Nicholas Agar | PubMed Health

PubMed2003

Cloning and identity.

Critics of human cloning allege that the results of the process are likely to suffer from compromised identities making it near impossible for them to live worthwhile lives. This paper uses the account of the metaphysics of personal identity offered by Derek Parfit to investigate and support the claim of identity-compromise. The cloned person may, under certain circumstances, be seen as surviving, to some degree, in the clone. However, I argue that rather than warranting concern, the potential for survival by cloning ought to help protect against the misuse of the technology.

Cloning, Organism↗

PubMed1998

Liberal eugenics.

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Child↗

PubMed1995

Designing babies: morally permissible ways to modify the human genome.

My focus in this paper is the question of the moral acceptability of attempts to modify the human genome. Much of the debate in this area has revolved around the distinction between supposedly therapeutic modification on the one hand, and eugenic modification on the other. In the first part of the paper I reject some recent arguments against genetic engineering. In the second part I seek to distinguish between permissible and impermissible forms of intervention in such a way that does not appeal to the therapeutic/eugenic distinction. If I am right much of what we would intuitively call eugenic intervention will be morally acceptable. Central to my argument is an asymmetry in the way genetic engineers can influence a person's capacities on the one hand and life-goals on the other. Forms of genetic intervention that have a high probability of producing a mismatch of life-goals and capacities will be ruled out.

Biology↗