely dysfunctional (neglecting, abusive, and/or dissociative) caregiving environments, the development of mentalization becomes inhibited and results in a predominantly teleological, nonmentalistic interpretation of intimate attachment relationships that is a core feature of certain developmental psychopathologies such as borderline personality disorder. The normal developmental shift from a teleological to a mentalistic mode of action interpretation is illustrated in terms of recently discovered qualitative changes in imitative and observational learning styles during infancy. It is hypothesized that these changes are related to the infant's developing capacity to interpret the communicative-referential behavioral cues that frame the caregiver's infant-directed actions as signaling a cooperative and benevolent mentalistic attitude toward the baby. In closing, it is proposed that the hypothesized role of severely dysfunctional attachment environments in inhibiting the establishment of mentalization skills could be directly tested in early development in the domain of observational learning. It is predicted that differential patterns of "teleological emulation" versus "mentalistic imitative learning" will be found in infants raised in severely dysfunctional versus congenial and secure caregiving contexts, respectively.

Child Development↗

PubMed2002

Rational imitation in preverbal infants.

Here we show that if an adult demonstrates a new way to execute a task to a group of infants aged 14 months, the children will use this action to achieve the same goal only if they consider it to be the most rational alternative. Our results indicate that imitation of goal-directed action by preverbal infants is a selective, interpretative process, rather than a simple re-enactment of the means used by a demonstrator, as was previously thought.

Adult↗