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Biomedical subjects

L M Reder

Publications and source records attributed to L M Reder.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Another source of individual differences: strategy adaptivity to changing rates of success.

This article explores an alternative approach to the study of individual differences of cognitive function-- that people may have the same strategies but differential ability to adaptively select among them in response to success and failure feedback from the environment. Three studies involving the complex and dynamic Kanfer-Ackerman Air Traffic Control Task (P. L. Ackerman & R. Kanfer, 1994) demonstrate (a) that individuals do differ systematically along this strategy adaptivity dimension, (b) that those differences have important consequences for overall task performance, and (c) that the differences are primarily associated with reasoning ability and working-memory capacity.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

Awareness and working memory in strategy adaptivity.

To further the understanding of the mechanisms of strategy choice, in three experiments, we investigate the role of explicit awareness and working memory in strategy adaptivity. Experiment 1 provided correlational evidence that individual differences in strategy adaptivity to changing base rates are related to individual differences in awareness of those changes but appear not to be related to individual differences in working memory capacity. Experiment 2 replicated the role of awareness, and the results suggest that awareness at the time of the base-rate change, rather than afterwards, is related to increased strategy adaptivity. Experiment 3 measured working memory capacity using a different procedure and manipulated working memory load with a dual-task procedure; again, no apparent role of working memory capacity in strategy adaptivity was found. This juxtaposition of findings presents a challenge for existing models of strategy choice.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

The unconscious feeling of knowing: a commentary on Koriat's paper.

In Koriat's paper "The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control," he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal.

Cognition↗

A mechanistic account of the mirror effect for word frequency: a computational model of remember-know judgments in a continuous recognition paradigm.

A theoretical account of the mirror effect for word frequency and of dissociations in the pattern of responding Remember vs. Know (R vs. K) for low- and high-frequency words was tested both empirically and computationally by comparing predicted with observed data theory in 3 experiments. The SAC (Source of Activation Confusion) theory of memory makes the novel prediction of more K responses for high- than for low-frequency words, for both old and new items. Two experiments used a continuous presentation and judgment paradigm that presented words up to 10 times. The computer simulation closely modeled the pattern of results, fitting new Know and Remember patterns of responding at each level of experimental presentation and for both levels of word frequency for each participant. Experiment 3 required list discrimination after each R response (Group 1) or after an R or K response (Group 2). List accuracy was better following R responses. All experiments were modeled using the same parameter values.

Adult↗

Process, not representation: reply to Radvansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (1999) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought--Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings.

Association Learning↗

Working memory: activation limitations on retrieval.

Two experiments which require subjects to hold a digit span while solving an equation and then recall the digit span are performed. The size of the memory span and the complexity of the equation are manipulated as well as whether the subject is required to substitute items from the digit span for constants in the equation. As either task (digit span recall or equation solving) gets more complex there are performance decrements (accuracy or latency) not only in that task but also in the other task. It is also shown that the majority of the errors are misretrievals. These results are consistent with the proposal that working memory load has its impact on retrieval from memory. These results are fit by the ACT-R theory (Anderson, 1993) which assumes that there is a limit on source activation and that this activation has to be divided between the two tasks. As either task increases in complexity there is less activation for retrieval of information from declarative memory. Subjects' misretrievals of associatively related information could be predicted by assuming a partial matching process in ACT-R.

Adult↗

Partial matching in the Moses illusion: response bias not sensitivity.

Previous research has demonstrated that people have enormous difficulty in detecting distortions in such questions as, "How many animals of each kind did Moses take in the Ark?" Reder and Kusbit (1991) argued that the locus of the effect must be the existence of a partial-match process. Other research has suggested that this partial-match process operates at the word level and that, with adequate focus on the relevant word, the Moses illusion is greatly diminished. The present experimental results argue that those conclusions were based on a shift in response criterion with no concomitant change in ability to detect distortions. Furthermore, the data suggest that the matching process operates below the word level, at the level of distinctive features.

Adult↗

When preparation fails: disruptive effects of prior information on perceptual recognition.

There is a conflict in the literature on selective attention. Suppose a subject is briefly presented an item followed by a multiple-alternative recognition test. If the items are pictures, the subject's performance is facilitated by presenting the alternatives beforehand (a before facilitation), but when the items are letters the subjects' performance is disrupted by presenting the alternatives beforehand (a before disruption). Five experiments were conducted to resolve this conflict, and all involved a comparison of tachistoscopic recognition when alternatives were either presented beforehand or not. The first two studies showed that the before disruption with letters was not due to certain task parameters. Experiments 3-5 demonstrated that this effect was due to masking conditions. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that the disruption occurred only when a mask is used, while the last experiment indicated the disruption effect was sensitive to the type of mask employed. Preseumably, the before disrption arises because a subject erroneously considers the features of a mask along with those of the test item in arriving at a perceptual decision.

Attention↗