Biomedical subjects

Paul D Windschitl

Publications and source records attributed to Paul D Windschitl.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2007

The influence of outcome desirability on optimism.

People are often presumed to be vulnerable to a desirability bias, namely, a tendency to be overoptimistic about a future outcome as a result of their preferences or desires for that outcome. In this article, this form of wishful thinking is distinguished from the more general concepts of motivated reasoning and overoptimism, and the evidence for this bias is reviewed. The authors argue that despite the prevalence of the idea that desires bias optimism, the empirical evidence regarding this possibility is limited. The potential for desires to depress rather than enhance optimism is discussed, and the authors advocate for greater research attention to mediators of both types of effects. Nine possible mediational accounts are described, and critical issues for future research on the desirability bias are discussed.

Achievement↗

PubMed2004

Biases in social comparative judgments: the role of nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism effects.

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior.

Affect↗

PubMed2004

The dud-alternative effect in likelihood judgment.

The judged likelihood of a focal outcome should generally decrease as the list of alternative possibilities increases. For example, the likelihood that a runner will win a race goes down when 2 new entries are added to the field. However, 6 experiments demonstrate that the presence of implausible alternatives (duds) often increases the judged likelihood of a focal outcome. This dud-alternative effect was detected for judgments involving uncertainty about trivia facts and stochastic events. Nonnumeric likelihood measures and betting measures reliably detected the effect, but numeric likelihood measures did not. Time pressure increased the magnitude of the effect. The results were consistent with a contrast-effect account: The inclusion of duds increases the perceived strength of the evidence for the focal outcome, thereby affecting its judged likelihood.

Humans↗

PubMed2003

The influence of egocentrism and focalism on people's optimism in competitions: when what affects us equally affects me more.

Six experiments investigated people's optimism in competitions. The studies involved hypothetical and real competitions (course grades in Experiments 1 and 2, a trivia game in Experiments 3-5, and a poker game in Experiment 6) in which the presence of shared adversities and benefits (factors that would generally hinder or help the absolute performance of all competitors) was manipulated. Shared adversities tended to reduce people's subjective likelihoods of winning, whereas shared benefits tended to increase them. The findings suggest that when people judge their likelihood of winning, their assessments of their own strengths and weaknesses have greater impact than their assessments of their competitors' strengths and weaknesses. We identify egocentrism and focalism as two causes of the bias. The experiments revealed moderators of this bias, but also illustrated its robust nature across a variety of conditions.

Adult↗

PubMed2003

Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism: when what happens frequently is "more likely to happen to me".

Three studies investigated the role of nonmotivated egocentric processes in comparative optimism (and pessimism). According to an egocentric-processes account, when people judge their comparative likelihood of experiencing an event (e.g., "Compared to the average person, how likely are you to become wealthy?"), they consider their own chances of experiencing the event more so than the referent's chances. This should produce higher comparative estimates when an event's absolute frequency is high rather than low-a prediction supported in Study 1, which manipulated event frequency through a novel, time frame manipulation. Study 2 empirically distinguished egocentrism from a related focalism account. In Study 3, comparative estimates were related to the perceived frequency of events, independent of the events' perceived desirability and controllability. Path analyses provided additional support for egocentrism, and systematic cases of comparative pessimism were observed as predicted by the egocentric-processes account.

Ego↗

PubMed2002

Context and the interpretation of likelihood information: the role of intergroup comparisons on perceived vulnerability.

Four experiments investigated how people's perceptions about a group's (e.g., women's) vulnerability to a disease are influenced by information about the prevalence of the disease in a comparable group (e.g., men). Participants read symptom and prevalence infomation about fictitious diseases before answering questions regarding target group vulnerability. Participants used the prevalence rate for a nontarget group as an immediate comparison standard for intuitively interpreting the degree of vulnerability of a target group, resulting in robust contrast effects. Experiments 3 and 4 illustrated that these contrast effects can cause a person's intuitive perceptions about a group's vulnerability to selected diseases to conflict with his or her knowledge of the prevalence rates for the diseases. The results support a distinction between 2 components of psychological uncertainty-beliefs in objective probability and more intuitive perceptions of certainty.

Adult↗

PubMed2002

Likelihood judgment based on previously observed outcomes: the alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm.

Previous research has demonstrated that intuitive perceptions of certainty regarding a focal outcome are sensitive to variations in how evidence supporting nonfocal alternatives is distributed, even when such variations have no bearing on objective probability. We investigated this alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm in which participants made likelihood judgments on the basis of their memory for past observations of relevant outcomes. In Experiment 1, a manipulation of evidence (observed frequencies) across alternative outcomes influenced not only intuitive certainty estimates about a focal outcome but also numeric subjective probabilities. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that these effects were attributable to the influence of information loss on frequency estimations. The findings were consistent with the heuristic comparison account, which suggests that the judged likelihood of a focal outcome will be disproportionately influenced by the strength (frequency) of the strongest alternative outcome.

Humans↗