Biomedical subjects

Kristian Lindgren

Publications and source records attributed to Kristian Lindgren.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma.

The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming simple trigger strategies and many iterations per game, we analyse the rate of convergence to the evolutionarily stable populations. We find that for some values of the payoff parameters of the Prisoner's Dilemma this rate is so low that the assumption, that mutations in the population are infrequent on that time-scale, is unreasonable. Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In order to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid when the population size is large. We then analyse how the evolutionary dynamics depends on the following factors: mutation rate, group size, the value of the payoff parameters, and the structure of the initial population. In order to carry out the simulations for groups of more than just a few individuals, we derive an efficient way of calculating the fitness values. We find that when the mutation rate per individual and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterized by populations which are evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased, other fixed points with a higher degree of cooperation become stable. For some values of the payoff parameters, the system is characterized by (apparently) stable limit cycles dominated by cooperative behaviour. The parameter regions corresponding to high degree of cooperation grow in size with the mutation rate, and in number with the group size. For some parameter values, we find more than one stable fixed point, corresponding to different structures of the initial population.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

War of attrition with implicit time cost.

In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the strategies of the whole population. We identify and analyse the underlying mechanisms responsible for the implicit time cost. Each player participates in a series of games, where those prepared to wait longer win with higher certainty but play less frequently. The model is characterized by the ratio of the winner's score to the loser's score, in a single game. The fitness of a player is determined by the accumulated score from the games played during a generation. We derive the stationary distribution of strategies under the replicator dynamics. When the score ratio is high, we find that the stationary distribution is unstable, with respect to both evolutionary and dynamical stability, and the dynamics converge to a limit cycle. When the ratio is low, the dynamics converge to the stationary distribution. For an intermediate interval of the ratio, the distribution is dynamically but not evolutionarily stable. Finally, the implications of our results for previous models based on the war of attrition are discussed.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

Urban economy as a scale-free network.

We present empirical evidence that land values are scale free and introduce a network model that reproduces the observations. The network approach to urban modeling is based on the assumption that the market dynamics that generates land values can be represented as a growing scale-free network. Our results suggest that the network properties of trade between specialized activities cause land values, and likely also other observables such as population, to be power-law distributed. In addition to being an attractive avenue for further analytical inquiry, the network representation is also applicable to empirical data and is thereby attractive for predictive modeling.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2002

Urban growth simulation from "first principles".

General and mathematically transparent models of urban growth have so far suffered from a lack in microscopic realism. Physical models that have been used for this purpose, i.e., diffusion-limited aggregation, dielectric breakdown models, and correlated percolation all have microscopic dynamics for which analogies with urban growth appear stretched. Based on a Markov random field formulation we have developed a model that is capable of reproducing a variety of important characteristic urban morphologies and that has realistic microscopic dynamics. The results presented in this paper are particularly important in relation to "urban sprawl," an important aspect of which is aggressively spreading low-density land uses. This type of growth is increasingly causing environmental, social, and economical problems around the world. The microdynamics of our model, or its "first principles," can be mapped to human decisions and motivations and thus potentially also to policies and regulations. We measure statistical properties of macrostates generated by the urban growth mechanism that we propose, and we compare these to empirical measurements as well as to results from other models. To showcase the open-endedness of the model and to thereby relate our work to applied urban planning we have also included a simulated city consisting of a large number of land use classes in which also topographical data have been used.

Journal Article↗