An Chomhairle Oiluna Talmhaiochta v. Doyle [13 April 1989].
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Ireland. High Court.
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Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The plaintiffs were airline hostesses who claimed that they had been discriminated against on the basis of sex by their employer. On appeal of a lower court decision, the High Court of Ireland held the following, among other things: 1) the plaintiffs could seek relief with respect to new acts of discrimination that are the direct result of an original act even if a complaint about the original act would be time-barred; 2) the Labour Court need not hold a preliminary hearing to decide whether a complaint is receivable before trying to settle the complaint or referring it to an equality officer for investigation; and 3) the plaintiffs had been subject to discrimination in 1) being forced to resign on marriage; 2) being refused permanent employment when other married women who married later were taken back into service; and 3) when taken back, being refused recognition for past service and experience in calculating seniority when other married women had been given full recognition. It ruled that, under the Employment Equality Act 1977, discrimination could occur with respect to the same sex on the basis of marital status.
The Court held unconstitutional provisions of the Irish Social Welfare (No. 2) Act 1985, which, in effect, gave lower total unemployment benefits to a married couple than to two single people living together in the same circumstances. It ruled that these provisions violated Article 41.2 of the Constitution, which pledges the State to guard with special care the institution of marriage and to protect it against attack.
The High Court of Ireland granted a decree of nullity with respect to the parties' marriage. It ruled that the wife's consent was only apparent, since her husband had lied to her before the marriage about whether he was a homosexual. It concluded that the husband was unable to maintain the life-long relationship required of marriage and that the wife would not have married him if she had known the full facts. In 1988, the High Court refused to grant a decree of nullity to a woman who had married after she had become pregnant, remained married for 20 years, and had five children with her husband. It held that there was no evidence that the wife had been subject to duress or undue influence by another person before her marriage sufficient to overbear her will and that a court could not grant a nullity on the basis of the pressure of events. (See D.B. (O'R.) vs. N.O'R, 29 July 1988, reported in Irish Law Times, Vol. 8, June 1989, p. 130.)
The court held that a wife who had not made either a direct or indirect contribution to the family home would be given a 50% beneficial interest in that home upon divorce a mensa et thoro. It based its ruling on Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution, under which the State has a specific duty to try to ensure that mothers are not obliged by economic necessity to engage in work to the neglect of their duties in the home. It ruled that a woman should have her work as a homemaker and mother taken into account in calculating her contribution toward acquisition of the home.
The plaintiff/relator, the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, applied for costs against the defendants for its part in a case in which the defendants were ordered to cease counseling women that they could go to England to obtain an abortion. In the earlier case the Court had not decided the issue whether the plaintiff/relator had standing to bring the case since the Attorney General had taken over prosecution of the case. Here the Court ruled that the plaintiff did have standing and that as an organization established to defend the right to life of the unborn there was a substantial controversy between the Society and the defendants. Nonetheless, the Court did not award costs to the Society.
The Court held that, if it was established that a person at the time of marriage was incapable by reason of mental illness of entering into a sustained marriage relationship, that was sufficient grounds for annulling the marriage. In the Court's view, it did not matter that the actual breakdown of the marriage was the result of other pressures.