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John Paley

Publications and source records attributed to John Paley.

12 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

Evidence and expertise.

This paper evaluates attempts to defend established concepts of expertise and clinical judgement against the incursions of evidence-based practice. Two related arguments are considered. The first suggests that standard accounts of evidence-based practice imply an overly narrow view of 'evidence', and that a more inclusive concept, incorporating 'patterns of knowing' not recognised by the familiar evidence hierarchies, should be adopted. The second suggests that statistical generalisations cannot be applied non-problematically to individual patients in specific contexts, and points out that this is why we need clinical judgement. In evaluating the first argument, I propose a criterion for what counts as evidence. It is a minimalist criterion but the 'patterns of knowing', referred to in the literature, still fail to meet it. In evaluating the second argument, I will outline the powerful empirical reasons we have for thinking that decisions based on research evidence are usually better than decisions based on clinical judgement; and show that current efforts to rehabilitate clinical judgement seriously underestimate the strength of these reasons. By way of conclusion, I will sketch the ways in which the concept of expertise will have to be modified if we accept evidence-based practice as a template for health-care.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMed2005

Phenomenology as rhetoric.

The literature on 'nursing phenomenology' is driven by a range of ontological and epistemological considerations, intended to distance it from conventionally scientific approaches. However, this paper examines a series of discrepancies between phenomenological rhetoric and phenomenological practice. The rhetoric celebrates perceptions and experience; but the concluding moment of a research report almost always makes implicit claims about reality. The rhetoric insists on uniquely personal meanings; but the practice offers blank, anonymous abstractions. The rhetoric invites us to believe that knowing is subjective and involved, but at the same time it recommends a technique (bracketing) which can only represent a crude, and entirely misconceived, gesture towards objectivity. Finally, the rhetoric claims that generalisation is beside the point; but the majority of researchers generalise anyway. In quietly ignoring their own rhetoric, 'phenomenologists' appropriate scientific prerogatives illegitimately. For their methods do not entitle them to lay claim to anything resembling 'objectivity', or generalisability, or 'reality', or theoretical abstraction. Like other researchers, they want to talk in generalisable terms about reality; they want to be objective, they want to do theory. But they are saddled with a philosophy that is disabling, because it says they can only talk about perceptions, and meanings, and uniqueness.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2005

Narrative vigilance: the analysis of stories in health care.

The idea of narrative has been widely discussed in the recent health care literature, including nursing, and has been portrayed as a resource for both clinical work and research studies. However, the use of the term 'narrative' is inconsistent, and various assumptions are made about the nature (and functions) of narrative: narrative as a naive account of events; narrative as the source of 'subjective truth'; narrative as intrinsically fictional; and narrative as a mode of explanation. All these assumptions have left their mark on the nursing literature, and all of them (in our view) are misconceived. Here, we argue that a failure to distinguish between 'narrative' and 'story' is partly responsible for these misconceptions, and we offer an analysis that shows why the distinction between them is essential. In doing so, we borrow the concept of 'narrativity' from literary criticism. Narrativity is something that a text has degrees of, and our proposal is that the elements of narrativity can be 'sorted' roughly into a continuum, at the 'high narrativity' end of which we find 'story'. On our account, 'story' is an interweaving of plot and character, whose organization is designed to elicit a certain emotional response from the reader, while 'narrative' refers to the sequence of events and the (claimed) causal connections between them. We suggest that it is important not to confuse the emotional persuasiveness of the 'story' with the objective accuracy of the 'narrative', and to this end we recommend what might be called 'narrative vigilance'. There is nothing intrinsically authentic, or sacrosanct, or emancipatory, or paradigmatic about narrative itself, even though the recent health care literature has had a marked tendency to romanticize it.

Attitude to Health↗
PubMed2005

Error and objectivity: cognitive illusions and qualitative research.

Psychological research has shown that cognitive illusions, of which visual illusions are just a special case, are systematic and pervasive, raising epistemological questions about how error in all forms of research can be identified and eliminated. The quantitative sciences make use of statistical techniques for this purpose, but it is not clear what the qualitative equivalent is, particularly in view of widespread scepticism about validity and objectivity. I argue that, in the light of cognitive psychology, the 'error question' cannot be dismissed as a positivist obsession, and that the concepts of truth and objectivity are unavoidable. However, they constitute only a 'minimal realism', which does not necessarily bring a commitment to 'absolute' truth, certainty, correspondence, causation, reductionism, or universal laws in its wake. The assumption that it does reflects a misreading of positivism and, ironically, precipitates a 'crisis of legitimation and representation', as described by constructivist authors.

Cognition↗
PubMed2004

Clinical cognition and embodiment.

I first identify two different distinctions: between Cartesian cognition and embodied cognition, and between calculative rationality and intuitive know-how. I then suggest that, in the nursing literature, these two distinctions are run together, to create an opposition between 'Cartesian rationality' and 'embodied know-how'. However, it is vital to keep the two distinctions apart, because 'embodied knowing' is very frequently rational. In separating the idea of embodied cognition from non-rational intuition, I show how 'embodiment' leads to the concepts of distributed cognition and distributed expertise. This has extensive and important implications for how we understand clinical cognition in nursing.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗
PubMed2004

Gadow's romanticism: science, poetry and embodiment in postmodern nursing.

Sally Gadow's work is a sophisticated version of a familiar line of thought in nursing. She creates a chain of distinctions which is intended to differentiate cultural narratives, and particularly the 'science narrative', from imaginative narratives, especially poetry. Cultural narratives regulate and restrict; imaginative narratives are creative, liberating and potentially transcendent. These ideological effects are (supposedly) achieved through different structures of language. Scientific language, for example, is abstract and literal, while poetry is sensuous and metaphorical. In this paper, I argue that Gadow's way of discriminating between science and poetry fails. In the first place, the ideological valence she assigns to each of them is unwarranted. Science and poetry can both be harnessed to the project of emancipation, just as both can be incorporated in a strategy of oppression. In the second place, the claim that poetry and science are distinguished by their respective linguistic features--specifically, that one is metaphorical and the other literal--cannot be sustained. I illustrate this argument, as Gadow illustrates hers, by reference to the concept of embodiment, and consider whether Gadow is correct in thinking that poetry, not science, makes it possible for individuals (especially women) to 'reclaim the body'. I also suggest that Gadow's brand of postmodernism echoes Romanticism, whose defining characteristic was an insistent contrast between poetry and science. This is 'flip side' postmodernism, which merely opposes modernist values, preferring subjectivity to objectivity, feeling to rationality, and multiple realities to truth. It is less radical, and far less interesting, than 'remix' postmodernism, whose objective is not to reverse the polarities, but to reconfigure the entire circuit.

History, 20th Century↗
PubMed2002

Benner's remnants: culture, tradition and everyday understanding.

BACKGROUND: Benner's account of meaning and embodiment in nursing depends on a theory which she has never fully articulated, although she makes numerous allusions to it. Behind the background of shared meanings hovers something called 'culture', which provides each individual with meaning, determines what counts as real for her, and actively hands down interpretation-laden practices. This view is based, Benner claims, on the Heideggerian assumption that the meaning and organization of a culture precedes individual meaning-giving activity. AIM: I explore Benner's implicit view of culture, drawing on her published work over 15 years, and offer an appraisal of it. In doing so, I attempt to make sense of some rather strange remarks Benner has recently made about 'remnants' of Cartesian and Kantian thinking being found in the everyday understandings of people with asthma. METHODS: The concept of culture is developed with reference to both Benner's own work and that of the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, whose work she frequently cites. Having identified the principal tenets of what we might conveniently call the Benner-Geertz theory, I proceed to interrogate the theory, using the recent anthropological literature -- and, in particular, materialist attacks on the idea of culture as a system of meanings -- in order to cast doubt on it. I also review, very briefly, an alternative way of understanding 'culture', which is not vulnerable to the same criticisms. CONCLUSIONS: Benner's implicit theory of culture is revealed, somewhat ironically, as an inverted form of Cartesian dualism. Its intellectual provenance is not Heidegger, who appears to reject it, but the sort of American sociology associated with Talcott Parsons. As a corollary, it is suggested that Benner's 'remnants' analogy cannot be justified, and that the idea of Cartesian and Kantian concepts permeating Western culture, infecting both the providers and receivers of health care, is a myth.

Anthropology, Cultural↗
PubMed2002

Caring as a slave morality: Nietzschean themes in nursing ethics.

BACKGROUND: Sceptical arguments about 'caring' can be divided into three categories. First, it is suggested that, while caring is no doubt an admirable thing in itself, it is just one ideal among others. Secondly, it is claimed that caring is not really a virtue at all, and that it should be regarded as more of a vice, because it promotes favouritism, injustice, and self-deception. Thirdly, there is a worry that caring is not politically realistic, and that its advocates underestimate the powerful organizational and social structures which conspire to subvert nursing. AIM: This paper outlines a fourth, and more radical, type of scepticism, which explains why caring is subject to these drawbacks. In doing so, it considers the relation between caring, phenomenology and holism in nursing discourse, and the way in which all three fit together to form the 'caring paradigm'. METHODS: The paper adopts a genealogical approach, borrowed directly from Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality. That book argues that the values associated with caring are the expression of a profound resentment, harboured by the slaves (weak, powerless, timorous) against the nobles (strong, powerful, self-confident). Caring represents an inversion, a sort of 'fantasy revenge', in which the nobles can be portrayed as 'evil', while the slaves portray their own weakness as 'good'. Taking its cue from Nietzsche, the paper shows that the Genealogy narrative can be transposed into a modern health care context, with nurses as the 'slaves' and the medical profession as the 'nobles'. CONCLUSIONS: The ideology of caring is, in the Genealogy's terms, a slave morality. It represents an attack on the 'medical-scientific model', motivated by resentment, and designed to establish nursing's superiority. Its effects have been debilitating, and it has prevented nursing from becoming a 'noble' (that is, a properly scientific) discipline.

Christianity↗