Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Nicolao Bonini.
Alternative measures of confirmation or evidential support have been proposed to express the impact of ascertaining one event on the credibility of another. We report an experiment that compares the adequacy of several such measures as descriptions of confirmation judgment in a probabilistic context.
This paper studies consistency in the judged probability of a target hypothesis in lists of mutually exclusive nonexhaustive hypotheses. Specifically, it controls the role played by the support of displayed competing hypotheses and the relatedness between the target hypothesis and its alternatives. Three experiments are reported. In all experiments, groups of people were presented with a list of mutually exclusive nonexhaustive causes of a person's death. In the first two experiments, they were asked to judge the probability of each cause as that of the person's decease. In the third experiment, people were asked for a frequency estimation task. Target causes were presented in all lists. Several other alternative causes to the target ones differed across the lists. Findings show that the judged probability/frequency of a target cause changes as a function of the support of the displayed competing causes. Specifically, it is higher when its competing displayed causes have low rather than high support. Findings are consistent with the contrastive support hypothesis within the support theory.
A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling people's noneconomic reasons for escalation.
Attributing higher "probability" to a sentence of form p-and-q, relative to p, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the word probability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentence p is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunction p-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.