Biomedical subjects

Howard Shevrin

Publications and source records attributed to Howard Shevrin.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

Unconscious inhibition and facilitation at the objective detection threshold: replicable and qualitatively different unconscious perceptual effects.

Although the veridicality of unconscious perception is increasingly accepted, core issues remain unresolved [Jack, A., & Shallice, T. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition, 79, 161-196], and sharp disagreement persists regarding fundamental methodological and theoretical issues. The most critical problem is simple but tenacious-namely, how to definitively rule out weak conscious perception as an alternative explanation for putatively unconscious effects. Using a direct task and objectively undetectable stimuli, the current experiments demonstrate clearly reliable unconscious perceptual effects, which differ qualitatively from weakly conscious effects in fundamental ways. Most importantly, the current effects correlate negatively with stimulus detectability, directly rebutting the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems [Reingold, E., & Merikle, P. (1988). Using direct and indirect measures to study perception without awareness. Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 563-575; Reingold, E., & Merikle, P. (1990). On the inter-relatedness of theory and measurement in the study of unconscious processes. Mind and Language, 5, 9-28)], which all predict positive correlations. Moreover, the current effects are entirely bidirectional [Katz, (2001). Bidirectional experimental effects. Psychological Methods, 6, 270-281)] and radically uncontrollable, including below-chance performance despite intentions to facilitate. In contrast, weakly conscious effects on direct measures are unidirectional, facilitative, and potentially controllable. Moreover, these qualitative differences also suggest that objective and subjective threshold phenomena are fundamentally distinct, rather than the former simply being a weaker version of the latter [Merikle, P., Smilek, D., Eastwood, J. (2001). Perception without awareness: Perspectives from cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79, 115-134]. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between rather than conflate these methods. Further, the current effects reinforce recent work [e.g. Naccache, L., Blandin, E., & Dehaene, S. (2002). Unconscious masked priming depends on temporal attention. Psychological Science, 13, 416-424] demonstrating that unconscious effects, although not selectively controllable, are nonetheless mediated by strategic and individual difference factors, rather than being immune to such influences as long thought.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Anxiety, attributional thinking,and the primary process.

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well-established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions--all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3-5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10-point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a significant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth finding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.

Adult↗

PubMed2004

Characterization of event related potentials using information theoretic distance measures.

Analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs) using signal processing tools has become extremely widespread in recent years. Nonstationary signal processing tools such as wavelets and time-frequency distributions have proven to be especially effective in characterizing the transient phenomena encountered in event-related potentials. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of event-related potentials collected during a psychological experiment where two groups of subjects, spider phobics and snake phobics, are shown the same set of stimulus: A blank stimulus, a neutral stimulus and a spider stimulus. We introduce a new approach, based on time-frequency distributions, for analyzing the ERPs. The difference in brain activity before and after a stimulus is presented is quantified using distance measures as adapted to the time-frequency plane. Three different distance measures, including a new information theoretic distance measure, are applied on the time-frequency plane to discriminate between the responses of the two groups of subjects. The results illustrate the effectiveness of using distance measures combined with time-frequency distributions in differentiating between the two classes of subjects and the different regions of the brain.

Algorithms↗

PubMed2004

A temporal dissociation of subliminal versus supraliminal fear perception: an event-related potential study.

Current theories of emotion suggest that threat-related stimuli are first processed via an automatically engaged neural mechanism, which occurs outside conscious awareness. This mechanism operates in conjunction with a slower and more comprehensive process that allows a detailed evaluation of the potentially harmful stimulus (LeDoux, 1998). We drew on the Halgren and Marinkovic (1995) model to examine these processes using event-related potentials (ERPs) within a backward masking paradigm. Stimuli used were faces with fear and neutral (as baseline control) expressions, presented above (supraliminal) and below (subliminal) the threshold for conscious detection. ERP data revealed a double dissociation for the supraliminal versus subliminal perception of fear. In the subliminal condition, responses to the perception of fear stimuli were enhanced relative to neutral for the N2 "excitatory" component, which is thought to represent orienting and automatic aspects of face processing. By contrast, supraliminal perception of fear was associated with relatively enhanced responses for the late P3 "inhibitory" component, implicated in the integration of emotional processes. These findings provide evidence in support of Halgren and Marinkovic's temporal model of emotion processing, and indicate that the neural mechanisms for appraising signals of threat may be initiated, not only automatically, but also without the need for conscious detection of these signals.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2004

Unconscious perception: a model-based approach to method and evidence.

Unconscious perceptual effects remain controversial because it is hard to rule out alternative conscious perception explanations for them. We present a novel methodological framework, stressing the centrality of specifying the single-process conscious perception model (i.e., the null hypothesis). Various considerations, including those of SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), suggest that conscious perception functions hierarchically, in such a way that higher level effects (e.g., semantic priming) should not be possible without lower level discrimination (i.e., detection and identification). Relatedly, alternative conscious perception accounts (as well as the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems-Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990) predict positive relationships between direct and indirect measures. Contrariwise, our review suggests that negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships are found, providing strong evidence for unconscious perception and further suggesting that conscious and unconscious perceptual influences are functionally exclusive (cf. Jones, 1987), in such a way that the former typically override the latter when both are present. Consequently, unconscious perceptual effects manifest reliably only when conscious perception is completely absent, which occurs at the objective detection (but not identification) threshold.

Humans↗

PubMed2002

A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression.

In previous research Libet (1966) discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for neural activation of consciousness, suggesting the possibility that this neurophysiological time factor is a necessary condition for the development of repression.

Brain↗

PubMed2002

The priority of primary process categorizing: experimental evidence supporting a psychoanalytic developmental hypothesis.

Earlier work has provided experimental evidence for the existence of the primary and secondary process mental organization posited by Freud and has demonstrated that primary process effects are the more active unconsciously (Brakel et al. 2000). Primary and secondary processes were assessed by a categorization test in which qualitatively different principles could be used. In new experiments using the same stimuli, another significant implication of Freud's model was tested: that primary process mental organization has developmental priority. In these experiments, which studied 559 participants ranging in age from 3 to 80, it was found (1) that primary process mentation predominates in preschoolers; (2) that it is not until around age 7 that primary process organization is supplanted by secondary process organization; and (3) that after age 7 the predominance of secondary process organization remains remarkably stable throughout the life span.

Adolescent↗