Efficiency and health services.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to O W Anderson.
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We reviewed age-specific national mortality data for the years 1981 through 1985 to evaluate changes in the location of death among the nation's elderly after implementation of Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS). Although it was unchanged in 1981 and 1982, the percentage of deaths occurring in the nation's nursing homes increased from 18.9 percent in 1982 to 21.5 percent in 1985. The increases in nursing home deaths were greatest between 1983 and 1984, when 33 states showed larger-than-expected increases when compared with a base period before implementation of PPS. These changes were accompanied by a decline in the percentage of deaths that occurred in hospitals. These changes in the location of death were most pronounced in the Midwest, South, and West; they were very small in the Northeast and in states not affected by the PPS. Furthermore, the states with high population enrollments in health maintenance organizations and with large declines in the mean hospital length of stay in 1984 showed the greatest shifts in the location of death. We conclude that Medicare's PPS resulted in the increased transfer of terminally ill patients from hospitals to nursing homes. Further study is required to determine whether such transfer is medically appropriate.
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The status of the concept of controlling the quality of physicians is reviewed as are studies that have been done on methods to measure and improve quality. The conclusions are dismal given the rhetoric and actions on attempts to measure and control quality of physician decision making. Massive attempts are being made, for example, mandating PSROs to monitor quality before there is a methodology. Cost and quality reviews have, at most, a marginal impact and do not deserve the expenditures to conduct them. Studies on utilization review show minimal impact on reducing utilization. Administrative reviews reduce utilization for certain specific, narrowly defined procedures such as injections. There is no operational definition of "unnecessary" utilization. The tendency is to regard the lowest levels as optimal, presumably because they result in lower expenditures. Bureaucratic reviews do not provide incentives to decision makers the way various types of HMO delivery types do from current evidence. Hence, HMOs, deductibles and coinsurance, and competition have greater promise for limiting expenditures than do utilization reviews. Quality audits are also marginally effective because of limited promise of changing provider behavior given current methods of doing so. They miss the organizational aspects in which incentives are generated. Research is needed, therefore, on alternative forms of quality and cost control such as HMOs, physician risk sharing, competitive models, and deductibles and coinsurance. Until the much needed research has been done, the amount of resources spent on review should be minimized. In the meantime, the review processes should concentrate on extreme variations of very narrowly defined criteria of proven validity while improving the review methodology by systematic research on quality monitoring.
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The federal legislation mandating Professional Standards Review Organizations to monitor the decision making of physicians regarding their patients is a method unique to the United States to control medical care costs according to prevailing professional criteria. Other countries, so far, depend largely on health service structures, reimbursement methods, and arbitrary government budget limitations. Our dislike of highly structured delivery systems has pragmatically moved us in the direction of monitoring diagnostic and therapeutic decision making. PSRO is mandated at a time when there is no systematic methodology with validated criteria for monitoring medical practice. This will likely lead to subtle sabotage of PSRO by the medical profession justified by quality standards which are the professions' prerogative. It is conceivable that quality standards will rise and, therefore, costs. The drive for monitoring physician decision making is understandable even when there is no methodology. It then behooves medical schools to conduct research on methodologies of monitoring services, a possible favorable side-effect of the legislation. An unfavorable side-effect may likely be that the criteria will be based exclusively on technical medical considerations and ignore the personal and social attributes of patients which should affect the decision making of physicians. Medicine will then become even more technocratic than it is now. All countries are converging at various degrees of intensity in establishing planned limits to expansion, examining possibilities of monitoring physician decision making and capping this off with arbitrary budget ceilings. The state of the art of health services management appears to permit no other recourse.
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