Biomedical subjects

Jacob L Kool

Publications and source records attributed to Jacob L Kool.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

Pneumonic plague cluster, Uganda, 2004.

The public and clinicians have long-held beliefs that pneumonic plague is highly contagious; inappropriate alarm and panic have occurred during outbreaks. We investigated communicability in a naturally occurring pneumonic plague cluster. We defined a probable pneumonic plague case as an acute-onset respiratory illness with bloody sputum during December 2004 in Kango Subcounty, Uganda. A definite case was a probable case with laboratory evidence of Yersinia pestis infection. The cluster (1 definite and 3 probable cases) consisted of 2 concurrent index patient-caregiver pairs. Direct fluorescent antibody microscopy and polymerase chain reaction testing on the only surviving patient's sputum verified plague infection. Both index patients transmitted pneumonic plague to only 1 caregiver each, despite 23 additional untreated close contacts (attack rate 8%). Person-to-person transmission was compatible with transmission by respiratory droplets, rather than aerosols, and only a few close contacts, all within droplet range, became ill.

Adult↗

PubMed2005

Risk of person-to-person transmission of pneumonic plague.

Plague has received much attention because it may be used as a weapon by terrorists. Intentionally released aerosols of Yersinia pestis would cause pneumonic plague. In order to prepare for such an event, it is important, particularly for medical personnel and first responders, to form a realistic idea of the risk of person-to-person spread of infection. Historical accounts and contemporary experience show that pneumonic plague is not as contagious as it is commonly believed to be. Persons with plague usually only transmit the infection when the disease is in the endstage, when infected persons cough copious amounts of bloody sputum, and only by means of close contact. Before antibiotics were available for postexposure prophylaxis for contacts, simple protective measures, such as wearing masks and avoiding close contact, were sufficient to interrupt transmission during pneumonic plague outbreaks. In this article, I review the historical literature and anecdotal evidence regarding the risk of transmission, and I discuss possible protective measures.

Disease Outbreaks↗

PubMed2004

Laboratory analysis of tularemia in wild-trapped, commercially traded prairie dogs, Texas, 2002.

Oropharyngeal tularemia was identified as the cause of a die-off in captured wild prairie dogs at a commercial exotic animal facility in Texas. From this point source, Francisella tularensis-infected prairie dogs were traced to animals distributed to the Czech Republic and to a Texas pet shop. F. tularensis culture isolates were recovered tissue specimens from 63 prairie dogs, including one each from the secondary distribution sites. Molecular and biochemical subtyping indicated that all isolates were F. tularensis subsp. holarctica (Type B). Microagglutination assays detected antibodies against F. tularensis, with titers as great as 1:4,096 in some live animals. All seropositive animals remained culture positive, suggesting that prairie dogs may act as chronic carriers of F. tularensis. These findings demonstrate the need for additional studies of tularemia in prairie dogs, given the seriousness of the resulting disease, the fact that prairie dogs are sold commercially as pets, and the risk for pet-to-human transmission.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

First reported prairie dog-to-human tularemia transmission, Texas, 2002.

A tularemia outbreak, caused by Francisella tularensis type B, occurred among wild-caught, commercially traded prairie dogs. F. tularensis microagglutination titers in one exposed person indicated recent infection. These findings represent the first evidence for prairie-dog-to-human tularemia transmission and demonstrate potential human health risks of the exotic pet trade.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Risk of hospital-acquired legionnaires' disease in cities using monochloramine versus other water disinfectants.

OBJECTIVE: To measure the association between the disinfection of municipal drinking water with monochloramine and the occurrence of hospital-acquired legionnaires' disease (LD). SETTING: One hundred sixty-six U.S. hospitals. DESIGN: Survey of 459 members of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) for hospital features; endemic- and outbreak-related, hospital-acquired LD; the source of the hospital water supply; and the methods of disinfection used by the hospitals and municipal water treatment plants. RESULTS: SHEA members representing 166 (36%) of 459 hospitals responded; 33 (20%) reported one or more episodes of hospital-acquired LD during the period from 1994 to 1998 and 23 (14%) reported an outbreak of hospital-acquired LD during the period from 1989 to 1998. Hospitals with an occurrence of hospital-acquired LD had a higher census (median, 319 vs 221; P = .03), more acute care beds (median, 500 vs 376; P = .04), and more intensive care unit beds (median, 42 vs 24; P = .009) than did other hospitals. They were also more likely to have a transplant service (74% vs 42%; P = .001) and to perform surveillance for hospital-acquired disease (92% vs 61%; P = .001). After adjustment for the presence of a transplant program and surveillance for legionnaires' disease, hospitals supplied with drinking water disinfected with monochloramine by municipal plants were less likely to have sporadic cases or outbreaks of hospital-acquired LD (odds ratio, 0.20; 95% confidence interval, 0.07 to 0.56) than were other hospitals. CONCLUSION: Water disinfection with monochloramine by municipal water treatment plants significantly reduces the risk of hospital-acquired LD.

American Hospital Association↗

PubMed2003

Isolated case of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax, New York City, 2001.

On October 31, 2001, in New York City, a 61-year-old female hospital employee who had acquired inhalational anthrax died after a 6-day illness. To determine sources of exposure and identify additional persons at risk, the New York City Department of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and law enforcement authorities conducted an extensive investigation, which included interviewing contacts, examining personal effects, summarizing patient's use of mass transit, conducting active case finding and surveillance near her residence and at her workplace, and collecting samples from co-workers and the environment. We cultured all specimens for Bacillus anthracis. We found no additional cases of cutaneous or inhalational anthrax. The route of exposure remains unknown. All environmental samples were negative for B. anthracis. This first case of inhalational anthrax during the 2001 outbreak with no apparent direct link to contaminated mail emphasizes the need for close coordination between public health and law enforcement agencies during bioterrorism-related investigations.

Anthrax↗

PubMed2002

An outbreak of diarrhea in a neonatal medium care unit caused by a novel strain of rotavirus: investigation using both epidemiologic and microbiological methods.

OBJECTIVE: In December 1999, an outbreak of diarrhea was reported in a general hospital neonatal medium care unit (NMCU) caused by a novel strain of rotavirus with genotype P[6], G9. An investigation was conducted to determine risk factors for illness among neonates. DESIGN: Rotavirus diagnosis was by latex agglutination and typing by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction. A case-control study was performed using data collected from medical records on exposures in a 3-day period before illness (cases) or a random 3-day period (controls). Environmental swabs were tested for rotavirus. Antenatal blood samples from mothers and blood samples provided by hospital staff were analyzed for rotavirus antibodies. RESULTS: Fifty-six cases of rotaviral illness were confirmed by latex agglutination. Forty-seven of these were among 118 neonates exposed to the NMCU (attack rate, 40%). There was a 4-week period with no clinical cases in the course of the outbreak. Increased frequency (> or = 15 times in 3 days) of ungloved nasogastric feeding was a significant risk factor (adjusted odds ratio, 8.79), controlling for birth weight and gestational age. Environmental sampling showed persistence of the virus on ward surfaces despite cleaning. None of 24 NMCU staff members had high levels of antibodies against P[6], G9. Three (8%) of 38 mothers had high antibody levels; 2 had infants who became ill. The outbreak ended with a 7-day ward closure, disinfection, and introduction of gloved nasogastric feeding. CONCLUSIONS: Case-control studies can be successful in identiffying risk factors for nosocomial outbreaks of diarrhea. High levels of rotavirus antibodies in mothers may not protect infants. The environment may be the most important reservoir of rotavirus during outbreaks.

Case-Control Studies↗

PubMed2002

A European study on the relationship between antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance.

In Europe, antimicrobial resistance has been monitored since 1998 by the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS). We examined the relationship between penicillin nonsusceptibility of invasive isolates of Streptococcus pneumoniae and antibiotic sales. Information was collected on 1998-99 resistance data for invasive isolates of S. pneumoniae to penicillin, based on surveillance data from EARSS and on outpatient sales during 1997 for beta-lactam antibiotics and macrolides. Our results show that in Europe antimicrobial resistance of S. pneumoniae to penicillin is correlated with use of beta-lactam antibiotics and macrolides.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗

PubMed2002

A large outbreak of Legionnaires' disease at a flower show, the Netherlands, 1999.

In 1999, an outbreak of Legionnaires' disease affected many visitors to a flower show in the Netherlands. To identify the source of the outbreak, we performed an environmental investigation, as well as a case-control study among visitors and a serologic cohort study among exhibitors to measure exposure to possible sources. Of 77,061 visitors, 188 became ill (133 confirmed and 55 probable cases), for an attack rate of 0.23% for visitors and 0.61% for exhibitors. Two whirlpool spas in halls 3 and 4 of the exhibition and a sprinkler in hall 8 were culture positive for Legionella pneumophila. One of three genotypes found in both whirlpool spas was identical to the isolates from 28 of 29 culture-positive patients. Persons who paused at the whirlpool spa in hall 3 were at increased risk for becoming ill. This study illustrates that whirlpool spas may be an important health hazard if disinfection fails.

Adult↗