Biomedical subjects

Kevin S Griffith

Publications and source records attributed to Kevin S Griffith.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

A population survey of smallpox knowledge, perceptions, and healthcare-seeking behavior surrounding the Iraq invasion--Connecticut 2002-03.

BACKGROUND: Knowledge and perceptions about smallpox would probably influence public behavior following an intentional smallpox release. We assessed public knowledge, perceptions, and related healthcare-seeking behavior in Connecticut during the period of heightened interest in smallpox preparedness surrounding the Iraq invasion. METHODS: Smallpox-related questions were added to Connecticut's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System survey, an ongoing statewide adult population-based survey during December 2002-July 2003 and November-December 2003. RESULTS: Among 4,074 respondents, when asked about a hypothetical febrile illness, 72% would first contact their primary care provider (PCP) on weekdays. During nights and weekends, respondents would depend nearly equally on PCPs and emergency departments (37% versus 36%). Most knew smallpox is transmissible from person to person (72%) but not that the majority infected with smallpox survive (38%) or that smallpox is most contagious after the appearance of rash (11%). Knowledge regarding transmissibility and mortality improved during the study period (p < 0.001). Only 31% recognized that vaccinia vaccine is riskier than routine vaccines; 41% would choose vaccination if available. Concern about smallpox's potential use as a weapon was high but decreased after President Bush declared "mission accomplished" in Iraq in May 2003 (p < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Despite national coverage of smallpox by the media, most respondents lacked basic knowledge regarding the disease. Incorrect perceptions regarding vaccinia vaccine's risks could increase inappropriate vaccine demand among nonexposed people with vaccine contraindications during a mass vaccination campaign. Current perceptions should inform future smallpox preparedness planning. In addition, both PCPs and emergency medicine clinicians should be targeted for education regarding smallpox diagnosis.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2003

Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax in an elderly woman, Connecticut, 2001.

On November 20, 2001, inhalational anthrax was confirmed in an elderly woman from rural Connecticut. To determine her exposure source, we conducted an extensive epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investigation. Molecular subtyping showed that her isolate was indistinguishable from isolates associated with intentionally contaminated letters. No samples from her home or community yielded Bacillus anthracis, and she received no first-class letters from facilities known to have processed intentionally contaminated letters. Environmental sampling in the regional Connecticut postal facility yielded B. anthracis spores from 4 (31%) of 13 sorting machines. One extensively contaminated machine primarily processes bulk mail. A second machine that does final sorting of bulk mail for her zip code yielded B. anthracis on the column of bins for her carrier route. The evidence suggests she was exposed through a cross-contaminated bulk mail letter. Such cross-contamination of letters and postal facilities has implications for managing the response to future B. anthracis-contaminated mailings.

Aged↗

PubMed2002

Anthrax postexposure prophylaxis in postal workers, Connecticut, 2001.

After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient's area. Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers within 20 days of initial prophylaxis. Ninety-four workers obtained antibiotics, 68 of whom started postexposure prophylaxis, and of these, 21 discontinued. Postal workers who never started or stopped taking prophylaxis cited as reasons disbelief regarding anthrax exposure, problems with adverse events, and initial reports of negative cultures. Postal workers with adverse events reported predominant symptoms of gastrointestinal distress and headache. The influence of these concerns on adherence suggests that communication about risks of acquiring anthrax, education about adverse events, and careful management of adverse events are essential elements in increasing adherence.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001: epidemiologic findings.

In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facilities, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty (91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law enforcement communities.

Adult↗