Research and patients in a permanent vegetative state.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to H Draper.
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Presumed consent to organ donation looks increasingly unlikely to be a palatable option for increasing organ procurement in the UK following the publication of the report into events at Alder Hey and elsewhere. Yet, given that the alternative to increasing the number of cadaveric organs available is either to accept a greater number of live donations, or accept that people will continue to die for the want of an organ, public policy makers remain obliged to consider other means of increasing the procurement rate. In this paper, we meet the main objections to mandated choice (namely that it undermines autonomy and that mandated donation is preferable). We have modified the traditional approach to mandated choice to take into account the force of the objection that mandated donation is preferable, by accepting that people can and do make bad decisions about organ donation and proposing that all accompanying public education and information about cadaveric donation should be directed in favour of donation.
In this paper we consider the use of cases in medical ethics research and teaching. To date, there has been little discussion about the consent or confidentiality requirements that ought to govern the use of cases in these areas. This is in marked contrast to the requirements for consent to publish cases in clinical journals, or to use personal information in research. There are a number of reasons why it might be difficult to obtain consent to use cases in ethics. Many cases concern people who are incompetent, and thus unable to give consent. Often the material is of a sensitive nature, it is not clear who should give consent, or the ethicist has no access to those involved. We argue that the use of cases in ethics research and teaching can be justified by appeal to the public interest argument, and suggest a number of areas for discussion and clarification.
The majority of patients being treated for acute renal failure in intensive care units have multiple medical problems. Accordingly, the withdrawal of renal replacement therapies should be considered as part of a general decision about whether to initiate or continue with treatment per se. Several guidelines on withdrawing and withholding therapy have been produced and some common themes emerge: concerns to avoid euthanasia, potential for benefit, patient consent (shared decision-making), team consensus/decision-making, and the provision of appropriate palliative care and resource implications. Each of these is considered in turn, although the word limit for this paper does not permit detailed exposition.
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People who suffer from eating disorders often have to be treated against their will, perhaps by being detained, perhaps by being forced to eat. In this paper it is argued that whilst forcing compliance is generally acceptable, there may be circumstances under which a sufferer's refusal of consent to treatment should be respected. This argument will hinge upon whether someone in the grip of an eating disorder can actually make competent decisions about their quality of life. If so, then the decision to refuse therapy may be on a par with other decisions to refuse life-prolonging therapy made by sufferers of debilitating chronic, or acute onset terminal illness. In such cases, palliation might justifiably replace aggressive therapy. The argument will also draw heavily on the distinction between competent refusal of therapy and passive euthanasia, and the distinction between incompetence and irrational decisions. Both distinctions will then be applied to decisions to refuse food. The extent to which sufferers from anorexia nervosa can be categorised as either incompetent or irrational will be examined. It against this background that it will be argued that at least some of those who suffer from eating disorders should have their refusals respected, even if they may die as a result.
In 1997, a court in Cyprus jailed Pavlos Georgiou for fifteen months for knowingly infecting a British woman, Janet Pink, with HIV-1 through unprotected sexual intercourse. Pink met Georgiou in January 1994 whilst on holiday. She discovered that she had contracted the virus from him in October 1994 but continued the relationship until July 1996 when she developed AIDS. She returned to the UK for treatment and reported Georgiou to the Cypriot authorities. There have been a number of legal cases involving deliberate transmission of HIV, but most have involved forced exposure to infected bodily fluids for example, rape or biting, and have been dealt with using the existing legislation for rape or assault. While it is often difficult to prove responsibility for transmission in cases of forced exposure to HIV, it is even more contentious in cases like those of Janet Pink where an individual has consented to sex but claims that he/she was not forewarned of his/her partner's HIV-positive status. At present there is no specific criminal offence of having unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosing one's HIV-positive status but a prosecution could possibly be brought under any one of a number of existing offences. Perhaps a change of policy needs to be considered. The Home Office has issued a consultation document which outlines a proposal that will allow the criminalization of intentional transmission of diseases, like HIV, that are likely to cause serious harm. This revised legislation would cover all other potentially fatal diseases (including salmonella and legionnaire's disease, for instance) but seems primarily to be targeted at HIV transmission. Should transmission of HIV through consensual sex, without the HIV-positive status of the individual being disclosed, be an offence? This question, and that of whether there is a moral obligation to disclose a positive HIV status prior to having a sexual relationship is the subject of this paper.
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PIGD) goes some way to meeting the clinical, psychological and ethical problems of antenatal testing. We should guard, however, against the assumption that PIGD is the answer to all our problems. It also presents some new problems and leaves some old problems untouched. This paper will provide an overview of how PIGD meets some of the old problems but will concentrate on two new challenges for ethics (and, indeed, law). First we look at whether we should always suppose that it is wrong for a clinician to implant a genetically abnormal zygote. The second concern is particularly important in the UK. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) gives clinicians a statutory obligation to consider the interests of the future children they help to create using in vitro fertilisation (IVF) techniques. Does this mean that because PIGD is based on IVF techniques the balance of power for determining the best interests of the future child shifts from the mother to the clinician?
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In the UK in October 1992, Mrs S was forced to have a caesarean section despite her objections to such a procedure on religious grounds. The case once again called into question the obligations of women to the unborn, and also whether one person can be forced to undergo a medical procedure for the benefit of someone else. Re S, like the case of Angela Carder, is often discussed in terms of the conflict between maternal and fetal rights. This paper looks instead at our obligations to save life in general-whether or not we are pregnant- and at the obligations of mothers to their children-whether they are born or unborn. Drawing on Judith Jarvis Thomson's distinction, it argues that minimal decency informs the duties which are owed to strangers, but that parents can be expected to behave as Good Samaritans towards their children. Finally, it is argued that even if mothers are ethically obliged to consent to caesarean sections which will save the lives of their babies, this does not necessarily mean that others are at liberty, or even obliged, to proceed with such operations without their consent.
Sucrose intolerance, the inability to digest sugar, has been found to be unusually frequent among North Alaskan Inupiat. It is conjectured that this rare hereditary condition reached elevated levels due in part to the small, rather isolated population structure characterizing traditional Inupiat settlement patterns. An additional factor was likely to be a form of "selection relaxation" in which sucrose intolerance was not selected against during precontact times when the Inupiat diet consisted primarily of animal foods. An attempt was made to trace genealogical connections between pedigree containing cases of sucrose intolerance. This proved to be mostly unsuccessful due to insufficient information. It calls for researchers to make exerted efforts to obtain pertinent family history data along with extended pedigree records. Sucrose intolerance, while affecting relatively few persons, can lead to health problems, particularly if there is limited dietary choice. This is likely to be the situation among North Alaskan populations where sugar has become a major constituent in their acculturated diet.
There is strong evidence that the risk of breast cancer in populations is influenced by environmental factors. Plasma lipids and lipoproteins are known to be under environmental control and to have epidemiological and/or biological characteristics that suggest they may be relevant to breast cancer risk. The purpose of the study described here was to determine whether plasma lipids, lipoproteins, and the urinary excretion of the mutagen malondialdehyde (MDA) are associated with differences in breast cancer risk. We measured plasma lipids, lipoproteins, and urinary MDA in women without breast cancer but with different degrees of density of the breast parenchyma on mammography, a strong risk factor for breast cancer. Mammograms from 273 premenopausal women were digitized to high spatial resolution by a scanning densitometer, and images were analyzed to quantify the extent of density. The percentage of the breast occupied by mammographic densities was found, after controlling for the effects of age and the Quetelet index of obesity, to be significantly associated with plasma levels of high-density lipoprotein cholesterol, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, triglyceride, apoprotein B, and urinary excretion of MDA. A multivariate model comprised of the Quetelet index of obesity, alcohol consumption, apoprotein B, parity, daily MDA excretion, and the skinfold thickness sum accounted for 36% of the variation in breast density. These results suggest that differences in lipid metabolism are associated with differences in breast cancer risk as defined by mammographic densities. These findings are consistent with several other observations that show a relationship between plasma lipids, lipoproteins, and risk factors for breast cancer.