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Biomedical subjects

Paul Barach

Publications and source records attributed to Paul Barach.

18 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

Wrong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and wrong-patient adverse events: Are they preventable?

HYPOTHESIS: Wrong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and wrong-patient adverse events (WSPEs) are devastating, unacceptable, and often result in litigation, but their frequency and root causes are unknown. Wrong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and wrong-patient events are likely more common than realized, with little evidence that current prevention practice is adequate. DESIGN: Analysis of several databases demonstrates that WSPEs occur across all specialties, with high numbers noted in orthopedic and dental surgery. Databases analyzed included: (1) the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), (2) the Florida Code 15 mandatory reporting system, (3) the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) Closed Claims Project database, and (4) a novel Web-based system for collecting WSPE cases (http://www.wrong-side.org). RESULTS: The NPDB recorded 5940 WSPEs (2217 wrong-side surgical procedures and 3723 wrong-treatment/wrong-procedure errors) in 13 years. Florida Code 15 occurrences of WSPEs number 494 since 1991, averaging 75 events per year since 2000. The ASA Closed Claims Project has recorded 54 cases of WSPEs. Analysis of WSPE cases, including WSPE cases submitted to http://www.wrong-side.org, suggest several common causes of WSPEs and recurrent systemic failures. Based on these findings, we estimate that there are 1300 to 2700 WSPEs annually in the United States. Despite a significant number of cases, reporting of WSPEs is virtually nonexistent, with reports in the lay press far more common than reports in the medical literature. Our research suggests clear factors that contribute to the occurrence of WSPEs, as well as ways to reduce them. CONCLUSIONS: Wrong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and wrong-patient adverse events, although rare, are more common than health care providers and patients appreciate. Prevention of WSPEs requires new and innovative technologies, reporting of case occurrence, and learning from successful safety initiatives (such as in transfusion medicine and other high-risk nonmedical industries), while reducing the shame associated with these events.

Humans↗
PubMed2006

Training teams for the perioperative environment: a research agenda.

A research agenda for investigating the impact of team-work training on patient safety in the perioperative environment is presented. The current status of teamwork training is reviewed briefly, and conclusions based on existing research are presented. We present a roadmap for future research on how teamwork training should be structured, delivered, and evaluated to optimize patient safety in the operating room. For teamwork skills to be assessed and have credibility, team performance measures must be grounded in team theory, account for individual and team-level performance, capture team process and outcomes, adhere to standards for reliability and validity, and address real or perceived barriers to measurement. The interdisciplinary nature of work in the perioperative environment and the necessity of cooperation among team members play an important role in enabling patient safety and avoiding errors. Teams make fewer mistakes than do individuals, especially when each team member knows his or her responsibilities, as well as those of other team members. However, simply installing a team structure without addressing the organizational context of care--the culture--does not automatically ensure it will operate effectively. Factors associated with the design of teamwork training, measures of training effectiveness, and the assessment process that should be explored in near-term work (1 to 2 years) are addressed. We also address the impact of the organizational environment, including the role of institutional support and culture, that need to be explored in longer term research (3 to 5 years).

Education, Medical↗
PubMed2005

Five system barriers to achieving ultrasafe health care.

Although debate continues over estimates of the amount of preventable medical harm that occurs in health care, there seems to be a consensus that health care is not as safe and reliable as it might be. It is often assumed that copying and adapting the success stories of nonmedical industries, such as civil aviation and nuclear power, will make medicine as safe as these industries. However, the solution is not that simple. This article explains why a benchmarking approach to safety in high-risk industries is needed to help translate lessons so that they are usable and long lasting in health care. The most important difference among industries lies not so much in the pertinent safety toolkit, which is similar for most industries, but in an industry's willingness to abandon historical and cultural precedents and beliefs that are linked to performance and autonomy, in a constant drive toward a culture of safety. Five successive systemic barriers currently prevent health care from becoming an ultrasafe industrial system: the need to limit the discretion of workers, the need to reduce worker autonomy, the need to make the transition from a craftsmanship mindset to that of equivalent actors, the need for system-level (senior leadership) arbitration to optimize safety strategies, and the need for simplification. Finally, health care must overcome 3 unique problems: a wide range of risk among medical specialties, difficulty in defining medical error, and various structural constraints (such as public demand, teaching role, and chronic shortage of staff). Without such a framework to guide development, ongoing efforts to improve safety by adopting the safety strategies of other industries may yield reduced dividends. Rapid progress is possible only if the health care industry is willing to address these structural constraints needed to overcome the 5 barriers to ultrasafe performance.

Accident Prevention↗
PubMed2005

Disclosing adverse events to patients.

BACKGROUND: The rationale for, and recommended approaches to, disclosing adverse events to patients are examined on the basis of the experience of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The VHA's National Ethics Committee endorses a general policy requiring the routine disclosure of adverse events to patients and offers practical recommendations for implementation. PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO DISCLOSING ADVERSE EVENTS: Disclosure is required when the adverse event (1) has a perceptible effect on the patient that was not discussed in advance as a known risk; (2) necessitates a change in the patient's care; (3) potentially poses an important risk to the patient's future health, even if that risk is extremely small; (4) involves providing a treatment or procedure without the patient's consent. From an ethical perspective, disclosure is required and should not be limited to cases in which the injury is obvious or severe. Disclosure of near misses is also discretionary but is advisable at times. In general, disclosure by a clinician involved in the patient's care is appropriate. CONCLUSION: Although a variety of psychological and cultural factors may make clinicians and organizations reluctant to disclose adverse events to patients, the arguments favoring routine disclosure are compelling. Organizations should develop clear policies supporting disclosure and should create supportive environments that enable clinicians to meet their ethical obligations to disclose adverse events to patients and families.

Family↗
PubMed2005

The role of teamwork in the professional education of physicians: current status and assessment recommendations.

BACKGROUND: The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has recommended that organizations establish interdisciplinary team training programs that incorporate proven methods for team management. Teamwork can be assessed during physician medical education, board certification, licensure, and continuing practice. Team members must possess specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs), such as the ability to exchange information, which enable individual team members to coordinate. ASSESSING PHYSICIAN TEAMWORK: KSAs might be elicited and assessed across a physician's career, starting in medical school and continuing through licensure and board certification. Professional bodies should be responsible for the development of specific team knowledge and skill competencies and for promoting specific team attitude competencies. Tools are available to assess medical student, resident, and physician competence in these critical team KSAs. CHALLENGES AND COMPLEXITIES IN TEAM PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: For teamwork skills to be assessed and have credibility, team performance measures must be grounded in team theory, account for individual and team-level performance, capture team process and outcomes, adhere to standards for reliability and validity, and address real or perceived barriers to measurement.

Education, Medical↗
PubMed2005

Emergency preparedness for biological and chemical incidents: a survey of anesthesiology residency programs in the United States.

UNLABELLED: We surveyed health care professionals about their preparations to manage the clinical problems associated with patients exposed to hazardous substances, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Training for WMD is considered a key part of public health policy and preparedness. Although such events are rare, when they do occur, they can cause mass casualties. In many models of mass casualty management, anesthesiology personnel are responsible for treating patients immediately on arrival at the hospital. We studied the extent of training offered to anesthesiology personnel in the use of WMD protective gear and patient management in United States (US) anesthesiology residency programs. Information was obtained via an online survey to all program directors and chair persons of anesthesiology programs. We polled all of the 135 US anesthesiology programs of which 90 (67%) responded. Only 37% had any form of training, and many of them did not repeat training after initial sessions. Twenty-eight percent of programs east of the Mississippi River reported some form of training whereas only 17% of programs west of it reported training available. The majority of anesthesia residency programs in the US that responded to our survey provided little or no training in the management of patients exposed to WMD. IMPLICATIONS: In an attack involving weapons of mass destruction or toxic chemicals, anesthesiologists will provide care. Our survey of United States anesthesiology residency programs demonstrated that there is limited training of residents regarding the anesthetic management of patients injured by weapons of mass destruction. This has serious public health implications.

Anesthesiology↗
PubMed2004

Clarifying adverse drug events: a clinician's guide to terminology, documentation, and reporting.

Adverse drug events cause substantial morbidity and mortality, yet they remain underappreciated and misunderstood. The terminology to describe errors and patient harm associated with medications causes much confusion. This article uses the case study of a patient with multiple adverse drug events to clarify key terms, such as adverse event, adverse drug reaction, adverse drug event, medication error, and side effect. The case discussion illustrates clinical approaches to analyzing the causal connection between a suspect drug and an adverse event. Examples and rationale for meaningful documentation of adverse drug events are provided, along with an outline of the types of events that should be reported to regulatory agencies.

Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems↗
PubMed2004

Raised speed limits, speed spillover, case-fatality rates, and road deaths in Israel: a 5-year follow-up.

OBJECTIVES: We assessed the 5-year, nationwide impact on road deaths of the raise in the speed limit (November 1, 1993) on 3 major interurban highways in Israel from 90 to 100 kph. METHODS: We compared before-after trends in deaths as well as case fatality-an outcome independent of exposure (defined as vehicle-kilometers traveled). RESULTS: After the raise, speeds rose by 4.5%-9.1%. Over 5 years, there was a sustained increase in deaths (15%) and case fatality rates (38%) on all interurban roads. Corresponding increases in deaths (13%) and case fatality (24%) on urban roads indicated "speed spillover." CONCLUSIONS: Immediate increases in case fatality predicted and tracked the sustained increase in deaths from increased speeds of impact. Newtonian fourth power models predicted the effects of "small" increases in speed on large rises in case fatality rates. Countermeasures and congestion reduced the impact on deaths and case-fatality rates by more than half.

Accidents, Traffic↗
PubMed2003

Microsystems in health care: Part 6. Designing patient safety into the microsystem.

BACKGROUND: This article explores patient safety from a microsystems perspective and from an injury epidemiological perspective and shows how to embed safety into a microsystem's operations. MICROSYSTEMS PATIENT SAFETY SCENARIO: Allison, a 5-year-old preschooler with a history of "wheezy colds," and her mother interacted with several microsystems as they navigated the health care system. At various points, the system failed to address Allison's needs. The Haddon matrix provides a useful framework for analyzing medical failures in patient safety, setting the stage for developing countermeasures. CASE STUDY: The case study shows the types of failures that can occur in complex medical care settings such as those associated with pediatric procedural sedation. Six patient safety principles, such as "design systems to identify, prevent, absorb, and mitigate errors," can be applied in a clinical setting. In response to this particular case, its subsequent analysis, and the application of microsystems thinking, the anesthesiology department of the Children's Hospital at Dartmouth developed the PainFree Program to provide optimal safety for sedated patients. CONCLUSION: Safety is a property of a microsystem and it can be achieved only through thoughtful and systematic application of a broad array of process, equipment, organization, supervision, training, simulation, and team-work changes.

Academic Medical Centers↗
PubMed2003

Creatine phosphate kinase elevations signaling muscle damage following exposures to anticholinesterases: 2 sentinel patients.

In this study, the authors describe 2 patients who experienced confirmed exposures to anticholinesterases that commenced in the 1970s. Subsequently, elevations in creatine phosphate kinase (CPK) were initially detected more than a decade following the first acute exposure. Beginning in the early 1980s, the patients suffered from progressive generalized muscle weakness, chronic fatigue, myopathy, neuropathy, and severe neurobehavioral impairments. Previous occupational exposures included pyridostigmine, as well as isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (percutaneous lethal dose [LD50] < 28 mg/kg body weight), and 1 patient had exposure to agricultural organophosphates. The authors hypothesize that the workers' CPK elevations, first detected more than a decade following acute exposures to anticholinesterases, were sentinel events for impending muscle damage and necrosis. Many Gulf War veterans with Gulf War disease who reported exposures to anticholinesterases 1 decade earlier currently suffer from vague neuromuscular and cognitive impairments. Therefore, medical programs for Gulf War veterans with Gulf War Syndrome should include surveillance for elevated CPK, abnormalities of neuromuscular conduction, and genetic susceptibility, and they should promote therapeutic trials for palliation.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

Patient safety and health policy: a history and review.

Policy initiatives on many fronts have converged to improve patient safety. A major tension that characterizes this process is the attempt to achieve a balance between learning and control in complex systems with technical, social, and organizational components. Efforts to improve learning are marked by better information flow, discovery, flexibility in thinking, embracing of failures as learning opportunities, and core incentives to promote voluntary participation of all stakeholders in the process. Efforts to improve accountability are traditionally marked by public disclosure, meeting of certain widely disseminated standards, availability of performance measures, exposure to legal liability, and compliance with mandated directives (statutes, regulations, accreditation requirements). In some sense, these directions are mutually exclusive. Although a more collaborative regulatory-improvement model would be helpful in creating an industrywide safety culture, it is likely that learning and accountability functions will follow separate tracks. An exception would be policy that stimulates organizations to comply with regulation by showing how well and by what methods they are learning and how others can profit from these experiences. Any approach to improving patient safety should, at a minimum, include a nonpunitive in-depth mechanism for reporting incidents, postincident evaluations for identification of system changes to prevent subsequent occurrences, and state-guaranteed legislative protection from discovery for all aspects of information gathered to improve patient safety. Nonpunitive approaches have yielded useful results in other industries [43]. State and federal courts, state licensing boards, and accrediting bodies such as JCAHO all function to maintain accountability and standards; however, the very fear of existing legal liability or its misapplication are the greatest hurdles to pioneering patient-safety efforts. The health care system needs to transform the existing culture of blame and punishment that suppresses information about errors and adverse events into a culture of safety that focuses on openness and information sharing to improve health care and prevent adverse outcomes. Education and leadership will be most important to creating and sustaining a strong safety culture and arguably the most important defense against preventable harms. Safety culture cannot be legislated, just as the old adage states that it is easier to pull rather than push a piece of spaghetti. Given the imbalances and inefficiencies of market forces in health care, perverse incentives that have strengthened resistance to change, and secrecy when it comes to adverse event information, however, it is likely that policy initiatives will continue to play an important role in the transformation of the industry to more highly reliable, safer levels of care.

Delivery of Health Care↗
PubMed2002

Creating effective leadership for improving patient safety.

Leadership has emerged as a key theme in the rapidly growing movement to improve patient safety. Leading an organization that is committed to providing safer care requires overcoming the common traps in thinking about error, such as blaming individuals, ignoring the underlying systems factors, and blaming the bureaucracy of the organization. Leaders must address the system issues that are at work within their organizations to allow individual and organizational learning to occur.

Health Care Coalitions↗