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Peter D Taylor

Publications and source records attributed to Peter D Taylor.

8 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

The evolutionary consequences of plasticity in host-pathogen interactions.

Interactions between individuals such as hosts and pathogens are often characterized by substantial phenotypic plasticity. Pathogens sometimes alter their exploitation strategies in response to defensive strategies adopted by their host and vice versa. Nevertheless, most game-theoretic models developed to explain the evolution of pathogen and host characteristics assume that no such plasticity occurs. Allowing for phenotypic plasticity in these models is difficult because one must focus on the evolution of pathogen and host reaction norms, and then allow for the potentially indefinite reciprocal changes in pathogen and host behaviour that occur during an infection as a result of their interacting reaction norms. Here, we begin to address these issues for a simple host-pathogen system in which the pathogen exhibits a level of virulence and the host exhibits a level of immune clearance. We find, quite generally, that plasticity promotes the evolution of higher levels of cooperation, in this case leading to reduced levels of both virulence and clearance.

Biological Evolution↗
PubMed2005

Sex allocation and dispersal in a heterogeneous two-patch environment.

We investigate the evolution of sex allocation and dispersal in a two-habitat environment using a game theoretic analysis. One habitat is of better quality than the other and increased habitat quality influences the competitive ability of offspring in a sex-specific manner. Unlike previous work, we allow incomplete mixing of the population during mating. We discuss three special cases involving the evolution of sex allocation under fixed levels of dispersal between habitats. In these special cases, stable sex-allocation behaviors can be both biased and unbiased. When sex-allocation behavior and dispersal rates co-evolve we identify two basic outcomes. First-when sex-specific differences in the consequences of spatial heterogeneity are large-we predict the evolution of biased sex-allocation behavior in both habitats, with dispersal by males in one direction and dispersal by females in the other direction. Second-when sex-specific differences are small-unbiased sex-allocation is predicted with no dispersal between habitats.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Modelling information exchange in worker-queen conflict over sex allocation.

We investigate the conflict between queen and worker over sex allocation, specifically the allocation of the queen's eggs between workers and reproductives and the allocation of the reproductive eggs between male and female. In contrast to previous models, we allow workers to observe and use information about the strategy of the queen. We consider three conflict models: simultaneous (no information exchange), sequential (a one-way information exchange) and negotiated (an iterated two-way information exchange). We find that the first model produces sex ratios intermediate between the classic queen (1:1) and worker (1:3) optima. The second model, in which the worker has information about the queen's decisions, produces a different result and one that is somewhat counter-intuitive in that the sex ratios are less female-biased than for the other two models, and in fact are often male-biased. The third model predicts sex ratios intermediate between the first two models. We discuss how these findings may shed new light on observed sex allocation patterns in social insects and we suggest some experimental tests.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

A kin-selection approach to the resolution of sex-ratio conflict between mates.

We investigate an instance of conflict between mates over the sex ratio of their brood. We construct a kin-selection model for the evolution of the sex ratio assuming local resource competition (LRC) among females. We explore two basic scenarios: (a) the case where parents make simultaneous sex-ratio decisions (the simultaneous allocation model); and (b) the case where parental sex-ratio decisions occur one after the other (the sequential allocation model). In the simultaneous investment model, resolution of the conflict between mates depends on the extent to which relative paternal contribution influences the brood sex ratio. In the sequential allocation model, fathers determine primary sex-ratio through fertilization bias; then mothers modify the paternal sex-ratio decision by adjusting the level of investment of some resource that contributes to offspring survival. Under the sequential model, a compromise is always achieved; however this compromise favours one perspective or the other, depending on the extent to which maternal investment influences offspring survival.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Fitness and evolutionary stability in game theoretic models of finite populations.

We investigate two methods of measuring fitness in evolutionary games played among members of a finite population. Classical notions of stability account for the action of selection only, and use immediate reproductive gains as a measure of fitness. This classical interpretation of fitness is what we call reproductive fitness (RF), and is found in the early studies of evolutionary stability in finite populations. More recent work has incorporated the influence of random genetic drift by applying fixation probability (FP) as a measure of fitness. When defined in this way, fitness represents a measure of ultimate evolutionary success. Our main result describes an equivalence between candidate evolutionarily stable strategies under both the RF and FP interpretations of fitness. We apply this result to matrix games in which the use of mixed strategies is permitted, and find here an equivalence between the RF and FP conditions for evolutionary stability.

Biological Evolution↗
PubMed2004

Stability in negotiation games and the emergence of cooperation.

Consider a two-player game in which each player contributes a costly resource to the common good of the pair. For such contests, the Nash equilibrium contribution, x*, is one for which neither player can increase its pay-off by unilaterally altering its contribution from x*. We study an elaboration of this game, which allows the players to exchange x-offers back and forth in a negotiation phase until they converge to a final pair of contributions, x1 and x2. A significant feature of such negotiation games, hitherto unrecognized, is the existence of a set of neutrally stable equilibrium points in negotiation phase space. To explore the long-term evolutionary outcome of such games, we simulate populations containing various mixtures of negotiation strategies and, contrary to previous results, we often find convergence to a contribution that is more cooperative than the Nash equilibrium. Mathematical analysis suggests why this might be happening, and provides a novel and robust explanation for cooperation, that negotiation can facilitate the evolution of cooperative behaviour.

Biological Evolution↗