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Kirsten G Volz

Publications and source records attributed to Kirsten G Volz.

9 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

The neural implementation of multi-attribute decision making: a parametric fMRI study with human subjects.

Decision making is not a unitary entity but involves rather a series of interdependent processes. Decisions entail a choice between two or more alternatives. Within the complex series of decisional processes, at least two levels can be differentiated: a first level of information integration (process level) and a second level of information interpretation (control level), leading to a subsequent motor response or cognitive process. The aim of this study was to investigate the neural network of these decisional processes. In a single trial fMRI study, we implemented a simple decision-making task, where subjects had to decide between two alternatives represented on five attributes. The similarity between the two alternatives was varied systematically in order to achieve a parametric variation of decisional effort. For easy trials, the two alternatives differed significantly in several attributes, whereas for difficult trials, the two alternatives differed only in small details. The results show a distributed neural network related to decisional effort. By means of time course analysis different subprocesses within this network could be differentiated: regions subserving the integration of the presented information (premotor areas and superior parietal lobe) and regions subserving the interpretation of this information (frontolateral and frontomedial cortex, anterior insula, and caudate) as well as a region in the inferior frontal junction updating task rules.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

Decision-making and the frontal lobes.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: This article reviews the most significant advances concerning the neural correlates of decision-making with emphasis on those imaging studies investigating the neural implementation of evaluative judgment processes. This is done against the background of current concepts from the field of judgment and decision-making. RECENT FINDINGS: Actual neuroscientific findings suggest that subject to the extent of how deeply a decision-maker has to explore his/her value system in order to reach a decision, distinguishable orbital and medial prefrontal areas will be engaged. Decisions low in costs mapping the values onto the decision problem mainly rely on orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whereas decisions high in costs particularly draw on anterior-medial and dorsomedial prefrontal areas. This suggestion is related to the anatomic properties of the respective areas. SUMMARY: Combining neuroimaging data with concepts from research in judgment and decision-making may facilitate advances in our understanding of the contrast between normative theories and descriptive theories of decision-making. Incorporating findings from research on decision-making behavior in patients with specific prefrontal lesions may have much to offer for an understanding of both the areas' functions and cognitive theories on decision-making.

Decision Making↗
PubMed2006

Why you think milan is larger than modena: neural correlates of the recognition heuristic.

When ranking two alternatives by some criteria and only one of the alternatives is recognized, participants overwhelmingly adopt the strategy, termed the recognition heuristic (RH), of choosing the recognized alternative. Understanding the neural correlates underlying decisions that follow the RH could help determine whether people make judgments about the RH's applicability or simply choose the recognized alternative. We measured brain activity by using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants indicated which of two cities they thought was larger (Experiment 1) or which city they recognized (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, increased activation was observed within the anterior frontomedian cortex (aFMC), precuneus, and retrosplenial cortex when participants followed the RH compared to when they did not. Experiment 2 revealed that RH decisional processes cannot be reduced to recognition memory processes. As the aFMC has previously been associated with self-referential judgments, we conclude that RH decisional processes involve an assessment about the applicability of the RH.

Adult↗
PubMed2006

What neuroscience can tell about intuitive processes in the context of perceptual discovery.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, intuition is "the ability to understand or know something immediately, without conscious reasoning." Most people would agree that intuitive responses appear as ideas or feelings that subsequently guide our thoughts and behaviors. It is proposed that people continuously, without conscious attention, recognize patterns in the stream of sensations that impinge upon them. What exactly is being recognized is not clear yet, but we assume that people detect potential content based on only a few aspects of the input (i.e., the gist). The result is a vague perception of coherence which is not explicitly describable but instead embodied in a "gut feeling" or an initial guess, which subsequently biases thought and inquiry. To approach the nature of intuitive processes, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging when participants were working at a modified version of the Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task. Starting from our conceptualization that intuition involves an informed judgment in the context of discovery, we expected activation within the median orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), as this area receives input from all sensory modalities and has been shown to be crucially involved in emotionally driven decisions. Results from a direct contrast between intuitive and nonintuitive judgments, as well as from a parametric analysis, revealed the median OFC, the lateral portion of the amygdala, anterior insula, and ventral occipito-temporal regions to be activated. Based on these findings, we suggest our definition of intuition to be promising and a good starting point for future research on intuitive processes.

Adult↗
PubMed2005

Variants of uncertainty in decision-making and their neural correlates.

When leaving the tidy world of rules and people start judging probabilities on an intuitive basis, it revealed that they have some intuitions to choose from. One could refer to them as a family of subjective probability concepts or following Kahneman and Tversky, as variants of uncertainty. The authors distinguished between external and internal attributions of uncertainty and could show that the perceived reason of uncertainty determines the selected coping strategy. To investigate whether variants of uncertainty can also be distinguished on the cerebral level, two functional magnetic resonance imaging studies were conducted. Participants had to predict events (abstract visual stimuli) under parametrically varying degrees of (un-)certainty. In the first experiment, uncertainty was induced by the manipulation of event probability (externally attributed uncertainty). In the second experiment, uncertainty depended on participants' knowledge of valid rules of event occurrence, as trained before the experimental session (internally attributed uncertainty). As a result, parametric analyses revealed that activation within the posterior fronto-median cortex, particularly within mesial Brodmann area (BA) 8, increased with increasing uncertainty, no matter for which reason uncertainty emerged. Furthermore, it was found that different variants of uncertainty entailing different coping strategies can be dissociated due to additionally activated networks. Concluding, increasing activation within mesial BA 8 reflects that we are uncertain, additional networks what we do to resolve uncertainty in order to achieve future rewards. Hence, the phenomenological distinction between processes related to externally and internally attributed uncertainty is paralleled on the cerebral level.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2005

Frontomedian activation depends on both feedback validity and valence: fMRI evidence for contextual feedback evaluation.

Activation within the posterior frontomedian cortex (pFMC) is suggested to be involved in decision conflict, which typically emerges whenever one does not know which action to choose in order to receive a positive outcome. Decision conflict attenuates due to learning which is often indicated by and therefore confounded with the receipt of increasingly frequent positive and decreasingly frequent negative feedback. The present functional Magnetic Resonance study aimed to disentangle the influence of the factors processing of negative feedback and contextual feedback evaluation on pFMC activation. Participants performed a forced choice paradigm in which they had to decide which one out of two competing stimuli would win in a virtual competition game. In one condition (rule learning, RL), participants were provided with valid feedback so that contextual feedback evaluation had a guiding function for action and thus enabled learning. In contrast, participants received no valid information from feedback in another condition (putative learning, PL) and hence could not learn on the basis of contextual feedback evaluation. However, a learning effect in the latter condition was simulated by gradually increasing the frequency of positive feedback and decreasing the frequency of negative feedback according to a learning model which was derived from pilot data. Importantly, participants were naive with respect to feedback manipulations. Beyond confirming pFMC activation for decision conflicts, a significant interaction between validity and valence of feedback in pFMC revealed the specific contribution of contextual feedback evaluation processes on activation of this area. Not the processing of negative feedback per se, which was found to elicit activation within anterior cingulate cortex, but the evaluation of feedback against the background of the current mental model is suggested to be reflected by pFMC activation.

Adult↗
PubMed2004

Why am I unsure? Internal and external attributions of uncertainty dissociated by fMRI.

Behavioral evidence suggests that the perceived reason of uncertainty causes different coping strategies to be implemented, particularly frequency ratings with externally attributed uncertainty and memory search with internally attributed uncertainty. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate whether processes related to these different attributions of uncertainty differ also in their neural substrates. Participants had to predict events that were uncertain due to internal factors, that is, insufficient knowledge. Data were compared with a preceding study in which event prediction was uncertain due to external factors, that is, event probabilities. Parametric analyses revealed the posterior frontomedian cortex, that is, mesial Brodmann Area 8 (BA 8) as the common cortical substrate mediating processes related to uncertainty no matter what the cause of uncertainty. However, processes related to the two differently attributed types of uncertainty differed significantly in relation to the brain network that was coactivated. Only processes related to internally attributed uncertainty elicited activation within the mid-dorsolateral and posterior parietal areas known to underlie working memory (WM) functions. Together, findings from both experiments suggest that there is a common cerebral correlate for uncertain predictions but different correlates for coping strategies of uncertainty. Concluding, BA 8 reflects that we are uncertain, coactivated networks what we do to resolve uncertainty.

Adaptation, Psychological↗
PubMed2003

Predicting events of varying probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI.

Many everyday life predictions rely on the experience and memory of event frequencies, i.e., natural samplings. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural substrates of prediction under varying uncertainty based on a natural sampling approach. The study focused particularly on a comparison with other types of externally attributed uncertainty, such as guessing, and on the frontomedian cortex, which is known to be engaged in many types of decisions under uncertainty. On the basis of preceding stimulus cues, participants predicted events that occurred with probabilities ranging from p = 0.6 to p = 1.0. In contrast to certain predictions in a control task, predictions under uncertainty elicited activations within a posterior frontomedian area (mesial BA 8) and within a set of subcortical areas which are known to subserve dopaminergic modulations. The parametric analysis revealed that activation within the mesial BA 8 significantly increased with increasing uncertainty. A comparison with other types of uncertainty indicates that frontomedian correlates of frequency-based prediction appear to be comparable with those induced in long-term stimulus-response adaptation processes such as hypothesis testing, in contrast to those engaged in short-term error processing such as guessing.

Adult↗