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M Bosinelli

Publications and source records attributed to M Bosinelli.

10 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2001

Consciousness during dreams.

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.

Awareness↗
PubMed2000

Slow wave and REM sleep mentation.

The aim of this experiment was to compare the characteristics of mental activity during REM and Slow Wave Sleep (SWS). Forty dream reports and their mnemonic associations were collected from twenty subjects. The reports were analyzed for structure (number of temporal units, number of report multi-units, and narrative continuity), awareness (reality testing, subjective time), and content (self, setting, laboratory references, number of non-self characters, implausibility, body feelings, number and intensity of emotions, vividness). Associations were classified as episodic and semantic memories. Results showed that REM reports were significantly longer than SWS reports. Minor content SWS-REM differences were also detected, which were more quantitative than qualitative. The collected observations might support the tentative hypothesis that dreaming is a continuous process, which is not unique to REM sleep. Different levels of engagement of the cognitive system are responsible for the SWS-REM differences that were detected.

Adult↗
PubMed1998

A comparison of mental activity during sleep onset and morning awakening.

The aims of the experiment were: (1) to establish the proportion of sleep stages in morning spontaneous awakening and to observe whether any stage-dependent differences can be found in the mentation reports; and (2) to compare the characteristics of mental activity during sleep onset (SO) and during the latest sleep period. One hundred forty-four dream reports and their association reports were collected from 36 subjects in a lab experimental design. Dream reports were analyzed as to structure (length, narrative continuity), content (self, setting, lab references, nonself characters, dimensional distortions, body feelings, bizarreness and emotions), and awareness (reality testing). Associations were classified as episodic, abstract self-referred, and semantic memories. The morning awakenings results were not affected by the stage of sleep during which dreaming occurs. SO reports prevalently show a lifelike nature, while sleep-offset reports are prevalently dreamlike. On the other hand, there seems to be a similar availability of mnemonic systems in the two sleep conditions.

Adult↗
PubMed1991

Cognitive aspects of mental activity during sleep.

Upon nighttime experimental awakening of 27 subjects in four sleep conditions (sleep onset early; sleep onset late; Stage 2; and rapid eye movement, REM, sleep), 108 dream reports and their association reports were collected. Dream reports were analyzed for length (temporal units) and content categories (continuity; implausibility; presence of the dreamer [i.e., "the self"], a setting, characters). Associations were classified as episodic, abstract self-referred, and semantic memories. The two sets of results tend to show a basic homogeneity among mentation reports in the four sleep conditions considered. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the same cognitive mechanisms operate, at different levels of engagement, in dream generation rather than the hypothesis of multiple dream-generation systems dependent upon the physiological characteristics of the various sleep stages.

Adult↗
PubMed1986

Differential access to memory traces in the production of mental experience.

Two experiments were performed to determine the nature of the memory traces used in the production of mental experiences (dreams, daydreams). Free associations with dreams, collected upon experimental awakenings in Sleep Onset and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, were classified as strict episodes, abstract self-references, or semantic traces, adapting Tulving's model (Experiment 1). Results showed that associations with Sleep Onset dreams were mainly strict episodes while REM associations were evenly distributed: that represents a psychophysiological state-dependency of the access to memory traces. A comparison of free associations with dream, daydreams, and films (Experiment 2) showed a similarity between access to memory traces in daydreaming and Sleep Onset dreaming. Physiological condition was not a discriminating factor. This homogeneity suggests that cognitive processes involved in the creation of original narrative sequences may be similar in sleep and waking. These findings and their interpretation tend to support a unitary theory of the mind rather than dichotomous models which, in dream research, have often been misleading.

Adult↗
PubMed1982

Self-representation in dream experiences during sleep onset and REM sleep.

The Scoring System for Latent Structure (SSLS) was used to test three hypotheses regarding the degree of self-participation in dreams reported during sleep onset (SO) and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. These hypotheses were that (a) the ratio of interactive to associative sentences would be significantly greater in REM than in SO; (b) the level of Ego activity would be significantly greater in REM than in SO; and (c) the ratio between interactive sentences with Ego not present and interactive sentences with Ego present would be significantly different in REM and in SO. None of these hypotheses was confirmed. However, the following significant differences were found: (a) the ratio between sentences with Ego substituted and the total number of interactive sentences was greater in REM than in SO (p less than 0.05); (b) the ratio between sentences with Ego substituted and sentences with Ego present was greater (p less than 0.05) in REM than in SO; (c) the ratio between sentences with Ego inserted and sentences with Ego substituted was greater in SO than in REM (p less than 0.01); and (d) the relative incidence of defective Ego was greater (p less than 0.01) in SO than in REM. These data were interpreted in terms of psychodynamic models of dream formation.

Adolescent↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Mind and consciousness during sleep.

The epistemological-methodological constraints for an approach to dream as an object of scientific-experimental investigation are pointed out, along with the suggestion of a new memory paradigm, that utilizes the linguistic convention ('word play') proposed by Wittgenstein. A model of dream generation is proposed, in which mnemonic materials activated from long-term memory stores enter the dream production system (bottom-up process); such materials are elaborated and interpreted by a top-down process. A circular feedback activity, operating between these two components, is able to activate additional mnemonic materials. Some experimental results, concerning the incidence of dream recall in different stages of sleep, show evidence of the continuity of dreaming activity throughout the period of sleep. The relationships between dream and consciousness/awareness are then considered. Experimental data suggest that consciousness, interpreted as awareness (phenomenal awareness; meta-awareness; self awareness), can be present along the whole sleep/dream process, even if many modifications of meta-awareness and of self-awareness are possible. Some hypotheses on the relationship between sleep and dreaming are formulated.

Animals↗