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L W Barsalou

Publications and source records attributed to L W Barsalou.

8 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1999

Perceptual symbol systems.

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

Cognition↗
PubMed1998

Basing categorization on individuals and events.

Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that events constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categorization. In these models, each learning events updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. An implication is that events involving the same individual affect learning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals across events, establish representations of them, and use these representations in categorization. These findings are consistent with "representationalism," the view that an internal model of the world constitutes a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an undifferentiated dynamical system. Although categorization is an inherently statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completion, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently representational process that establishes an internal model of the world. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to track the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and simulate them in events.

Humans↗
PubMed1998

Reuniting perception and conception.

Work in philosophy and psychology has argued for a dissociation between perceptually-based similarity and higher-level rules in conceptual thought. Although such a dissociation may be justified at times, our goal is to illustrate ways in which conceptual processing is grounded in perception, both for perceptual similarity and abstract rules. We discuss the advantages, power and influences of perceptually-based representations. First, many of the properties associated with amodal symbol systems can be achieved with perceptually-based systems as well (e.g. productivity). Second, relatively raw perceptual representations are powerful because they can implicitly represent properties in an analog fashion. Third, perception naturally provides impressions of overall similarity, exactly the type of similarity useful for establishing many common categories. Fourth, perceptual similarity is not static but becomes tuned over time to conceptual demands. Fifth, the original motivation or basis for sophisticated cognition is often less sophisticated perceptual similarity. Sixth, perceptual simulation occurs even in conceptual tasks that have no explicit perceptual demands. Parallels between perceptual and conceptual processes suggest that many mechanisms typically associated with abstract thought are also present in perception, and that perceptual processes provide useful mechanisms that may be co-opted by abstract thought.

Association Learning↗
PubMed1997

Multiple organisations of events in memory.

Theories of memory organisation propose that activity knowledge organises autobiographical memory globally. According to these views, memories that share a participant, location, or time are only organised together if they also share an activity. If they do not, they are nested within their respective activity organisations locally rather than being organised together globally. Two experiments that assessed people's clustering of laboratory events consistently obtained findings that contradict this view. Both experiments found that people organise event memories globally in non-activity clusters, cross-classify events into multiple organisations, and pivot between activity and non-activity clusters. Consistent with studies of naturalistic events, these studies of laboratory events indicate that people cross-classify event memories simultaneously into multiple global organisations.

Adult↗
PubMed1996

The instantiation principle in natural categories.

According to the instantiation principle, the representation of a category includes detailed information about its diverse range of instances. Many accounts of categorisation, including classical and standard prototype theories, do not follow the instantiation principle, because they assume that detailed, exemplar-level information is filtered out of category representations. Nevertheless, the instantiation principle can be implemented in a wide class of models, including both exemplar and abstraction models. To assess the instantiation principle empirically, a parameter-free exemplar-based model of instantiation was applied to typicality judgments for 16 simple categories (e.g. mammal, beverage) and 14 complex categories (e.g. dangerous mammal) in four superordinates (animal, food, small animal, dangerous animal). Across three studies, the model did an excellent job of predicting mean typicality judgments (correlations generally above 0.9) and a good job of predicting standard deviations (fits generally from 0.6 to 0.9). In Study 3, predicting the skew of typicality distributions was successful as well (a fit of 0.87), and dropping atypical exemplars from the simulations degraded prediction. All of these results support the instantiation principle, indicating that subjects incorporate detailed information about category instances into their representations of categories.

Humans↗
PubMed1985

Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories.

Three possible determinants of graded structure (typicality) were observed in common taxonomic categories and goal-derived categories: (1) an exemplar's similarity to ideals associated with goals its category serves; (2) an exemplar's similarity to the central tendency of its category (family resemblance); and (3) an exemplar's frequency of instantiation (people's subjective estimates of how often it is encountered as a category member). Experiment 1 found that central tendency did not predict graded structure in goal-derived categories, although it did predict graded structure in common taxonomic categories. Ideals and frequency of instantiation predicted graded structure in both category types to sizeable and equal extents. A fourth possible determinant--familiarity--did not predict typicality in either common taxonomic or goal-derived categories. Experiment 2 demonstrated that both central tendency and ideals causally determine graded structure, and work showing that frequency causally determines graded structure is discussed. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the determinants of a particular category's graded structure can change with context. Whereas ideals may determine a category's graded structure in one context, central tendency may determine a different graded structure in another. It is proposed that graded structures do not reflect invariant structures associated with categories but instead reflect people's dynamic ability to construct concepts.

Adult↗