Reaction after smallpox vaccination.
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Adult↗
Biomedical subjects
Janice M Rusnak
Publications and source records attributed to Janice M Rusnak.
History of U.S. military contributions to the study of parasitic diseases.
U.S. military researchers have made major contributions to the discovery, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of a number of parasitic diseases. We review the paramount U.S. military contributions to the understanding of leishmaniasis, filariasis, schistosomiasis, trypanosomiasis, gastrointestinal parasites, intestinal capillariasis, and angiostrongyliasis.
Biomedical Research↗
Risk of occupationally acquired illnesses from biological threat agents in unvaccinated laboratory workers.
Many vaccines for bioterrorism agents are investigational and therefore not available (outside of research protocol use) to all at-risk laboratory workers who have begun working with these agents as a result of increased interest in biodefense research. Illness surveillance data archived from the U.S. offensive biological warfare program (from 1943 to 1969) were reviewed to assess the impact of safety measures on disease prevention (including biosafety cabinets [BSCs]) before and after vaccine availability. Most laboratory-acquired infections from agents with higher infective doses (e.g., anthrax, glanders, and plague) were prevented with personal protective measures and safety training alone. Safety measures (including BSCs) without vaccination failed to sufficiently prevent illness from agents with lower infective doses in this high-risk research setting. Infections continued with tularemia (average 15/year), Venezuelan equine encephalitis (1.9/year), and Q fever (3.4/year) but decreased dramatically once vaccinations became available (average of 1, 0.6, and 0 infections per year, respectively). While laboratory-acquired infections are not expected to occur frequently in the current lower-risk biodefense research setting because of further improvements in biosafety equipment and changes in biosafety policies, the data help to define the inherent risks of working with the specific agents of bioterrorism. The data support the idea that research with these agents should be restricted to laboratories with experience in handling highly hazardous agents and where appropriate safety training and precautions can be implemented.
Biological Warfare↗
Management guidelines for laboratory exposures to agents of bioterrorism.
Over the past several years, funding for biodefense research has increased dramatically, leading to the possibility of increased laboratory-acquired infections with potential bioterrorism agents. The Special Immunizations Program at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases reviewed its policy and management of potential occupational exposures (1989-2002) to assess guidelines for determining the risk of exposure and disease and to determine criteria for initiating postexposure prophylaxis (PEP). Initiating antibiotic PEP was based primarily on exposure risk but was also influenced by vaccination status and agent virulence. PEP was given to nearly all moderate- and high-risk bacterial exposures, regardless of vaccination status, to most unvaccinated and subsets of vaccinated minimal-risk exposures, but generally not to negligible-risk exposures. Algorithms for evaluating and managing potential exposures are presented to provide guidance to other agencies as they begin to work with these agents.
Antibiotic Prophylaxis↗
Experience in the medical management of potential laboratory exposures to agents of bioterrorism on the basis of risk assessment at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
Experience in managing laboratory exposures to potential agents of bioterrorism is limited. The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases reviewed laboratory exposures involving these agents (1989 to 2002) to assess the effectiveness of medical management. The evaluation of 234 persons (78% vaccinated) for exposure to 289 infectious agents revealed 5 confirmed infections (glanders, Q fever, vaccinia, chikungunya, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis). Postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis was given for most moderate- or high-risk bacterial exposures (41/46; 89%); most unvaccinated minimal-risk (7/10; 70%), and subsets of vaccinated minimal-risk exposures (18/53; 34%) but generally not negligible-risk exposures (6/38; 16%). Vaccine "breakthroughs" were not unexpected (enzootic Venezuelan equine encephalitis, localized vaccinia) or presented with mild symptoms (Q fever). A multifaceted policy of personal protective measures, vaccination, early assessment, and postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis was effective in minimizing morbidity and mortality in at-risk laboratory workers.
Alphavirus Infections↗
Laboratory exposures to staphylococcal enterotoxin B.
Staphylococcal enterotoxins are 23- to 29-kDa polypeptides in the bacterial superantigen protein family. Clinical symptoms from intoxication with staphylococcal enterotoxins vary by exposure route. Ingestion results in gastrointestinal symptoms, and inhalation results in fever as well as pulmonary and gastrointestinal symptoms. Review of occupational exposures at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases from 1989 to 2002 showed that three laboratory workers had symptoms after ocular exposure to staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB). Conjunctivitis with localized cutaneous swelling occurred in three persons within 1 to 6 hours after exposure to SEB; two of these persons also had gastrointestinal symptoms, which suggests that such symptoms occurred as a result of exposure by an indirect cutaneous or ocular route. Ocular exposures from SEB resulting in conjunctivitis and localized swelling have not previously been reported. Symptoms from these patients and review of clinical symptoms of 16 laboratory-acquired inhalational SEB intoxications may help healthcare workers evaluate and identify SEB exposures in laboratory personnel at risk.
Accidents, Occupational↗