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Biomedical subjects

R A Zilinskas

Publications and source records attributed to R A Zilinskas.

9 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed1998

Verifying compliance to the biological and toxin weapons convention.

There are difficult technical problems inherent in verifying compliance to the Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention (BWC) that are making it difficult to reach international agreement on a verification protocol. A compliance regime will most likely involve the formation of an Organization for the Prevention of Biological Warfare (OPBW). Based in part on the experience of UNSCOM in Iraq, this article considers the value of establishing an OPBW and the problems that would be faced by such an international organization. It also reviews the types of verification measures that might be applied by the OPBW and their limitations and benefits for deterring biological weapons programs.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed1997

Iraq's biological weapons. The past as future?

Between 1985 and April 1991, Iraq developed anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin for biological warfare; 200 bombs and 25 ballistic missiles laden with biological agents were deployed by the time Operation Desert Storm occurred. Although cause for concern, if used during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's biological warfare arsenal probably would have been militarily ineffective for 3 reasons: (1) it was small; (2) payload dispersal mechanisms were inefficient; and (3) coalition forces dominated the theater of war (ie, they had overwhelming air superiority and had crippled Iraq's command and control capability). Despite the Gulf War defeat, the Iraqi biological warfare threat has not been extinguished. Saddam Hussein remains in power, and his desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction continues unabated. In this context, the international community must be firm in its enforcement of United Nations resolutions designed to deter Iraq from reacquiring biological warfare capability and must take steps to develop a multidisciplinary approach to limiting future development of weapons of mass destruction.

Aflatoxins↗
PubMed1989

Biotechnology and the Third World: the missing link between research and applications.

A United Nations University study investigated the activities of four major United Nations agencies that focussed on helping developing countries gain advanced capabilities in biotechnology. Relevant program and project documents were scrutinized at agency headquarters and managers were interviewed. Then, projects underway in three case countries (Egypt, Thailand, and Venezuela) were examined. The resulting information was used to assess whether United Nations projects were fulfilling these countries' needs and (or) advancing their capabilities in biotechnology. The minute, United Nations originated assistance available was directed solely at increasing capabilities in research and thus benefited bioscientists and their institutes. However, as virtually no linkage exists between the research establishment and the industrial--marketing sector, results from indigenous research does not reach industrialists or health workers. Consequently, biotechnology is neither advancing economic development in the case countries nor helping solve national problems. This situation is likely to persist because corrective systemic changes will be difficult to implement. Major implications of these findings are discussed, particularly as they bear on the United Nations system.

Academies and Institutes↗