An experimental disconnection approach to a function of consciousness.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to J E Bogen.
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Frontal and horizontal sections of the cerebrum make plain that with a few exceptions (pineal, pituitary) all structures are paired. Hemicerebrectomy has made clear that only one member of the hemispheric pair suffices to sustain the sentiments, emotions, memories, and intentions both conscious and unconscious that we call in the aggregate, mind. That the anatomical duality can sustain a duality of mentation is evident from not only the split-brain results in all species examined but also the results of appropriate testing of anatomically intact individuals. There is no physiological evidence for a plurality of mind beyond duality. Psychoanalytic views of mind can benefit from revision in the light of the split-brain studies. But such revisions seem slight compared with improvements needed in the views prevalent among most other psychologic and philosophic theorists.
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Reviewed are some of the dramatic experimental results and penetrating analyses characterizing the career of Roger Sperry. These require that we seriously consider his opinions regarding matters not yet testable, especially regarding the brain/mind relationships. His opinions include first, that a worthwhile understanding of brain function requires a biological explanation of consciousness; second, that mental properties described by him as "overall pattern effects in brain dynamics" can govern neuronal traffic at the cellular level by virtue of "mental forces'; and third, that further development of this outlook can provide a scientific basis for moral values. Discussion here is restricted to the first two of these points, urging that most criticisms of them arise largely from semantic confusions inherited from our past. Particular emphasis is placed on distinguishing mind from soul, thus totally separating the brain-onto-mind mapping problem from the nexus problem inherited from Descartes. Taken here is a physicalist position regarding mind, together with agnosticism regarding the nonmaterial.
It has been asserted at times that the human right hemisphere is cognitively inferior to that of a chimpanzee or even a monkey. Related is the even stronger claim that human consciousness, as well as cognition, requires language. These claims are discussed, and counterexamples are presented from both split-brain subjects and patients hemispherectomized in adulthood after customary development as righthanders.
An anatomico-physiologic approach to consciousness is facilitated by recognizing that the various meanings of consciousness have in common a crucial core C variously called subjectivity, awareness, consciousness-as-such, or consciousness per se. A sharp distinction is made between the property C and the contents of consciousness, partial loss of which is typical of cerebro-cortical lesions. The neuronal mechanism producing subjectivity also acts as an attention-action coordinator, hence must have specific connectivity requirements. These requirements are best met by the thalamic intralaminar nuclei (ILN). Whereas large lesions elsewhere leave C undisturbed, quite small bilateral lesions in ILN engender immediate unresponsiveness. This combination of anatomic and neurologic evidence is bolstered by a variety of physiologic evidence leading to the conclusion that further investigations of the ILN, and their interaction with lower centers as well as cerebral cortex, are most apt to yield a better understanding of consciousness.
How certain neural mechanisms (Mc) momentarily endow with subjective awareness (C) percepts and affects represented elsewhere is more likely to be clarified when structures essential to Mc are identified. The loss of C with bilateral thalamic lesions involving the intralaminar nuclei (ILN) contrasts with retention of C after large cortical ablations depriving C of specific contents. A role of ILN in the perception of primitive (i.e., not cortically computed) sensations is suggested by their afference of directly ascending pathways. A role for ILN in awareness of cortical activity is suggested by their widespread afference from cortex, a property shared with striatum. A role for ILN in volition is suggested by their heavy projection to striatum. Unlike striatum, ILN also project widely to almost all neocortex, enabling an effect on ideation; this last property is in common with other structures (e.g., locus coeruleus) but none of them has the same direct cortical afference. And passage through the reticular nucleus (nRt) of ILN efferents to cortex could impact the attention-selective action of nRt. It is suggested that the quickest route to a better understanding of C involves more intensive study of ILN. No other structure seems, in the light of our current knowledge, a more likely site for Mc.
The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness (more precisely, what I call C) depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalamus (hereafter, ILN). This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I (Bogen, 1995). This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be read in conjunction with Part I.
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Six individuals who had complete cerebral commissurotomy for medically intractable epilepsy participated in a magnetic resonance imaging study 20 or more years postoperatively. In all cases the completeness of callosotomy was clearly demonstrable. The status of the anterior commissure, cut in all six, could not be confirmed with the same confidence.
A duality of mind is readily demonstrable in split-brain humans, and evidence is steadily accumulating that ongoing interhemispheric communication is incomplete in the intact brain. It is now certain that the corpus callosum can transfer high-level information from one hemisphere to another. When we take into account the well-established principle of hemispheric specialization, added to the impressive normality of split-brain humans in ordinary social situations, a physiologic explanation for at least some forms of creativity seems close at hand. What is required is a partial (and transiently reversible) hemispheric independence during which lateralized cognition can occur and is responsible for the dissociation of preparation from incubation. A momentary suspension of this partial independence could account for the illumination that precedes subsequent deliberate verification. From this point of view, we can understand better the opinion of Frederic Bremer, who wrote years ago that the corpus callosum subserves "the highest and most elaborate activities of the brain"--in a word, creativity.
Electroencephalographic recordings of eight corpus callosotomy patients and eight precision-matched control subjects were obtained as subjects watched a film symbolically depicting death. A content-analytic measure of alexithymia was regressed on eight auto-spectral alpha-band intensity averages and on subsets of alpha-band coherence averages. Results were interpreted on the basis of three possible mechanisms of alexithymia: (1) Alexithymic subjects had more right-temporal alpha-band intensity, suggesting inadequate understanding of the film. (2) A possible lack of inner speech in alexithymics was suggested by their relative alpha abundance of the left frontal and left temporal channels but left parietal alpha desynchronization, and by their lower left frontotemporal but higher left parietofrontal and left parietotemporal coherences. (3) Alexithymic subjects had higher right frontal-left parietal and left frontal-left parietal coherences, suggesting possible interhemispheric inhibition of expression. Expressive subjects had higher right frontal-left temporal (and homologous interhemispheric frontal, parietal, and frontal) coherences, suggesting interhemispheric facilitation of verbal expression.
Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were obtained while 6 completely commissurotomized patients, 2 partially commissurotomized patients, and 8 precision-matched normal control subjects watched 4 times a film symbolically depicting death. Our hypothesis was that alexithymia--a diminished capability to verbally express moods, symbols, and feelings--would be greater for patients because loss of cerebral commissures reduces interhemispheric communication, separating right-hemisphere-dependent affective understanding and left-hemisphere-dependent verbalization. Path and covariance structure analyses confirmed that callosotomy decreased alpha-band EEG coherences (after adjustment for mean intrahemispheric coherence) between pairs of scalp electrode channels placed homologously over frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes of the brain. This result occurred both for an index of interhemispheric coherence and for a latent variable indicated by the 3 adjusted coherences. Reduced levels of interhemispheric coherence in turn increased alexithymia, for an overall index and for a latent variable indicated by lexical-level content-analytic measures of verbal responses to the filmic stimulus.
Controversy has arisen regarding the neuropathological basis of prosopagnosia. Some investigators suggest that bilateral lesions are needed to cause the deficit, whereas others felt that a unilateral right posterior lesion is sufficient. Six patients with prosopagnosia with clinical and radiological evidence of unilateral right posterior lesions are presented. Our observations together with evidence from similar cases described in the literature suggest that an appropriately placed right hemispheric lesion may be sufficient to produce prosopagnosia.
This study assessed alexithymia in six patients with complete cerebral commissurotomy, two patients with partial commissurotomy, and eight matched control subjects. Comparisons were based on content-analytic measures of the subjects' spoken and written responses to a film that symbolically represented death and loss. The commissurotomized patients were more alexithymic on all four lexical-level variables, all six sentential-level variables, and all six global-level variables. Discriminant function analysis found a linear combination of four variables that effectively discriminated groups of fully commissurotomized, partially commissurotomized, and normal control subjects and correctly classified 15 of the 16 subjects.
It has been a signal honor to be president of the Los Angeles Society of Neurology and Psychiatry, which supported for 50 years a forum (the Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Societies) for other than routine views, including those of its famous founders. One of these was Dr. J. M. Nielsen. I remember one of his brain cuttings relevant to this paper: After someone had read the history, he said, "Let's look at the anterior commissure." He held the brain with one hand and that big knife in the other (as you know, the anterior commissure is shaped like a handlebar mustache) and he made one curving sweep through the brain; then he lifted off the top half, and there was the full extent of the commissure. Another Founder, Dr. Cyril Courville taught me as a neurology resident for a year, followed by my time with Dr. Philip Vogel, whose skill and intestinal fortitude resurrected cerebral commissurotomy (1). Dr. Courville, as Editor of the Bulletin, was succeeded by Dr. Clarence Olsen who was succeeded in the Bulletin's 30th year by Dr. Richard Walter. This paper is an extension, to some extent, of my articles called The Other Side of the Brain which were published in the Bulletin in 1969 (2-4). Those articles presented ideas some of which may now seem fairly orthodox. But in those days they were not, and I think that Dr. Walter's publishing them was a tribute to his wry sense of humor, as well as his historical perspective.