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M D Braine

Publications and source records attributed to M D Braine.

12 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1996

What do children know about the universal quantifiers all and each?

Children's comprehension of the universal quantifiers all and each was explored in a series of experiments using a picture selection task. The first experiment examined children's ability to restrict a quantifier to the noun phrase it modifies. The second and third experiments examined children's ability to associate collective, distributive, and exhaustive representations with sentences containing universal quantifiers. The collective representation corresponds to the "group" meaning (for All the flowers are in a vase all of the flowers are in the same vase). The distributive representation implies a pairing (e.g., each flower paired with a vase for Each flower is in a vase). The exhaustive representation exhausts both sets (e.g., for The flowers are in the vases all the flowers are in vases and all the vases have flowers in them). Four- to 10-year-olds children had little difficulty restricting the quantifier all to the noun it modified in a task which required them to attend to the group feature of all. In contrast, only 9- and 10-year-olds were able to solve the task when the quantifier was each and the pictures showed entities in partial one-to-one correspondence. Children showed a preference for associating collective pictures with sentences containing all and distributive pictures with sentences containing each. The results suggest that between the ages of 5 and 10 years, children's semantic representations undergo less radical changes than others have proposed. Instead, developmental change may occur gradually as children acquire linguistic cues which map onto existing semantic representations.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMed1994

Is nativism sufficient?

The past and present state of the empiricism-nativism issue is analysed. Empiricist philosophical doctrine ('no innate ideas') distinguished idea from structure or mechanism. However, Chomsky's conception of innate linguistic universals erased this distinction. The elimination left would-be empiricists without a coherent and defensible position. I argue that the issue remains alive primarily because of tension between two scientific tasks that face students of development. One is to discover what is cognitively and linguistically primitive, a task that encourages nativism. However, nativism is ultimately unsatisfactory because it systematically neglects the other task, which is to account for development, including the emergence of postulated innate primitives. To account for such primitives, it is necessary to relate them to particular central nervous system structures in such a way as to explain how the structure has the particular cognitive effects that define the primitive. That is likely to be difficult, and I show how the study of learning--much neglected in recent years--can help by reducing the number and type of innate primitives whose origin must be explained in that way.

Attention↗
PubMed1994

Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.

Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.

Cognition↗
PubMed1992

What sort of innate structure is needed to "bootstrap" into syntax?

The paper starts from Pinker's theory of the acquisition of phrase structure; it shows that it is possible to drop all the assumptions about innate syntactic structure from this theory. These assumptions can be replaced by assumptions about the basic structure of semantic representation available at the outset of language acquisition, without penalizing the acquisition of basic phrase structure rules. Essentially, the role played by X-bar theory in Pinker's model would be played by the (presumably innate) structure of the language of thought in the revised parallel model. Bootstrapping and semantic assimilation theories are shown to be formally very similar, though making different primitive assumptions. In their primitives, semantic assimilation theories have the advantage that they can offer an account of the origin of syntactic categories instead of postulating them as primitive. Ways of improving on the semantic assimilation version of Pinker's theory are considered, including a way of deriving the NP-VP constituent division that appears to have a better fit than Pinker's to evidence on language variation.

Child, Preschool↗
PubMed1990

Can children use a verb without exposure to its argument structure?

We hypothesize that canonical sentence schemas (e.g. Agent-verb-Patient) can sometimes assign argument structure to verbs. In particular, they provide a default argument structure early in learning when a verb's lexical entry may record the nature of the action but lack a specific argument structure. To test the theory and its application to causative verb errors (e.g. stay it there), novel action verbs were modelled, some as causative, some as intransitive, and some unmarked for transitivity. Spontaneous usage was recorded, along with responses to agent-questions ('What is the [Agent] doing?') and patient-questions ('What is the [Patient] doing?'). Comparable data were obtained for familiar English verbs, some of fixed and some of optional transitivity. Subjects were willing to use all novel verbs both transitively and intransitively, although adults respected assigned transitivity more than children. All subjects largely respected the transitivity of familiar verbs. The discourse pressure of the agent- and patient-questions greatly affected observed transitivity. No evidence was found for the intransitive-to-causative derivational process postulated by Bowerman. We propose that the kind of causativity error observed by Bowerman is due to assignment of argument structure from canonical sentence schemas, especially under pressure of a need to make a sentence with a particular argument (Agent or Patient) as subject. The theory has the advantage of explaining errors without postulating the acquisition of erroneous lexical entries that have to be unlearned, and it can be extended to other kinds of errors in the choice and placement of arguments.

Adult↗
PubMed1989

Reasoning about conditional sentences: development of understanding of cues to quantification.

The previous literature has reported that when children are asked to judge the truth or falsity of universally quantified conditional sentences of the form If a thing is P then it is Q they typically give responses, e.g., responding "true" whenever there is a case of P and Q even if there are also cases of P and not-Q. Three experiments are reported that address possible sources of this error. Experiment 1 shows that the error survives on sentences that refer to particular things as well as to things of a particular kind, and further shows that articulating the necessity of the consequent (... then it has to be Q) eliminates the error for adults and reduces it for fifth graders, although it does not affect second grade performance. Experiment 2 shows that for second and fifth graders the error survives to problems that are not universally quantified and for second graders to problems that are not conditionals although are otherwise structurally similar. Experiment 3 compares various verbal formulations of such universally quantified conditionals: Second and fifth graders do not make the error when the quantification is expressed with the surface structure that makes its universality most explicit (all things ...); the error tendency is greatest when the indefinite article is used (if a thing ...); and formulations using any fall in between. We argue that such erroneous evaluations of universally quantified conditionals have more to do with the quantificational aspect than the conditional aspect of the problems; children interpret the indefinite article as existential, although they resist the error when the cue to universal quantification is completely clear. The error appears to result more from the surface-structure form of the stimuli than from an inability of children to appreciate the logic of universally quantified conditionals.

Adolescent↗