PubMed HealthSearch

Biomedical subjects

J G Scadding

Publications and source records attributed to J G Scadding.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Diagnoses are not diseases.

The psychiatric community seems determined to ground its medical legitimacy on principles that confuse diagnoses with disease. If mental illnesses are diseases of the CNS, they are diseases of the brain, not the mind. If mental illnesses are the names of (mis)behaviour, they are forms of behaviour, not diseases. Psychiatric metaphors have the same role in medicine as religious metaphors have in theology. Religion is, among other things, the institutionalised denial of a finite life. Psychiatry is, among other things, the institutionalised denial of the tragic nature of life: individuals who want to reject the reality of free will and responsibility can medicalise life, and entrust its management to health professionals. Psychiatrists have succeeded in persuading the scientific community, the courts, the media, and the general public that the conditions they call mental disorders are diseases, that is, phenomena independent of motivation or will. The more firmly psychiatrically based ideas take hold of the collective American mind, the more foolishness and injustice they generate. Long ago, the law makers agreed to let psychiatrists literalise the metaphor of mental illnesses. Thus, the Americans With Disabilities Act (AWDA), scheduled to be fully implemented by July 1992, covers claustrophobia, personality problems, and mental retardation, though unlike DSM-III-R it excludes kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive gambling, and transvestism. The literal language of psychiatry allows motivated actions to be called 'disease'. Other examples of behaviour for which psychiatrists have disease names, and which AWDA implicitly accepts as genuine diseases, include dysmorphophobia, multiple personality disorder, frotteurism, hypoactive sexual desire disorder, and fractitious disorder with physical symptoms.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Adaptation, Psychological

Health and disease: what can medicine do for philosophy?

Philosophical discussions about health and disease often refer to a 'medical model' of bodily disease, in which diseases are regarded as causes of illness; diagnosis consists in identifying the disease affecting the patient, and this determines the appropriate treatment. This view is plausible only for diseases whose cause is known, though even in such instances the disease is the effect on the affected person, and must not be confused with its own cause. But in fact the medical diagnostic process which progresses from recognition of patterns of symptoms and signs, through search for abnormalities of structure and/or function, towards knowledge of causation often stops short of this desirable end-point; and at whatever point it comes to a halt, its result is expressed in terms of 'diseases'. Thus in medical discourse the names of diseases are a convenient device by which the current conclusion of the diagnostic process can be stated briefly; and they have widely varying factual implications. This nominalist analysis of the medical usages of the names of diseases has consequences for definitions of health and disease, and for some problems in medical ethics.

Classification

The concept of disease.

The connotations of the term "a disease" were investigated by studying the ways in which both medical and non-medical people used the word. A list of common diagnostic terms was read slowly to groups of non-medical academic staff of a university, secondary-school students, medical academics, and family practitioners, who then indicated whether they thought each word referred to disease.All groups rated illnesses due to infections as diseases, but the doctors, and particularly the general practitioners, were more generous in accepting as diseases the terms for non-infectious conditions. Apart from the nature of the cause, the most influential factor in determining whether or not an illness was considered to be a disease was the importance of the doctor in diagnosis and treatment.These findings provide further evidence that there is ambiguity about the meaning of the term disease. To the layman a disease seems to be a living agency that causes illness. Doctors have obviously accepted more heterogeneous defining characteristics but remain reluctant to adopt unequivocally nominalist ways of thought. The position is not unlike that in the physical sciences, in which there is a good precedent for distinguishing between the formal scientific and the everyday uses of terms such as "force" and "power."

Attitude of Health Personnel

Sarcoidosis: histopathological definition and clinical diagnosis.

Sarcoidosis is best defined in histopathological terms as 'a disease characterised by the presence in all of several affected organs and tissues of non-caseating epithelioid-cell granulomas, proceeding either to resolution or to conversion into hyaline connective tissue'. Although the defining characteristics are thus histopathological, diagnosis during life depends largely upon clinical, radiological, and immunological findings. The amount of support required from histology varies greatly from case to case. Though histology from one site cannot in itself establish the diagnosis of sarcoidosis, a generalised disease, detailed histological study of biopsy tissue makes an important and often essential contribution. In many instances, complete lack of necrosis, an intact reticulin pattern, and failure to demonstrate infective agents permit an unequivocal statement of compatibility with this diagnosis; however, a compatible clinical picture and absence of evidence of known causes of local granulomatous reactions or of other generalised granulomatous diseases are required for definitive diagnosis. In some, the histological pattern deviates in some particular from the accepted 'typical' pattern; there may be a little necrosis, the follicular pattern of the granuloma may be less than perfect, and exclusion of known infective agents can never be absolute. In such instances, subsequent surveillance, including possible response to treatment, may show a clinical course justifying a diagnosis of sarcoidosis, and necropsy may establish it; but it must be recognised that in a few cases, particularly those in which the clinical evidence of disease is confined to one organ, diagnosis is likely to remain in doubt for long periods. Reports on the histology of the Kveim test should be made without knowledge of clinical findings and in terms of the presence and quality of granulomatous response. A granulomatous reaction to a validated test suspension makes a contribution to diagnosis similar to the finding of granulomas in an additional organ or tissue.

Adult

Sarcoidosis.

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Antibody Formation