PubMed Health⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

J P Caverni

Publications and source records attributed to J P Caverni.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

A novel experimental paradigm for studying cognitive functions related to delayed response tasks in mice.

Rodents are the animals most commonly employed to model human cognitive functions, but serious problems arise from the non-selective use of behavioral paradigms that measure different processes in rodents than those found in humans. To avoid problems stemming from the use of different paradigms on humans and mice, a new experimental paradigm for mice was developed to study the cognitive functions involved in delayed response tasks. The experiments were conducted in an olfactory tubing maze using three successive delayed response tasks: an alternation task, a non-alternation task, and a reversal task. Mice had to discover the rule by themselves by choosing one of two identical odor cues presented simultaneously at the left and right sides of a testing chamber. The success criterion was set at 10, 8, 6, or 4 consecutive correct responses, with a maximum of 80 trials per task, as used in primates. In the delayed alternation task with the criterion of 10 or 8 consecutive successful trials, the rule was discovered but required many more than 80 trials for most of the mice. With a criterion of 6 or 4, the mice were successful but twice as many trials were necessary to reach the criterion of 6 as opposed to 4. In the delayed non-alternation and reversal tasks, more than 80 trials were needed to figure out the new rule with the criterion of 10 or 8. All mice were successful with the criterion of 6 or 4. The results indicated that no matter what criterion was used, mice were able to discover the two rules on the three consecutive delayed response tasks, but they did so with more or less ease. This novel paradigm for mice should be useful in experiments on pharmacological treatments or for testing transgenic or gene-targeting mice to gain insight into the brain structures involved in this type of task.

Animals↗

Hypothesis testing in a rule discovery problem: when a focused procedure is effective.

We investigated individuals' ability to use negative evidence in hypothesis testing. We compared performance in two versions of Wason's (1960) rule discovery problem. In the original version, a triple of numbers--(2, 4, 6)--was presented as an example of a rule that the experimenter had in mind (i.e., "increasing numbers"). Participants had to discover the rule by proposing new triples. In the other version, the same triple was presented as a counter-example to the experimenter's rule (i.e., "decreasing numbers"). We predicted that, in both conditions, participants would form hypotheses based on the features of the triple, and test only instances of the hypothesized rule. However, in the counter-example condition, such focused testing would invariably produce negative evidence. As a consequence, participants would be forced to revise their hypotheses. The reported results corroborated our predictions: Participants solved the counter-example version significantly better than the original problem.

Adult↗

Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning.

Cognition↗