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Biomedical subjects

Jerome C Wakefield

Publications and source records attributed to Jerome C Wakefield.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

Saving PTSD from itself in DSM-V.

Papers in this special issue of the Journal of Anxiety Disorders concern critical issues and core assumptions that underlie the diagnostic construct of posttraumatic stress disorder. Rather than addressing specific points raised in these papers, we consider the issues and their implications for redefining PTSD and associated disorders in the DSM-V. Specific proposals are advanced to tighten definitional criteria for traumatic events and posttraumatic symptoms. We believe the more stringent criteria express the intent of the PTSD category and will promote more effective research on whether that intent was legitimate or based on misconceptions.

Diagnosis, Differential↗

Are there relational disorders? A harmful dysfunction perspective: comment on the special section.

Can relational disorders exist as genuine medical disorders, even when there is no disorder in either individual participating in the relationship? Using the harmful dysfunction analysis of the concept of disorder as a framework, this comment on the special section on Relational Disorders (September 2006 issue of the Journal of Family Psychology) presents the argument that relational disorders do indeed exist. The harmful dysfunction analysis holds that disorders are harmful failures of biologically selected functions. The position argued for here is that there are evolutionarily selected functions that depend for their performance on the nature of the interaction between individuals and that these relational functions can fail, even when both individuals are normal, because of mismatches between normal variations. Thus, there are genuine relational dysfunctions that, when harmful, are relational disorders. Indeed, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) currently misclassifies some sexual relational disorders as individual disorders.

Female↗

The lay concept of conduct disorder: do nonprofessionals use syndromal symptoms or internal dysfunction to distinguish disorder from delinquency?

BACKGROUND: Conduct disorder (CD) must be distinguished from nondisordered delinquent behaviour to avoid false positives, especially when diagnosing youth from difficult environments. However, the nature of this distinction remains controversial. The DSM-IV observes that its own syndromal CD diagnostic criteria conflict with its definition of mental disorder, which requires that symptoms be considered a manifestation of internal dysfunction to warrant disorder diagnosis. Previous research indicates that professional judgments tend to be guided by the dysfunction requirement, not syndromal symptoms alone. However, there are almost no data on lay conceptualizations. Thus it remains unknown whether judgments about CD are anchored in a broadly shared understanding of mental disorder that provides a basis for professional-lay consensus. OBJECTIVE: The present study tests which conception of CD, syndromal-symptoms or dysfunction-requirement, corresponds most closely to lay judgments of disorder or nondisorder and compares lay and professional judgments. We hypothesized that lay disorder judgments, like professional judgments, tend to presuppose the dysfunction requirement. METHOD: Three lay samples (nonclinical social workers, nonpsychiatric nurses, and undergraduates) rated their agreement that youths described in clinical vignettes have a mental disorder. All vignettes satisfied DSM-IV CD diagnostic criteria. Vignettes were varied to present syndromal symptoms only, symptoms suggesting internal dysfunction, and symptoms resulting from reactions to negative circumstances, without dysfunction. RESULTS: All lay samples attributed disorder more often to youths whose symptoms suggested internal dysfunction than to youths with similar symptoms but without a likely dysfunction. CONCLUSIONS: The dysfunction requirement appears to reflect a widely shared lay and professional concept of disorder.

Attitude to Health↗

Personality disorder as harmful dysfunction: DSM'S cultural deviance criterion reconsidered.

The DSM's general criteria for personality disorder (PD) attempt to define PD versus nondisordered personality conditions. If dimensionalization of PD occurs in the DSM-V (perhaps, it is suggested, with PD diagnosis moved to Axis I and overall personality assessment in Axis II, thus separating diagnosis from case formulation), general criteria likely will still be needed to prevent massive false positives. In this article, one of the general criteria, the cultural deviance requirement (CDR), is examined from the perspective of the evolution-based harmful-dysfunction analysis of disorder. The CDR is often assumed to express value relativity of harm in diagnosis, but cultural values are a designed feature of human social functioning that influence personality formation. The CDR is thus argued to be an indicator of whether an individual's personality organization is due to an evolutionary dysfunction. Value relativity and evolutionary analysis thus converge.

Comorbidity↗

Dysfunction as a factual component of disorder.

The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis holds that disorder, mental or physical, requires harm, a value criterion, and dysfunction, a factual criterion referring to failure of a mechanism to perform a naturally selected function. Houts' arguments that the HD analysis does not offer an adequate factual account of dysfunction are examined and shown to be invalid. For example, his claim that the HD analysis confuses function with purpose, a value concept, ignores the analysis'account of function in terms of the value-free notion of effect-explanation; and his argument that functions imply norms (e.g., what mechanisms are 'supposed to' do) falsely assumes that such norms are evaluative. The HD analysis of function is analogous in logical structure to the functional analyst's factual behavioral notion of function. Houts' value account of disorder is inconsistent with people's classificatory judgments, as his own examples demonstrate.

Humans↗

Should the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder consider social context?

OBJECTIVE: The text of the DSM-IV states that a diagnosis of conduct disorder should be made only if symptoms are caused by an internal psychological dysfunction and not if symptoms are a reaction to a negative environment. However, the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria are purely behavioral and ignore this exclusion. This study empirically evaluated which approach--the text's negative-environment exclusion or the purely behavioral criteria--is more consistent with clinicians' intuitive judgments about whether a disorder is present, whether professional help is needed, and whether the problem is likely to continue. METHOD: Clinically experienced psychology and social work graduate students were presented with three variations of vignettes describing youths whose behavior satisfied the DSM-IV criteria for conduct disorder. The three variations presented symptoms only, symptoms caused by internal dysfunction, and symptoms caused by reactions to a negative environment. The clinicians rated their level of agreement that the youth described in the vignette had a disorder, needed professional mental health help, and had a problem that was likely to continue into adulthood. RESULTS: Youths with symptoms caused by internal dysfunction were judged to have a disorder, and those with a reaction to a negative environment not to have a disorder. The difference was not explained by the clinicians' judgments of the youths' need for professional help or the expected duration of symptoms. CONCLUSIONS: The clinicians' judgments supported the validity of the DSM-IV's textual claim that a diagnosis of conduct disorder is valid only when symptoms are due to an internal dysfunction.

Adolescent↗