Biomedical subjects

Meredith B Rosenthal

Publications and source records attributed to Meredith B Rosenthal.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

Do integrated medical groups provide higher-quality medical care than individual practice associations?

BACKGROUND: The association between the organizational structure of physician groups and health care quality has never been evaluated empirically. OBJECTIVE: To examine whether integrated medical groups (IMGs) provide higher-quality primary care than individual practice associations (IPAs). DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING: PacifiCare, a large health maintenance organization. PARTICIPANTS: Approximately 1.7 million enrollees of PacifiCare cared for by 119 California physician groups between July 1999 and June 2000. MEASUREMENTS: The percentage of eligible PacifiCare enrollees who received mammography, Papanicolaou smear screening, chlamydia screening, diabetic eye examination, an asthma controller medication, or a beta-blocker after acute myocardial infarction. RESULTS: Physician groups identified as IMGs, compared with those identified as IPAs, had higher rates of mammography (relative risk, 1.15 [95% CI, 1.01 to 1.33]), Papanicolaou smear screening (relative risk, 2.29 [CI, 1.53 to 3.42]), chlamydia screening (relative risk, 2.17 [CI, 1.04 to 4.55]), and diabetic eye screening (relative risk, 1.55 [CI, 1.28 to 1.88]). Leaders of IMGs were more likely to report using EMRs (37% vs. 2%; P < 0.001) and quality improvement strategies, but these characteristics explained little of the quality differences between IMGs and IPAs. LIMITATIONS: Organizational characteristics, including group type, were reported by physician group leaders and not directly assessed. Patient characteristics that could have accounted for some of the observed differences also were not assessed. CONCLUSIONS: Patients cared for in IMGs generally received higher-quality primary care than those cared for in IPAs. Having an EMR and implementation of quality improvement strategies did not explain the differences in quality. These findings suggest that physician group type influences health care quality.

California↗

PubMed2006

Pay for performance in commercial HMOs.

BACKGROUND: Pay for performance has increasingly become the subject of intense interest and debate, both of which have been heightened as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services moves closer to adopting this approach for Medicare. Although many claims have been made for the effectiveness of this approach, the extent of its national penetration remains unknown. METHODS: We surveyed a sample of 252 health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (response rate, 96%) drawn from 41 metropolitan areas across the nation about use of pay for performance. We determined the prevalence of pay-for-performance programs, detailed the features of such programs, and examined the adoption of pay for performance as a function of the characteristics of both the health plans and markets. RESULTS: More than half the HMOs, representing more than 80% of persons enrolled, use pay for performance in their provider contracts. Of the 126 health plans with pay-for-performance programs, nearly 90% had programs for physicians and 38% had programs for hospitals. Use of pay for performance was statistically associated with geographic region, use of primary care providers (PCPs) as gatekeepers, use of capitation to pay PCPs, and whether the plans themselves received bonuses or penalties according to performance. CONCLUSIONS: Pay for performance is now commonly used by HMOs, especially those that are situated to assign responsibility for a particular patient to a PCP or medical group. As the design of Medicare with pay for performance moves forward, it will be important to leverage the early experience of pay for performance in the commercial market.

Contracts↗

PubMed2006

A typology of organizational and contractual arrangements for purchasing and delivery of behavioral health care.

The evolution of behavioral health care financing and delivery has led to a wide variety of arrangements connecting consumers to behavioral health services. In this paper, we present a typology based on three distinguishing features of behavioral health arrangements along which there is a high degree of variability and this variability has been shown to affect the cost and quality of behavioral health care: (1) the extent to which sponsor oversight over care is outsourced by way of contracts rather than performed directly; (2) whether financing for behavioral health is partitioned from health care financing overall; and (3) the amount of financial risk shared by the sponsor with third parties.

Behavioral Medicine↗

PubMed2006

What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care?

Despite more than a decade of bench-marking and public reporting of quality problems in the health care sector, changes in medical practice have been slow to materialize. To accelerate quality improvement, many private and public payers have begun to offer financial incentives to physicians and hospitals based on their performance on clinical and service quality measures. The authors review the empirical literature on paying for quality in health care and comparable interventions in other sectors. They find little evidence to support the effectiveness of paying for quality. The absence of findings for an effect may be attributable to the small size of the bonuses studied and the fact that payers often accounted for only a fraction of the targeted provider's panel. Even in non-health settings, however, where the institutional features are more favorable to a positive impact, the literature contains mixed results on the effectiveness of analogous pay-for-performance schemes.

Program Evaluation↗

PubMed2005

Early experience with pay-for-performance: from concept to practice.

CONTEXT: The adoption of pay-for-performance mechanisms for quality improvement is growing rapidly. Although there is intense interest in and optimism about pay-for-performance programs, there is little published research on pay-for-performance in health care. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the impact of a prototypical physician pay-for-performance program on quality of care. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: We evaluated a natural experiment with pay-for-performance using administrative reports of physician group quality from a large health plan for an intervention group (California physician groups) and a contemporaneous comparison group (Pacific Northwest physician groups). Quality improvement reports were included from October 2001 through April 2004 issued to approximately 300 large physician organizations. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Three process measures of clinical quality: cervical cancer screening, mammography, and hemoglobin A1c testing. RESULTS: Improvements in clinical quality scores were as follows: for cervical cancer screening, 5.3% for California vs 1.7% for Pacific Northwest; for mammography, 1.9% vs 0.2%; and for hemoglobin A1c, 2.1% vs 2.1%. Compared with physician groups in the Pacific Northwest, the California network demonstrated greater quality improvement after the pay-for-performance intervention only in cervical cancer screening (a 3.6% difference in improvement [P = .02]). In total, the plan awarded 3.4 million dollars (27% of the amount set aside) in bonus payments between July 2003 and April 2004, the first year of the program. For all 3 measures, physician groups with baseline performance at or above the performance threshold for receipt of a bonus improved the least but garnered the largest share of the bonus payments. CONCLUSION: Paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed performance target may produce little gain in quality for the money spent and will largely reward those with higher performance at baseline.

Benchmarking↗

PubMed2005

The geographic distribution of physicians revisited.

CONTEXT: While there is debate over whether the U.S. is training too many physicians, many seem to agree that physicians are geographically maldistributed, with too few in rural areas. OBJECTIVE: Official definitions of shortage areas assume the market for physician services is based on county boundaries. We wished to ascertain how the picture of a possible shortage changes using alternative measures of geographic access. We measure geographic access by the number of full-time equivalent physicians serving a community divided by the expected number of patients (possibly both from within the community and outside) receiving care from those physicians. Moreover, we wished to determine how the geographic distribution of physicians had changed since previous studies, in light of the large increase in physician numbers. DESIGN: Cross-sectional data analyses of alternative measures of geographic access to physicians in 23 states with low physician-population ratios. RESULTS: Between 1979 and 1999, the number of physicians doubled in the sample states. Although most specialties experienced greater diffusion everywhere, smaller specialties had not yet diffused to the smallest towns. Multiple measures of geographic access, including physician-to-population ratios, average distance traveled to the nearest physician, and projected average caseload per physician, confirm that residents of metropolitan areas have better geographic access to physicians. Physician-to-population ratios exhibit the largest degree of geographic disparity, but ratios in rural counties adjacent to metropolitan areas are smaller than in those not adjacent to metropolitan areas. Distance-traveled and caseload models that allow patients to cross county lines show less disparity and indicate that residents of isolated rural counties have less access than those living in counties adjacent to metropolitan areas. CONCLUSION: Geographic access to physicians has continued to improve over the past two decades, although some smaller specialties have not diffused to the most rural areas. While substantial variation in the supply of physicians across communities remains, current measures of geographic access to physicians overstate the extent of maldistribution and yield an incorrect ranking of areas according to geographic accessibility of physicians.

Cross-Sectional Studies↗

PubMed2002

Promotion of prescription drugs to consumers.

BACKGROUND: Spending on prescription drugs is the fastest growing component of the health care budget. There is public concern about the possibility that direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs will result in inappropriate prescribing and higher costs of care. Guidelines issued in 1997 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding advertising to consumers through electronic media are considered by some to be responsible for unleashing a flood of direct-to-consumer advertising. METHODS: Using data on spending for promotional purposes and sales of prescription drugs, we examined industrywide trends for various types of promotion. We also tracked the relation between promotional efforts and sales over time. Finally, we documented the variation in direct-to-consumer advertising among and within five therapeutic classes of drugs and compared the variation in the intensity of such advertising with variation in the intensity of promotion to health care professionals. RESULTS: Annual spending on direct-to-consumer advertising for prescription drugs tripled between 1996 and 2000, when it reached nearly $2.5 billion. Despite this increase, such advertising accounts for only 15 percent of the money spent on drug promotion and is highly concentrated on a subgroup of products. Within a therapeutic class, there is marked variation in the intensity of direct-to-consumer advertising, and the amount of such advertising for specific products fluctuates over time. The initial surge in direct-to-consumer advertising preceded the 1997 FDA guidelines that clarified the rules for electronic direct-to-consumer advertising, and thus the 1997 guidelines may not have been the most important reason for the overall increase. CONCLUSIONS: Although the use of direct-to-consumer advertising has grown disproportionately to other forms of promotion, it continues to account for a small proportion of total promotional efforts. Nevertheless, physicians must assist patients in evaluating health-related information obtained through direct advertising.

Advertising↗

PubMed2002

The economic impacts of the tobacco settlement.

Recent litigation against the major tobacco companies culminated in a master settlement agreement (MSA) under which the participating companies agreed to compensate most states for Medicaid expenses. Here the terms of the settlement are outlined and its economic implications analyzed using data from Massachusetts. The financial compensation to Massachusetts (and other states) under the MSA is substantial. However, this compensation is dwarfed by the value of the health impacts induced by the settlement. Specifically, Medicaid spending will fall, but only by a modest amount. More importantly, the value of health benefits ($65 billion through 2025 in 1999 dollars) from increased longevity is an order of magnitude greater than any other impacts or payments. The net efficiency implications of the settlement turn mainly on a comparison of the value of these health benefits relative to a valuation of the foregone pleasure of smoking. To the extent that the value of the health benefits is not offset by the value of the pleasure foregone, the economic impacts of the MSA will include a share of these health benefits.

Advertising↗

PubMed2002

Managed care and efficient rationing.

Widespread dissatisfaction with managed care has led to calls for major reform and consumer protection. Although some have concluded that managed care backlash is simply a result of too much rationing, we propose an alternative view that focuses on the nature of services eliminated by managed care. In particular, we point out that managed care rations services largely without regard to consumer preferences. We question whether managed care's emphasis on supply-side control of moral hazard is consistent with the principles of efficient rationing. Further research on the nature of provider and consumer rationing decisions is needed to inform the design of supply-side and demand-side incentives that will lead to an efficient allocation of services.

Consumer Behavior↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Transmission of financial incentives to physicians by intermediary organizations in California.

Many U.S. physicians participate in provider-sponsored organizations that act as their intermediaries in contracting with managed care plans, particularly where capitation contracts are used. Examining a survey of 153 intermediary entities in California, we trace the cascade of financial incentives from health plans through physician organizations to primary care physicians. Although the physician organizations received the vast majority (84 percent) of their revenues through capitation contracts, most of the financial risk related to utilization and costs was retained at the group level. Capitation of primary care physicians was common in independent practice associations (IPAs), but payments typically were restricted to primary care services. Thirteen percent of medical groups and 19 percent of IPAs provided bonuses or withholds based on utilization or cost performance, which averaged 10 percent of base compensation.

California↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Paying for quality: providers' incentives for quality improvement.

Paying health care providers to meet quality goals is an idea with widespread appeal, given the common perception that quality of care in the United States remains unacceptably low despite a decade of benchmarking and public reporting. There has been little critical analysis of the design of the current generation of quality incentive programs. In this paper we examine public reports of paying for quality over the past five years and assess each of the identified programs in terms of key design features, including the market share of payers, the structure of the reward system, the amount of revenue at stake, and the targeted domains of health care quality.

Managed Care Programs↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Doughnut-hole economics.

Both the recently enacted Medicare prescription drug benefit and a new cohort of consumer-directed health benefit models offer doughnut-shaped insurance coverage with large deductibles that begin around the mean annual spending for enrollees. These policies leave enrollees to bear more risk than policies with equal expected payouts that rely on first-dollar deductibles. This risk to enrollees is substantial, given the skewed distribution of health care spending and the placement of the typical deductible. I consider alternative explanations for this new benefit design trend and conclude that the desire to distribute tangible benefits to the largest number of constituents is most plausible.

Deductibles and Coinsurance↗