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Biomedical subjects

M T Osterholm

Publications and source records attributed to M T Osterholm.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2001

Epidemiology and clonality of community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in Minnesota, 1996-1998.

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has emerged among patients in the general population who do not have established risk factors for MRSA. Records from 10 Minnesota health facilities were reviewed to identify cases of MRSA infection that occurred during 1996-1998 and to identify which cases were community acquired. Susceptibility testing and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping were performed on available isolates. A total of 354 patients (median age, 16 years) with community-acquired MRSA (CAMRSA) infection were identified. Most case patients (299 [84%]) had skin infections, and 103 (29%) were hospitalized. More than 90% of isolates were susceptible to all antimicrobial agents tested, with the exception of beta-lactams and erythromycin. Of 334 patients treated with antimicrobial agents, 282 (84%) initially were treated with agents to which their isolates were nonsusceptible. Of 174 Minnesota isolates tested, 150 (86%) belonged to 1 PFGE clonal group. CAMRSA infections were identified throughout Minnesota; although most isolates were genetically related and susceptible to multiple antimicrobials, they were generally nonsusceptible to initial empirical therapy.

Adolescent↗
PubMed2001

Tularemia as a biological weapon: medical and public health management.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗
PubMed2001

Botulinum toxin as a biological weapon: medical and public health management.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine. EVIDENCE: The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing.

Antitoxins↗
PubMed2001

Use of molecular subtyping in surveillance for Salmonella enterica serotype typhimurium.

BACKGROUND: Because Salmonella enterica serotype typhimurium is the most common serotype isolated from persons with salmonellosis in the United States, it is difficult to detect unusual clusters or outbreaks. To determine whether molecular subtyping could be useful in public health surveillance for S. enterica serotype typhimurium, the Minnesota Department of Health initiated the routine use of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) of isolates. METHODS: Beginning in 1994, all S. enterica serotype typhimurium isolates submitted by clinical laboratories to the Department of Health were subtyped by PFGE. A standard questionnaire was used to interview patients about possible sources of infection. RESULTS: From 1994 through 1998, 998 cases of infection with S. enterica serotype typhimurium were reported to the Minnesota Department of Health (4.4 cases per 100,000 person-years). PFGE was performed on 958 of the isolates (96 percent), and 174 different patterns were identified. Sixteen outbreaks with a common source were identified, accounting for 154 cases. PFGE subtyping made it possible to confirm 10 outbreaks that involved small numbers of cases in institutional settings. Of six larger, community-based outbreaks, four would probably not have been recognized without PFGE subtyping. These four outbreaks accounted for 96 of the 154 culture-confirmed outbreak cases (62 percent). Fifty-six of 209 isolates tested for antimicrobial susceptibility (27 percent) were resistant to at least five antimicrobial agents. The multidrug-resistant isolates identified had unique PFGE patterns. CONCLUSIONS: Routine molecular subtyping of S. enterica serotype typhimurium by PFGE can improve the detection of outbreaks and aid in the identification of multidrug-resistant strains. Combining routine molecular subtyping with a method of rapid communication among public health authorities can improve surveillance for S. enterica serotype typhimurium infections.

DNA, Bacterial↗
PubMed2000

Plague as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗
PubMed2000

Water quality laws and waterborne diseases: Cryptosporidium and other emerging pathogens.

Waterborne diseases, such as cryptosporidiosis, cause many cases of serious illness in the United States annually. Water quality is regulated by a complex system of federal and state legal provisions and agencies, which has been poorly studied. The authors surveyed state and territorial agencies responsible for water quality about their laws, regulations, policies, and practices related to water quality and surveillance of cryptosporidiosis related to drinking water. In this commentary they review the development and current status of federal drinking water regulations, identify conflicts or gaps in legal authority between federal agencies and state and territorial agencies, and describe court-imposed limitations on federal authority with regard to regulation of water quality. Recommendations are made for government actions that would increase the efficiency of efforts to ensure water quality; protect watersheds; strengthen waterborne disease surveillance; and protect the health of vulnerable populations.

Animals↗
PubMed1999

Smallpox as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense.

OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of smallpox as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. Evidence The first author (D.A.H.) conducted a literature search in conjunction with the preparation of another publication on smallpox as well as this article. The literature identified was reviewed and opinions were sought from experts in the diagnosis and management of smallpox, including members of the working group. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments that were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on October 30, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: Specific recommendations are made regarding smallpox vaccination, therapy, postexposure isolation and infection control, hospital epidemiology and infection control, home care, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs. In the event of an actual release of smallpox and subsequent epidemic, early detection, isolation of infected individuals, surveillance of contacts, and a focused selective vaccination program will be the essential items of an effective control program.

Biological Warfare↗