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Biomedical subjects

M Layton

Publications and source records attributed to M Layton.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

A recurring outbreak of Shigella sonnei among traditionally observant Jewish children in New York City: the risks of daycare and household transmission.

Dispersed community outbreaks of Shigella sonnei have occurred cyclically among traditionally observant Jews in the United States. In February 2000, we investigated a S. sonnei outbreak in one Jewish community in New York City. To determine risk factors for introduction of infection into households, we conducted a cohort study of households to compare risk factors for illness among primary subjects within households and age-matched well siblings. Isolates were subtyped by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). We used a random effects model to assess extra-household vs. intra-household transmission in households with multiple ill household members. Daycare or pre-school attendance [matched odds ratio (mOR) 16.1, P<0.001] and age <60 months (mOR 6.3, P<0.001) were independently associated with index subject illness. Outbreak isolates were closely related by PFGE analysis to the strain previously observed in Jewish community outbreaks. The random effects model strongly indicated that multiple illnesses in a single household are due to secondary transmission. Disease containment efforts should focus on reducing Shigella transmission in childcare settings and within homes.

Case-Control Studies↗

New haplotype for the Glu104Asp mutation in triose-phosphate isomerase deficiency and prenatal diagnosis in a Spanish family.

First-trimester prenatal diagnosis was undertaken by chorionic villus DNA analysis in a Spanish family with the inherited Glu104Asp triose-phosphate isomerase deficiency. The fetus was heterozygous for the mutation and therefore predicted to be clinically unaffected. To investigate the evolutionary origin of this mutation, studies were conducted on the intragenic 2262A/G polymorphism and the CD4 pentameric tandem repeat marker. A different haplotype was found to the one previously described, suggesting a different origin of the Spanish mutation.

Aspartic Acid↗

Field investigations of emergency department syndromic surveillance signals--New York City.

INTRODUCTION: The New York City (NYC) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has operated a syndromic surveillance system based on emergency department (ED) chief-complaint data since November 2001. This system was created for early detection of infectious-disease outbreaks, either natural or intentional. However, limited documentation exists regarding epidemiologic field investigations conducted in response to syndromic surveillance signals. OBJECTIVE: DOHMH conducted field investigations to characterize syndromic surveillance signals by person, place, and time and to determine whether signals represented true infectious-disease outbreaks. METHODS: A DOHMH physician reviews ED-based syndromic surveillance results daily to look for signals. When necessary, field investigations are conducted and consist of a review of the patient line list, telephone interviews with hospital staff, chart reviews, interviews with patients, and collection and testing of specimens. RESULTS: In November 2002, a series of citywide signals for diarrhea and vomiting syndromes, which coincided with institutional outbreaks consistent with viral gastroenteritis, prompted DOHMH to send mass e-mail notification to NYC ED directors and institute collection of stool specimens. Three of four specimens collected were positive for norovirus. In December 2002, DOHMH investigated why an ED syndromic signal was not generated after 15 ill patients were transferred to a participating ED during a gastrointestinal outbreak at a nursing home. Field investigation revealed varying chief complaints, multiple dates of ED visits, and a coding error in a complementary DOHMH syndromic system, and confirmed a seasonal norovirus outbreak. During March 2003, the system generated a 4-day citywide respiratory signal and a simultaneous 1-day hospital-level fever signal in a predominantly Asian community. In those instances, epidemiologic investigation provided reassurance that severe acute respiratory syndrome was not present. CONCLUSION: Detailed field investigations of syndromic signals can identify the etiology of signals and determine why a given syndromic surveillance system failed to detect an outbreak captured through traditional surveillance. Validation of the utility of syndromic surveillance to detect infectious-disease outbreaks is necessary to justify allocating resources for this new public health tool.

Communicable Diseases, Emerging↗

Elevated erythrocyte CDP-choline levels associated with beta-thalassaemia in patients with transfusion independent anaemia.

The accumulation of CDP-ethanolamine as well as CDP-choline in a small cohort of patients with normal UMPH1 and no defined cause for their anaemia suggested a defect in both phosphotransferases. Here we report 10 patients with transfusion independent beta-thalassaemia; 8 being pure heterozygotes and 2 heterozygotes also for Hb E. Mean CDP-choline (86.xxx +/- 48 microM) and CDP-ethanolamine (34.6 microM +/- 34.5 microM), mean control <3 microM. Elevated CDP-choline in patients with no defined cause for their haemolytic anaemia was previously suggested as a possible indicator of CDP-choline phosphotransferase deficiency. Here we associate it with transfusion independent beta-thalassaemia.

Anemia↗

Report on slide session, British Society for Haematology, 43rd Annual Scientific Meeting, Glasgow, 2003.

Seven patients who had a diagnostic problem were presented at the British Society for Haematology, Annual Scientific Meeting in 2003. The likely diagnosis was discussed on the basis of a synopsis of the history and blood film and trephine biopsy features and forms the basis of this report. Diagnostic problems dealt with included lymphoproliferative and myeloproliferative disorders and haemolytic anaemia.

Adult↗

The emergence of West Nile virus in North America: ecology, epidemiology, and surveillance.

In late summer 1999, the first domestically acquired human cases of WN encephalitis were documented in the USA. Aggressive vector-control and public education efforts by state and local public health officials limited the extent of human involvement. The discovery of virus-infected, overwintering mosquitoes during the winter of 1999-2000, predicted renewed virus activity for the following spring, and prompted early season vector-control activities and disease surveillance efforts in NYC and the surrounding areas. These surveillance efforts were focused on identifying WN virus infections in birds and mosquitoes as predictors of the potential risk of transmission to humans. By the end of the 2000 mosquito-borne disease transmission season, WN virus activity had been documented as far north as the states of Vermont and New Hampshire, and as far south as the state of North Carolina. The ongoing impacts that WN virus will have on wildlife, domestic animal and human populations of the western hemisphere are not yet known. Plans are in place for public health officials and scientists to monitor the further expansion of WN virus with the establishment or enhancement of vector-borne disease surveillance and control programs throughout the eastern seaboard. The valuable lessons learned from the detection and response to the introduction of WN virus into NYC should prove useful if and when subsequent intrusions of new disease agents occur.

Animals↗

Large-scale quarantine following biological terrorism in the United States: scientific examination, logistic and legal limits, and possible consequences.

Concern for potential bioterrorist attacks causing mass casualties has increased recently. Particular attention has been paid to scenarios in which a biological agent capable of person-to-person transmission, such as smallpox, is intentionally released among civilians. Multiple public health interventions are possible to effect disease containment in this context. One disease control measure that has been regularly proposed in various settings is the imposition of large-scale or geographic quarantine on the potentially exposed population. Although large-scale quarantine has not been implemented in recent US history, it has been used on a small scale in biological hoaxes, and it has been invoked in federally sponsored bioterrorism exercises. This article reviews the scientific principles that are relevant to the likely effectiveness of quarantine, the logistic barriers to its implementation, legal issues that a large-scale quarantine raises, and possible adverse consequences that might result from quarantine action. Imposition of large-scale quarantine-compulsory sequestration of groups of possibly exposed persons or human confinement within certain geographic areas to prevent spread of contagious disease-should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most imaginable circumstances. In the majority of contexts, other less extreme public health actions are likely to be more effective and create fewer unintended adverse consequences than quarantine. Actions and areas for future research, policy development, and response planning efforts are provided.

Bioterrorism↗

The outbreak of West Nile virus infection in the New York City area in 1999.

BACKGROUND: In late August 1999, an unusual cluster of cases of meningoencephalitis associated with muscle weakness was reported to the New York City Department of Health. The initial epidemiologic and environmental investigations suggested an arboviral cause. METHODS: Active surveillance was implemented to identify patients hospitalized with viral encephalitis and meningitis. Cerebrospinal fluid, serum, and tissue specimens from patients with suspected cases underwent serologic and viral testing for evidence of arboviral infection. RESULTS: Outbreak surveillance identified 59 patients who were hospitalized with West Nile virus infection in the New York City area during August and September of 1999. The median age of these patients was 71 years (range, 5 to 95). The overall attack rate of clinical West Nile virus infection was at least 6.5 cases per million population, and it increased sharply with age. Most of the patients (63 percent) had clinical signs of encephalitis; seven patients died (12 percent). Muscle weakness was documented in 27 percent of the patients and flaccid paralysis in 10 percent; in all of the latter, nerve conduction studies indicated an axonal polyneuropathy in 14 percent. An age of 75 years or older was an independent risk factor for death (relative risk adjusted for the presence or absence of diabetes mellitus, 8.5; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.2 to 59.1), as was the presence of diabetes mellitus (age-adjusted relative risk, 5.1; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.5 to 17.3). CONCLUSIONS: This outbreak of West Nile meningoencephalitis in the New York City metropolitan area represents the first time this virus has been detected in the Western Hemisphere. Given the subsequent rapid spread of the virus, physicians along the eastern seaboard of the United States should consider West Nile virus infection in the differential diagnosis of encephalitis and viral meningitis during the summer months, especially in older patients and in those with muscle weakness.

Adolescent↗

Tularemia as a biological weapon: medical and public health management.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗

Botulinum toxin as a biological weapon: medical and public health management.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine. EVIDENCE: The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing.

Antitoxins↗

Lessons from the West Nile viral encephalitis outbreak in New York City, 1999: implications for bioterrorism preparedness.

The involvement and expertise of infectious disease physicians, microbiologists, and public health practitioners are essential to the early detection and management of epidemics--both those that are naturally occurring, such as the 1999 outbreak of West Nile virus (WN virus) in New York City, and those that might follow covert acts of bioterrorism. The experience with the WN virus outbreak offers practical lessons in outbreak detection, laboratory diagnosis, investigation, and response that might usefully influence planning for future infectious disease outbreaks. Many of the strategies used to detect and respond to the WN virus outbreak resemble those that would be required to confront other serious infectious disease threats, such as pandemic influenza or bioterrorism. We provide an overview of the critical elements needed to manage a large-scale, fast-moving infectious disease outbreak, and we suggest ways that the existing public health capacity might be strengthened to ensure an effective response to both natural and intentional disease outbreaks.

Animals↗

A national register for surveillance of inherited disorders: beta thalassaemia in the United Kingdom.

OBJECTIVE: To demonstrate the value of a national register for surveillance of services for an inherited disorder. METHODS: Data from the United Kingdom Thalassaemia Register and the United Kingdom Register of Prenatal Diagnosis for Haemoglobin Disorders were combined in a database; these registers include all fetuses known to have been diagnosed with beta thalassaemia major, beta thalassaemia intermedia, or haemoglobin E/beta thalassaemia in the United Kingdom. Data were extracted to show outcomes (selective abortion or live birth) of all fetuses and the status of those born with a disorder (alive, dead, successful bone marrow transplant, or lost to follow-up) by parents' region of residence and ethnicity. FINDINGS: At the end of 1999 the register included 1074 patients, 807 of whom were alive and residing in the United Kingdom. A successful bone marrow transplant has been performed for 117 out of 581 (20%) patients born since 1975. Residents of Pakistani origin are now the main group at risk in the United Kingdom, replacing residents of Cypriot origin. This has led to a marked shift in the need for services from the south-east of England to the Midlands and the north of England. Despite the acceptability of prenatal diagnosis, the proportion of affected births remains 50% higher than would be expected, reflecting a widespread failure to deliver timely screening and counselling to carriers. Even though effective treatment is available the annual number of deaths is rising, indicating that better tolerated treatments are needed. CONCLUSION: A national diagnosis register is a powerful instrument for monitoring the treatment and prevention of inherited disorders and for highlighting correctable shortcomings. In view of the increasing possibilities for genetic screening there is a strong case for central funding for such databases within modern health services.

Adolescent↗

Plague as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗